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Abstract
This dissertation has three independent chapters. The first chapter investigates how the environmental
liability of lenders affects debtors' behavior. I use U.S. Census Bureau micro-data and the passage of the
Lender Liability Act as a novel identification strategy to answer this question. Firms increase on-site
pollution, cut investment in abatement technology, and incur 17.54% more environmental regulatory
violations when secured lenders become less responsible for the cleanup cost of their collateral. The
effects are stronger for firms close to bankruptcy or with high environmental risks. This lower
environmental compliance slightly benefits employment, but does not change wages or production.
Overall, financial constraints that may be alleviated due to reduced lender liability do not result in pollution
mitigation investment or increased production; instead, my findings suggest that reduced lender liability
lessens banks’ incentives to influence the practices of their debtors.
The second chapter studies how Private Equity (PE) firms affect firms' environmental outcomes in the oil
and gas industry. On average PE ownership leads to a 70% reduction in the use of toxic chemicals and a
50% reduction in satellite-based measures of CO2 emissions. However, this average effect hides
significant heterogeneities. PE-backed firms increase pollution in locations and periods where
environmental liability risk is low, as shown by a novel natural experiment that reduced these risks for
projects located on federal and Native American territories. Overall, high-powered incentives to maximize
shareholder value may benefit environmental outcomes when the risk of environmental regulation is high.
The third chapter is joint work with J. Anthony Cookson, Erik Gilje, Rawley Heimer. We study the effect of
personal wealth on entrepreneurial decisions using data on mineral payments from Texas shale drilling to
individuals throughout the United States. Large cash windfalls increase business formation by 0.8 to 2.1
percentage points, but do not affect transitions to self-employment. By contrast, cash windfalls
significantly extend self-employment spells, but do not affect the duration of business ownership. Our
findings help reconcile contrasting findings in prior work: liquidity constraints have different effects on
entrepreneurial activity that may depend on the entrepreneur’s motivations.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAY ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE
Aymeric Bellon
Erik P. Gilje
This dissertation has three independent chapters. The first chapter investigates how the
environmental liability of lenders affects debtors’ behavior. I use U.S. Census Bureau microdata and the passage of the Lender Liability Act as a novel identification strategy to answer
this question. Firms increase on-site pollution, cut investment in abatement technology,
and incur 17.54% more environmental regulatory violations when secured lenders become
less responsible for the cleanup cost of their collateral. The effects are stronger for firms
close to bankruptcy or with high environmental risks. This lower environmental compliance
slightly benefits employment, but does not change wages or production. Overall, financial
constraints that may be alleviated due to reduced lender liability do not result in pollution
mitigation investment or increased production; instead, my findings suggest that reduced
lender liability lessens banks’ incentives to influence the practices of their debtors.
The second chapter studies how Private Equity (PE) firms affect firms’ environmental outcomes in the oil and gas industry. On average PE ownership leads to a 70% reduction in the
use of toxic chemicals and a 50% reduction in satellite-based measures of CO2 emissions.
However, this average effect hides significant heterogeneities. PE-backed firms increase pollution in locations and periods where environmental liability risk is low, as shown by a
novel natural experiment that reduced these risks for projects located on federal and Native
American territories. Overall, high-powered incentives to maximize shareholder value may
benefit environmental outcomes when the risk of environmental regulation is high.
The third chapter is joint work with J. Anthony Cookson, Erik Gilje, Rawley Heimer. We
study the effect of personal wealth on entrepreneurial decisions using data on mineral pay-
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ments from Texas shale drilling to individuals throughout the United States. Large cash
windfalls increase business formation by 0.8 to 2.1 percentage points, but do not affect transitions to self-employment. By contrast, cash windfalls significantly extend self-employment
spells, but do not affect the duration of business ownership. Our findings help reconcile contrasting findings in prior work: liquidity constraints have different effects on entrepreneurial
activity that may depend on the entrepreneur’s motivations.
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CHAPTER 1
Fresh Start or Fresh Water: The Impact of Environmental
Lender Liability

1

1.1. Introduction
The traditional role of lenders is to provide capital to firms and ensure that loans are repaid
(Freixas and Rochet (2008)). However, a recent and popular view suggests that financial
intermediaries have a critical role in promoting better environmental practices.1 Should
lenders be responsible for correcting societies’ negative externalities, and if so, does it distort economic activity and employment? To be precise, lenders’ environmental responsibility
means that lenders incur a cost —lower deposits or fewer clients, legal liabilities or a utility cost to the bank’s owner— if their debtors implement non-sustainable environmental
practices. In this paper, I focus on one type of cost: the legal liability that lenders face if
their debtors pollute. Specifically, I investigate how the exposure of secured lenders to the
environmental damages attached to their debtors’ collateral affects corporate environmental
policies, production, and employment.
According to a financial constraint channel, the model of Pitchford (1995) shows that reducing environmental lender liability decreases the cost of capital and therefore leads to
additional investment in abatement activities that lower pollution levels. At the same time,
lower environmental lender liability lessens their incentives to monitor the environmental
compliance of their debtors’ collateral (Balkenborg (2001), Heyes (1996), Shavell (1997)),
thus leading to reduced investment in abatement activities and more pollution, supporting
an “influence channel.” Which of these two forces dominate and how they interact with
production choices is an empirical question.
This paper is the first empirical work to shed light on this question. To overcome the endogeneity of legal regimes to environmental outcomes and firms’ activities, I use a novel identification strategy relying on a federal law that overruled the opposite liability standards made
1

Recent works suggest that corporations have a role to take into account the wellbeing of other stakeholders (Bénabou and Tirole (2010), Hart and Zingales (2017)). Several examples in the popular press support
this idea for banks. For example, “Banks are demanding much stricter environmental criteria when financing
shipping companies” (Shipping industry faces ESG heat from lenders, Reuters, October 7, 2021). Moreover,
“The biggest U.S. banks are at risk of becoming regulators’ enforcement arm for climate matters and other
social issues” (Wall Street risks becoming regulators’ ’ESG police,’ analysts say, Bloomberg, October 26,
2021).
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by courts. Specifically, the Asset Conservation Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act (Lender Liability Act, henceforth) of 1996 clarified when and how collateralized
lenders can be subject to environmental liabilities under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). In the United States, environmental spills by bankrupt entities are handled by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
under CERCLA, which requires all responsible parties to pay for an environmental cleanup.
CERCLA liability is strict, unbounded, joint, and several,2 implying that one party with a
modest contribution to the environmental spill may be required to pay for the full cleanup,
representing $30 million on average in 1995 (Porter (1995)).3
Prior the Lender Liability Act of 1996, the 11th Circuit Court adjudicated in United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp (11th Cir. 1990) that any lender holding a security interest in a
facility with the capacity to influence the environmental practices of their debtors could be
held responsible for environmental cleanup costs. After the Lender Liability Act of 1996,
this “capacity-to-influence” test was explicitly suppressed; only collateralized lenders that
influence their debtors on a day-to-day basis were exposed to CERCLA liability. Therefore, I
compare facilities located in the 11th Circuit, where collateralized lenders were more exposed
to CERCLA liability, to other facilities in the United States in a difference-in-differences
specification around the Lender Liability Act of 1996.4
The empirical specifications are estimated using micro-data from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) matched to confidential US Census micro-datasets. This novel matching
of datasets provides detailed information at the year-facility-chemical level, such as the total
2

Unless it is established that apportionment is appropriate.
There is a lingering problem of contaminated areas in the United States. One US resident out
of six lives within three miles of a toxic site and is directly exposed to the negative health impacts of pollution. However, federal cleanup programs have decreased by 48% between 1999 and
2020, thus leading to fewer cleanup actions, which were on average divided by 5.9 in the same period
(Environment America Research and Policy Center (2021)). At the same time, the risks they pose to local
communities and environmental systems have grown higher because of climate change. Climate change
causes more severe and intense floods and hurricanes, increasing the risks of having both toxic chemicals
moving from contaminated sites to nearby communities and new environmental spills.
4
According to the principle of stare decisis, US courts follow the precedents set by other courts. Circuit
courts of Appeals have binding authority over their circuit, which implies that lower courts must follow the
interpretation they provide.
3
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amount of toxic releases, environmental violations, abatement investment, production and
stack-air emissions. It also serves as the most reliable source of information on employment,
payrolls, legal status, ownership structure between plants as well as establishment’s input
costs and quantity. This dataset allows me to both study a rich set of outcomes and improve
the identification strategy by including a large set of controls and fixed effects. In particular,
I account for industrial, chemical, and legal status time-trends as well as differential usages
of chemicals by plants if these usages remain constant during the time-period.
Using the novel natural experiment and dataset, I show that contrary to the theoretical
predictions of Pitchford (1995), environmental practices deteriorated in the treated group
compared to the control group after 1996. Specifically, for the average facility in my sample,
firms in the treated group, where lenders experienced a reduction in the environmental
liability of their collateral after 1996, increased on-site pollution by 13.7% and were 17.54%
more likely to incur at least one environmental violation compared to firms in the control
group.
Several tests show that a drop in production did not drive these deteriorated environmental
practices. I estimate a precise and statistically non-significant zero effect of environmental lender liability on two distinct production measures. Moreover, the magnitudes of the
baseline effects remain constant when I account flexibly for establishments’ input quantities and costs as well as real output. Next, I find evidence that process-related abatement
activities were reduced by 36.64%, providing direct evidence that treated firms decreased
their efforts to reduce pollution. Contrary to the view that a higher production scale would
have mechanically increased all types of pollution, I estimate a precise and statistically nonsignificant zero effect for pollution outcomes that were not regulated under CERCLA —such
as stack-air emissions— and therefore were not impacted by the reform.
Subsequently, I present cross-sectional tests5 supporting the view that the effects on pollution
outcomes were driven by lenders’ monitoring efforts, in accordance with the theoretical
5

I lack comprehensive and high quality data on firms’ credit with their banks or suppliers.
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predictions of Balkenborg (2001), Heyes (1996), and Shavell (1997). The effects on pollution
outcomes are stronger for firms with high initial leverage, consistent with the view that
lenders have greater bargaining power to impose more sustainable practices when firms
cannot rapidly substitute to other forms of financing. Supporting the view that lenders
monitor more closely their debtors that are more likely to file for bankruptcy, the increase
in pollution is higher for firms with a lower Z-score. Finally, the estimated reduction in
pollution is driven by firms with a higher environmental risk profile and by chemicals that
are highly toxic and whose releases are more likely to trigger a CERCLA cleanup action by
the EPA. Overall, these cross-sectional tests are consistent with the view that lenders focus
their costly monitoring efforts on the chemicals and firms that are the most exposed to EPA
cleanup actions under CERCLA.
I then quantify the incidence of this decreased environmental compliance on employment
and wages to provide a more precise picture of the benefits caused by the Lender Liability
Act. Understanding its impact on labor is part of an important controversial debate on
whether environmental regulation imposes costly job transitions for workers of regulated
firms.6 Consistent with a trade-off between protecting the environment and job creation,
firms that are less influenced by their secured lenders to adopt better environmental practices
experience an increase in employment of 2.08%, with no significant impact on wages. As
capital investment in pollution-reduction projects contracted and production remained the
same, the results support a substitution of labor at the expenses of capital following the
Lender Liability Act of 1996 for firms in the 11th Circuit.
The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences specification is that treated and
untreated firms would have evolved similarly in the absence of the legal change, conditional
on the fixed effects and time-varying controls. While this assumption cannot be directly
tested, I present several pieces of evidence suggesting that this assumption is likely to be
6
For examples of this debate of environmental regulation on job creation in the popular press, see for
instance “Biden’s Big Bet: Tackling Climate Change Will Create Jobs, Not Kill Them” (The New York Times,
July 2021), “Joe Biden’s climate-friendly energy revolution: What it will take to fight rising temperatures”
(The Economist, February 2021).

5

met empirically. Specifically, I plot a dynamic event study to show that the effects are
not driven by a pre-trend before 1996. Next, I run a placebo by showing that the effect
is close to zero and statistically insignificant for pollution not regulated under CERCLA
and therefore not affected by the shock. I then show that 12 variables defined at the state
level and capturing economic activity, tax systems, and government health did not evolve
differently after 1996 for the states in the treated group, thus ruling out an explanation that
the results are driven by a salient and concomitant state-level macroeconomic shock.
I run several robustness tests to ensure the validity of the results. Specifically, I report coefficients from 368 different regressions that explore all the possible combinations of controls
and fixed effects to transparently show how a specific set of controls affects the results, in
a way similar to the specification curves of Simonsohn et al. (2019) and Cookson (2018).
I then replicate the results with different measures of pollution and distinct approaches to
constructing the sample. Overall, the sensitivity analyses suggest that the results are not
driven by an arbitrary construction of a variable or the sample as a whole, nor do they rely
on the inclusion or exclusion of one or several specific controls.
Overall, the findings are consistent with the view that increasing secured lenders’ environmental liability aligns the incentives between lenders and local communities to minimize
both the probability of environmental toxic releases and the economic distortions on production caused by better environmental practices. It suggests, contrary to the conventional
view held by US regulators and practitioners,7 that secured lenders have the technology to
monitor and exploit their bargaining power over debtors to implement more environmentally
friendly practices while minimizing the economic distortions caused to production. While a
complete welfare analysis is outside the scope of this paper, the results are consistent with
the idea that stronger environmental lender liability promotes sustainable growth.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. It presents the first causal evidence
7

See for instance BMO Asset Management in the context of ESG engagement: “a hurdle for greater
activism among fixed-income investors is that bonds don’t give investors formal ownership rights as stocks
do” in UK Pushes Bond Investors to Take Up More Corporate Activism (Bloomberg, 11/24/2020)
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that collateralized lenders directly affect the environmental practices of their debtors and
that this influence is not driven by their effect on debtors’ investment decisions. One major
challenge is to differentiate the direct impact of lenders on pollution from their indirect
impact of lenders on pollution through their influence on debtors’ production choices. For
instance, a lender could influence its debtor to reduce production (e.g., after a covenant
violation; see Chava and Roberts (2008) and Ersahin et al. (2021a)) and stop producing a
type of good without any consideration of the environmental performance of the debtor, but
this decision would indirectly reduce pollution through the change in production induced
by the fact that this good is no longer produced. This paper addresses the challenge of
identifying the direct impact of lenders on pollution by exploiting a variation in the lender’s
expected cost of having a debtor with better environmental practices.
The literature on sustainable finance has focused exclusively on the role of shareholders in environmental engagement (Chu and Zhao (2019), Akey and Appel (2019),
Naaraayanan et al. (2019), Brandon et al. (2020), Bellon (2020), Krueger et al. (2020)).8
In contrast, this paper shows that lenders also engage with their debtors. While lenders do
not have any formal control rights, they can structure the set of debt contracts offered to
their clients to incentivize them to implement specific operational changes. In substance, this
paper shows that lenders are a driving force affecting environmental, social and governance
outcomes.
The second literature this paper contributes to concerns the role of collateral constraints.
This literature investigates how the ability to pledge collateral affects the level of production, employment, technology and business creation (Haselmann et al. (2010), Vig (2013),
Gilje et al. (2020), Mann (2018), Ersahin (2020), Aretz et al. (2020), Ersahin et al. (2021b),
Fonseca and Van Doornik (2021)). This paper suggests that legal aspects affecting the liquidation value of collateral –namely exposure to environmental liabilities– also impact the
8
Other factors include supply chains (Schiller (2018)), CEO preferences (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014),
Li et al. (2021)), financial constraints ( Bartram et al. (2021), Kim and Xu (2017), De Haas and Popov
(2019), Levine et al. (2019), Bartram et al. (2021)Cohn and Deryugina (2018), ) and competition
(Grinstein and Larkin (2020)).
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type of production; that is, whether production is made in a specific way, in our case using
more environmentally friendly practices or not.
This paper also augments the literature on limited liability. It presents the first empirical
evidence of lending theories on vicarious liability,9 studying environmental safety decisions
and production outcomes when a lender is responsible for the liability of another party.
This literature is mostly theoretical, with papers predicting either positive (Heyes (1996),
Shavell (1997)), negative (Pitchford (1995)), or ambiguous effects (Boyer and Laffont (1997),
Balkenborg (2001)) of increased liability on environmental safety. The closest empirical paper on vicarious liability is Akey and Appel (2020), which addresses how the exposure of
parent companies to the environmental liabilities of their subsidiaries shape their environmental and production outcomes. In contrast, my paper examines how collateralized lenders
(instead of parent companies) impact their debtors (instead of their subsidiaries) when their
environmental liability changes. Parent companies differ from lenders in several important
dimensions. Specifically, parent companies have formal control rights over their subsidiaries,
contrary to lenders. Lenders are more exposed to asymmetric information when they contract with their debtors, while parent companies have more information.
This paper relates to the literature on how environmental claims are treated in bankruptcy.
Environmental bond requirements are one way to ensure that some environmental liabilities
will be covered if a firm defaults. It affects firms’ investment decisions (Wittry (2021))
and industry dynamics (Boomhower (2019)). Relatedly, Ohlrogge (2020) reviews how the
dischargeability of RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) cleanup claims in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy affects environmental decision outcomes. However, I depart from
these papers in several ways. I study cleanups conducted by the EPA under the CERCLA
statutes instead of RCRA as in Ohlrogge (2020), or environmental bond requirements. The
dischargeability of environmental claims concerns all debt structures, while in my setting,
I am able to isolate the effect of collateralized debt. Finally, the non-dischargeability of
9

Naaraayanan and Nielsen (2021) study the role of vicarious liabilities in the context of board of directors.
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environmental cleanup claims is fundamentally different from environmental lender liability.
The reason is that the non-dischargeability of environmental cleanup claims in bankruptcy
implies that banks’ raw payoffs cannot be negative when assets are foreclosed upon, contrary
to CERCLA liability where the collateralized lender faces unbounded costs if found liable
for the cleanup cost.
Finally, this paper adds to the economic literature using administrative data to estimate the
distortions of US federal environmental regulation on employment. The papers by Walker
(2011, 2013) are most similar according to this dimension. In contrast, Walker studies the
impact on labor outcomes following the amendments of the Clean Air Act, while I study,
for the first time, the impact on labor outcomes of the 1996 amendment to CERCLA, which
regulates hazardous waste instead of air releases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 sorts the theories that
motivate the empirical analysis according to their predictions they give on the sign of the
relationship between pollution and environmental lender liability. Next, Section 1.3 exposes
the institutional framework and section describes the data and variables used. Section 1.5
shows the empirical specifications. Section 1.6 investigates the impact of lender liability
on pollution. Section 1.7 asks whether this impact on environmental practices is driven
by a change in production. Section 1.8 provides evidence of lender influence through crosssectional tests. Section 1.9 quantifies this lower environmental compliance induced by lenders
on labor outcomes. Section 1.10 performs several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness
of the findings. Finally, section 1.11 concludes.

1.2. Conceptual Framework
Both banking theories and theoretical models of vicarious liability —that is when one party
is responsible for another party’s liabilities— provide an ambiguous relationship between
pollution and environmental lender liability. In this section, I sort the theories that motivate
my empirical analysis according to their predictions regarding the sign of the relationship
between pollution and environmental lender liability.
9

1.2.1. Less environmental lender liability leads to more pollution
The starting point of the literature on lenders’ vicarious liability (Pitchford (1995),
Balkenborg (2001)) relies on three assumptions. First, lenders cannot write perfect contracts specifying to debtors which environmentally practices to adopt. As a result, lenders
incentivize debtors by writing contracts that depend on the occurence of an environmental accident. Second, environmental accidents lead to the bankruptcy of the firm. Third,
the lending market is competitive. Under these assumptions, higher environmental lender
liability increases the expected cost of providing funding, thus forcing lenders to ask for
more surplus. As a result, debtors’ net payoff is now reduced in the absence of an accident, but remains the same should an accident occur. The reason is that in the accident
state, the firm files for bankruptcy and its payoffs are always equal to zero. This mechanism
decreases the debtor’s incentive to exert environmental compliance effort. In equilibrium,
more environmental lender liability leads to more pollution.
A key component of Pitchford (1995) is that firms with a higher cost of capital have greater
incentives to decrease investment in abatement technology projects. As a result, the intuition
still hold in a world with unsecured debt or equity issuances, as long as secured debt is unique
in reducing debtors’ cost of capital. Secured debt has specific contractual properties that lead
to a lower cost of capital. Under the Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (henceforth,
UCC), secured debtholders have a security interest in an explicitly identifiable asset, that
they can seize if the borrower fails to repay their credit prior to bankruptcy. As such, secured
debt is more easily enforceable than a contractual right. Lender consent is required to sell,
move, transform, or reallocate an encumbered asset, protecting their security interest. These
unique contractual features of secured debt allow lenders to reduce their monitoring costs10
and make more credible threats,11 which discipline debtors and lower their costs of capital.
10

Lenders that focus on some specific physical assets instead of the entire company or its going concern face
reduced monitoring complexity (Jackson and Kronman (1978)). Moreover, secure debt solves coordination
frictions in monitoring tasks when a firm borrows from multiple lenders (Rajan and Winton (1995), Park
(2000)). The secured lender has an incentive to bear the full cost of monitoring because it reaps the full
reward of the monitoring effort, as the lender will be first to seize any assets it secured.
11
A rich literature in contract theory shows that lenders optimally punish debtors by seizing their collateral,
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1.2.2. Less environmental lender liability lowers pollution
If environmental liability for secured lenders makes the usage of secured debt too costly,
it could paradoxically increase firms’ debt capacity from unsecured debtors. Given the
priority rule, the expected value of unsecured debt is reduced once a debtor obtains secured
debt. Unsecured debtors often write negative pledge covenants to bar other debtholders
from encumbering firms’ assets (Bjerre (1998), Ivashina and Vallee (2020)). These negative
pledge covenants are enforceable only against the borrower and not against third parties
with a security interest that violates the covenant. Consequently, if debtholders cannot use
secured debt because of the exposure it creates to firms’ environmental cleanup costs, then
it makes firms’ commitment not to encumber their assets more credible, thus boosting their
pledgeable income.
If a lender has full bargaining power, then more lender liability leads to a greater safety
effort on the part of the debtor (Balkenborg (2001), Heyes (1996), Shavell (1997)). The
lender will induce more safety effort by lowering the cost of debt to the owner of the facility
when no environmental liability is to be paid. This action is possible because the lender’s
participation constraint is not binding. The result holds if the liability incurred or the
probability of an accident is not too large.
Contrary to the assumption of Pitchford (1995), an environmental spill of minimal impact
can happen without causing the firm to file for bankruptcy. Under this new assumption, a
lender can derive a contract to incentivize the debtor to improve its environmental practices
if two conditions are met (Lewis and Sappington (2001), Pitchford (2001)): first, it is not
possible for the debtor to hide a small environmental spills from the lender; second, the
debtor’s environmental effort has one dimension, which means that it is not possible to
reduce the probability of a small environmental spill without reducing the probability of
if they strategically default or do not exert effort to maximize profit. Borrowers anticipate the threat of
liquidation, which disciplines them, thus boosting their equilibrium pledgeable income. The mechanism
does not require debt to be secured, but higher liquidation value makes collateral repossession in case of
non-repayment less costly for the lenders, which decreases borrower financial constraints. Empirical works
support the view that bankruptcy payoffs affect the decision of agents to file for bankruptcy (Indarte (2020),
Yannelis (2016)).
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a significant environmental disaster (that causes the firm to file for bankruptcy). These
assumptions guarantee that small environmental spills are both observable and informative
regarding the probability of firms’ larger environmental accidents. As a result, the lender
will punish the debtor when such a small environmental spill occurs but rewards it if no
accident happens. Such a contract can reach the first-best allocation of pollution.
In practice, while contracts are far from perfect, lenders use more than just different statedependent surpluses to incentivize their debtors, as in Pitchford (1995). First, lenders can
use the debt maturity to discipline their debtors through the threat of not rolling over their
debt (Myers (1977)). Second, lenders use covenants, which allow them to monitor in a statecontingent manner and ensure that they benefit from additional information regarding any
intermediary spills. For instance, Choy et al. (2021) document that banks write covenants
stipulating that debtors carry out remedial actions, conduct environmental audits, and disclose environmental events.
It remains unclear whether these contractual tools are sufficient to ensure that enough
information is collected to provide lenders with enough bargaining power to incentivize
debtors to adopt more environmentally friendly practices. In the next section, I describe
the natural experiment that forms the basis of the empirical tests to distinguish between
the two opposing views.

1.3. Institutional Background
In this section, I present the natural experiment. Subsection 1.3.1 provides a broad overview
of the two main federal statutes that govern environmental regulation in the United States,
and subsections 1.3.2 to 1.3.4 detail the shocks used in the empirical analysis.
1.3.1. The Regulation of Pollution in the United States
In 1976, the US Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA). This regulation establishes a set of rules to handle how corporations in the United
States manage their hazardous waste. It regulates how hazardous waste should be trans-
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ported, treated and stored. The RCRA also increases the record-keeping and reporting
requirements of facilities handling hazardous waste. Congress directed the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) to enforce the set of RCRA’s rules, where their agents carried
out on-site inspections and prosecuted any environmental mismanagement. The RCRA has
been called the "cradle to grave" system, as it gives a comprehensive legal framework on
how to handle hazardous waste, from generation to disposal.
However, the RCRA does not provide any legal tools to undertake remedial actions against
toxic waste sites created before 1976 or address toxic releases from bankrupt entities. These
concerns grew particularly relevant at the end of the 1970s, with increasing media attention
and public awareness on these matters following the discovery of polluted sites at Love Canal
in Niagara Falls (New York) and the “Valley of the Drums” in Sheperdsville (Kentucky). To
address these issues, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, (CERCLA, also known as “Superfund”), which President
Carter signed on December 11, 1980.12
CERCLA provides several tools for the EPA to perform clean of contaminated sites and
seeks repayment from “Potentially Responsible Parties” (PRPs). The EPA can carry out
the cleanup and ask a PRP to reimburse the expenses. Alternately, the EPA can initiate
a court order or issue a unilateral order to compel a PRP to perform the cleanup. Finally,
the EPA can enter into a settlement under which one or several PRPs participate in the
cleanup.
As a central tenet, PRPs are liable for the cleanup costs of releasing of a hazardous substance. The principle that governs who is a PRP is that polluters should pay. Polluters
generally encompass four types of agents. the current owner and operator, the past owner
12

Whether the two main federal statutes —RCRA and CERCLA— that aim to prevent the release of
hazardous waste and contamination have achieved their goals is unclear. In the section A.1 in the online
appendix, I characterize this problem in the United States. In short, cleaning up contaminated areas is
costly, but federal financing has dropped in the last 20 years despite the many positive social benefits of
such actions. The future risks of contamination have increased through the influence of climate change,
urbanization, and greater local government indebtness.
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and operators of the site, the transporters, and the generator that “arranged for disposal or
treatment” of the substances at the site. Current owners or operators can also be liable for
the environmental liabilities of their past owners, even if they are not directly responsible
for the environmental damage. The reason for such a responsibility is to avoid regulatory
loopholes that would enable an owner to escape their liabilities by transferring all their
current assets to a newly created company.
The liability that CERCLA imposes on PRPs is strict, joint, several and retroactive, as
construed by courts and accepted by Congress in the 1986 amendments to CERCLA. Strict
liability implies that a PRP is responsible even if it complies with all existing environmental
regulations, such as the RCRA, which stipulates how hazardous waste should be handled,
stored and treated. Joint and several liabilities mean that a PRP that has contributed
minimally to a chemical spill can be responsible for the totality of the cleanup13 . CERCLA
liability is retroactive in the sense that any hazardous release of a toxic substance before
1980 is exposed to CERCLA liability.
There is no limit on the potential liability imposed by CERCLA, despite the high cost of
remedial actions. For example, the average cleanup cost in 1995 amounted to approximately
$25 to $30 million (Porter (1995)). CERCLA can impose other types of costs, such as
punitive damages, in case an order is issued and the PRP does not comply. These punitive
damages are capped at $50 million.
The EPA has limited resources and faces a large number of contaminated sites in the United
States. Consequently, it carries out remedial actions at sites that present the most significant
human and environmental damage risks. These sites are recorded in the National Priorities
List (NPL). In April 2021, there were 1,374 sites on this list, with an average score of 43.5.
Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows each location. The process made by EPA to detect,
assess, and decide how to include a site is described in appendix EPAr esponse.
13

Unless it is established that apportionment is appropriate. See for instance United States v. A&F
Materials Co. (S.D. I11. 1984)
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1.3.2. The initial secured creditor exemption
The 1980 statute of CERCLA is vague and imprecise14 on whether secured lenders are
excluded from environmental liabilities. The statute excludes “a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.” Secured lenders that hold an indicia of
ownership cannot be considered as an owner or operator and are subject to environmental
liabilities if they do not participate in management activities, which is known as the “secured lender exemption.” Several interpretations on the meaning of “participating in the
management” have been given by courts.
One of the first court cases to provide an interpretation of the secured lender exemption is
United States v. Mirabile (E.D. Pa. Sept 4, 1985). Given the importance of this District
Court judgment, I expose the facts, the procedural history and the court’s rationale for
its decision in the online appendix section A.3. In summary, the court found that secured
lenders were not responsible for the environmental cleanup costs as long as they did not
interact with the day-to-day production aspects of a business. The day-to-day production
aspects of a business include “the participation in operational, production or waste disposal
activities” and differ from the financial aspects of a business, such as providing financial
advice to a company. The ability to influence and participate indirectly in the financial
management of the company was not sufficient to find a secured lender liable.
Several courts adopted a standard close to the Mirabile case before 1996. Figure 1.2 shows
the states where courts adjudicated that some actual participation in the day-to-day aspects
of a business was necessary for a secured lender liable to be liable for the cleanup cost of
their collateral. In Hill v. East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal), the Court of Appeals
did not develop an interpretation of what constitutes “actual participation in management”.
However, it highlighted that “whatever the precise parameters of ’participation,’ there must
be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the
14

“The statutory definition of owner or operator, however, provides courts with little guidance in determining who may be liable as an owner or operator” Madden (1990)
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exception,” thus rejoining the interpretation of Mirabile.
1.3.3. Fleet Factors and “capacity to influence”
A radically different interpretation of the secured creditor exemption in US environmental
law that I exploit in the identification strategy is the “capacity to influence” test decided
in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp (11th Cir. 1990). Given the importance of this
judgment, section A.4 of the online appendix contains a case study of the court ruling,
where I explore the facts, the procedural history and the court’s rationale for the decision.
Notably, the Court of Appeals for 11th Circuit stipulated that any lender that has the ability
to influence the management team is liable for the cleanup cost in case of environmental contamination by hazardous waste. Actual participation in the activity of the debtor was not
required for a lender to be found liable, contrary to Mirabile. Secured creditors were responsible if they “could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it [they] so chose.” Lenders
usually influence how corporations operate their facilities through the use of covenants and
on-site inspections, to ensure that the value of their collateral is protected. The judgment
implies that such monitoring activities would expose lenders to environmental liability “by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to
influence the corporation’s treatment of hazardous wastes.” This new understanding represented a major shift in the way lenders could be held responsible: “the court enunciated a
radical new standard for determining lender liability under CERCLA” (Madden (1990)).
Part of the reason why the decision was such a “radical new standard” is that the appeal
was held by a quorum of the appellate court panel. Judge Robert S. Vance was a member
of the panel but passed away on December 16, 1989. One of the judges was a senior US
district judge sitting by designation. As a result, only one member of the ruling committee
was a regular judge from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Following Fleet Factors, the EPA issued a lender liability rule to limit the extent of CERCLA
liability (57 Fed.Reg. 18,344 (April 29, 1992)). As soon as the rule was issued, states and
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chemical manufacturers’ associations filed a petition to review it. The rule was vacated in
Kelley v. EPA (D.C. Cir.) on the grounds that the EPA has no authority to adjudicate the
extent of CERCLA liability and that this right is given only to courts.15
According to the principle of stare decisis, courts in the US follow the precedents set by other
courts. Circuit court of Appeals have binding authority over their circuit, which implies that
lower courts must follow the interpretation they provide. Moreover, almost all circuits have
adopted the “law of the circuit,” which implies that a judgment made by a circuit court
is binding for the subsequent circuits judgments. Therefore, lenders were facing different
environmental liability risks according to the location of a plant before 1996.
1.3.4. The 1996 federal law
Congress clarified the scope of CERCLA liabilities for secured lenders in the Asset Conservation Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act (Lender Liability Act, henceforth) of 1996. The statute was passed on September 30, 1996, but was first introduced in
February 1995. The federal statute brought important clarifications on what it means to
“participate in management,” which was initially included in the 1980 version of CERCLA
and later interpreted by courts.
The statute explicitly removed the interpretation given by Fleet Factors that a secured
lender can be held liable if they have the ability to influence its debtors, as “participate
in management [...] (ii) does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the
unexercised right to control, vessel or facility operations.” Financial and administrative
function were explicitly defined to make clear the distinction from environmental compliance
activities: “The term ‘financial or administrative function’ includes a function such as that
of a credit manager, accounts payable officer, accounts receivable officer, personnel manager,
comptroller, or chief financial officer, or a similar function.”
Moreover, the amendment clarifies what actions can lead to CERCLA liabilities for lenders.
15
The case was handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
which is the main appelate court for administrative law and therefore "decided the fate of the EPA [rule]"
(Harkins Jr (1993)).
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If a lender has a secured claim against a vessel or a facility, then the lender will be considered
as participating in management if the entity:
(I) exercises decision making control over the environmental compliance related
to the vessel or facility, such that the person has undertaken responsibility for
the hazardous substance handling or disposal practices related to the vessel or
facility; or
(II) exercises control at a level comparable to that of a manager of the vessel or
facility, such that the person has assumed or manifested responsibility.
Overall, a lender is responsible as soon as it takes part in any day-to-day activities of a
facility, that are unrelated to financial or administrative functions, but include environmental
compliance activities.
The amendment also lists the activities that do not lead to CERCLA liability for lenders
and constitute a “safe harbor.” 16 Broadly speaking, the tasks can be delineated into two
main aspects. They include activities necessary for lenders to ensure that the collateral
value is preserved, such as (1) including in the loan an environmental covenant or warranty;
(2) physically inspecting or monitoring a facility; and (3) providing advice or requiring the
borrower to prevent a release or address a threat of releases. Moreover, lenders are exempt
from CERCLA liabilities if they make decisions related to the life-cycle of the loan, such as
16

“(38) “participate in management” (...) (B) does not include— (i) performing an act or failing to act
prior to the time at which a security interest is created in a vessel or facility; (ii) holding a security interest
or abandoning or releasing a security interest; (iii) including in the terms of an extension of credit, or in a
contract or security agreement relating to the extension, a covenant, warranty, or other term or condition
that relates to environmental compliance; (iv) monitoring or enforcing the terms and conditions of the
extension of credit or security interest; (v) monitoring or undertaking one or more inspections of the vessel
or facility; (vi) requiring a removal action or other lawful means of addressing a discharge or substantial
threat of a discharge of oil in connection with the vessel or facility prior to, during, or on the expiration
of the term of the extension of credit; (vii) providing financial or other advice or counseling in an effort to
mitigate, prevent, or cure default or diminution in the value of the vessel or facility; (viii) restructuring,
renegotiating, or otherwise agreeing to alter the terms and conditions of the extension of credit or security
interest, exercising forbearance; (ix) exercising other remedies that may be available under applicable law
for the breach of a term or condition of the extension of credit or security agreement; or (x) conducting a
removal action under section 1321(c) of this title or under the direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed
under the National Contingency Plan, if such actions do not rise to the level of participating in management
under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and paragraph (26)(A)(vi);”
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(1) restructuring or renegotiating a credit agreement, (2) taking actions following a breach
of a secured loan agreement and (3) “holding a security interest or abandoning or releasing a
security interest.” The latter implies that the way the bank manages its portfolio of credits
has no impact on its exposure to environmental liabilities.
In 1997, the EPA issued a document explaining the Asset Conservation Lender Liability
and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 for lenders’ liabilities and provided additional
examples of the practices that trigger lenders’ liabilities.
Overall, the history of CERCLA provides a unique empirical setting to study the role environmental lender liability. The Lender Liability Act of 1996 had a more important impact
on facilities in the 11th circuit, which were more subject to environmental lender liability,
than facilities in other circuits. In the next section, I present the datasets that are used to
exploit this empirical setting.

1.4. Datasets, variables and descriptive statistics
1.4.1. Data sources and linkages
I exploit five main confidential datasets from the US Census Bureau, that I link together
using the establishment or firm identifiers. First, I use the Longitudinal Business Dataset
(LBD), which is a longitudinal database at the establishment level that tracks information
on annual payrolls, employment, and linkages of establishments for multi-unit firms across
years. It contains the population of firms with at least one employee in the United States
(Chow et al. (2021)). The LBD is built from administrative survey data and information
transmitted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The LBD does not contain the establishments’ names and addresses. I collect this information using the Business Register (BR).
Second, I exploit the Census of Manufactures (CMF), which collects detailed information
on establishments’ quantity of inputs, costs and the real output among the population of
manufacturing firms. This mandatory survey, which exposes firms to fines if they misreport,
is conducted every year that ends by in the number 7 or 2 (e.g. 1992, 1997). Third, I rely on
the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). This data source is similar to the CMF, except
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that the information is collected for years that do not end in 7 or 2 and it contains a fraction
of the total manufacturing establishments. Specifically, all establishments with more than
250 employees are included, while the remaining ones are sampled with a probability that
increases according to the number of employees. Fourth, I use the Compustat-SSEL bridge
developed by the Census Bureau to merge Compustat with the LBD.
I exploit four main datasets from the EPA, which I merge using their administrative identifiers or the chemical numbers. The first source of pollution comes from the toxic release
inventory (TRI). The database is constructed using the EPA Form R or Form A Certification Statement. The data are collected following Section 313 reporting requirements of
the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). It provides
administrative information on the hazardous releases and disposal made by facilities that are
either above 20,000 hours full-time equivalent employees, within a determined set of industries code or that employ certain chemicals above specific thresholds. The second dataset is
drawn from RCRA Corrective Action Enforcement database. The data on enforcement actions allow me to establish a picture of environmental compliance at the facility level, which
ultimately affects the probability and severity of hazardous releases. It includes, for instance,
whether the facility failed to train employees in hazardous waste management properly, has
open or leaking containers of hazardous waste or poor labeling of their hazardous waste,
such as an absence of hazardous waste manifests or determinations. The third dataset is the
EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), which contains information on chemical
toxicity for each CAS number reported in the TRI. The fourth and final dataset is the EPA’s
Pollution Prevention (P2) database, which provides information on firms’ production ratios
and abatement activities.
There is no existing linkage between the administrative identifiers of EPA databases and
the ones from the US Census Bureau. Therefore, I perform several fuzzy-matching steps
to connect the environmental datasets from the EPA to the BR from the Census Bureau,
which I describe in section A.5 in the online appendix. The algorithm exploits a notable
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advantage of the BR database: the ability to perform the match at the establishment level.
Specifically, the matching exploits the street name and establishment’s names; the physical
address number; the zip, county, and state codes; and the two-digit NAICS industry code
when this information is not missing. The accuracy of all final matches is manually verified.
I perform several data consistency checks of the final link table and dataset. I show that the
main measure of pollution from TRI correlates well with both measures of production size
from the ASM/CMF. Specifically, in Panel A of figure 1.3, I plot the binscatter between real
production (Panel A) and log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit . Each of the dots represents
the average of the two variables for each 5th percentile of real production. The binscatter
exhibits a strong linear and positive relationship between the two variables. This finding
demonstrates that the dataset used is able to replicate the stylized fact that a higher production scale leads to a mechanical increase in pollution. Panel B of figure 1.3 performs the
same exercise but with another proxy for production scale, namely the capital in structure
and building used by the facility.
Panel C of figure 1.3 shows the classical relationship between the probability of default
and pollution releases. Firms close to bankruptcy are more likely to increase pollution, a
classical result known as the judgment proof problem (Shavell (1986)). The reason is similar
to a risk-shifting mechanism: firms only fully benefit from additional pollution at time 0,
namely through reduced abatement costs, but bear part of the cost in the future, namely
higher litigation costs, because these costs are truncated to 0 if the firm files for bankruptcy.
Consistent with this mechanism, Panel C of figure 1.3 shows a negative relationship between
pollution and the Altman Z-score. Overall, these tests confirm the quality of the matched
links between the EPA and US Census Bureau datasets.
I perform two additional data consistency checks of the final link table. Participating in the
TRI implies that the firm met an employment threshold. I, therefore, verify whether this
employment threshold is met using information from the LBD. Next, I confirm that the exit
and entry patterns of facilities in the TRI are consistent with the exit and entry patterns
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from the LBD, supporting the quality of the link table.
I explain in the online appendix A.5.1 how I constructed the database and reports how I
merge the datasets step-by-step and the number of observations in each step. I clean the
raw files in a way that is consistent with previous works using US Census Bureau data or
the TRI. I verify that the results do not depend on the ways I clean the dataset.
1.4.2. Variable construction
The main measure of hazardous waste used in this paper is log(on-site CERCLA
pollution+1)cit , which is the log of the on-site pollution minus air pollution that does not
expose the facility to CERCLA liabilities, for facility i, in year t and for the toxic component
c. The reason I exclude air pollution is that this type of waste does not expose the owner
of the facility to CERCLA liability. To run a placebo, I construct a variable log(on-site
air pollution+1)cit that is the log of the on-site air pollution plus one. Figure 1.1 exposes
what on-site releases contain. According to EPA and previous academic studies (for instance
Akey and Appel (2020)), more on-site releases expose the owner to a higher probability of
an environmental spill. Therefore, this type of discharging pollution is the least preferred
one by EPA, as shown in the hierarchy of hazardous waste management (see figure A.1 in
the online appendix).
While the practice of adding one when taking the variable is used by almost all researchers
using the TRI, it could theoretically lead to biased estimates. Therefore, I construct three
additional transformations of this variable. I construct the variable 1(on-site CERCLA
pollution)cit , that is a dummy variable taking the value 100 if on-site CERCLA pollution is
strictly positive and zero otherwise. Next, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation,
which has been increasingly popular in empirical work (see for Burbidge et al. (1988)). It
is approximately equivalent to the natural logarithm but is well defined at zero. Finally, I
renormalize (on-site CERCLA pollution)cit by the total capital of the establishment.
I also use environmental variables that are not part of the TRI database. For example,
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1(Process-related abatement)cit , is a dummy that takes the value 100 if the establishment
invested in an abatement technology that changes the production process and zero otherwise.
Abatement activities that directly reduces the source of pollution during the production
process are considered by the EPA as the most reliable source of pollution reduction (see
figure A.1 in the online appendix). 1(RCRA environmental violation)it is a dummy variable
taking the value 100 if the establishment has at least one RCRA environmental violation
and zero otherwise. A firm with an RCRA environmental violation means that the firm has
not abided by all regulations that aim at minimizing the probability of an environmental
contamination. Finally, I use the EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System to construct
the variable toxicict , a dummy variable taking the value one if the chemical poses a threat
to human health and zero otherwise. A component is toxic if people exposed to it have
alterations in their biological system, such as the cardiovascular or dermal system, or if it
causes cancer.
Two distinct measures of production are available. First, I observe the variable Production
ratiocit , which is the ratio of the output at time t over the output at time t − 1 from which
the chemical is used. Second, I observe the variable log(Q) it , which is the logarithm of the
real output of the facility from the CMF/ASM.
I construct other firm-level variables from the US Census Bureau. Specifically, log(emp)it
and log(wage)it are respectively the logarithm of the number of employees and the total
payroll amount divided by the number of employees. For some tests, I include all the
inputs, some costs and the real output from the ASM/CMF defined at the establishment
level as controls.
I use Compustat to construct proxies for default and environmental liability risks as well as
firm-level controls. I investigate whether the effect is more substantial for a firm with higher
leverage or Z-score in 1995. Similarly, I test whether the effect is stronger for young firms,
as they are less likely to be exposed to environmental contamination, or for firms that report
more environmental liability. Specifically, I measure contingent environmental liability in
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the same way as Akey and Appel (2020), that is, by using the variable lo in Compustat. This
variable captures non-financial liability, including accrual for expected future environmental
costs. Finally, I construct firm-level controls using Compustat.
1.4.3. Descriptive statistics
There is a total of 3,400 establishments from 1,200 firms between 1992 and 1999. The treated
group is made of 250 establishments. Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the full
sample. The average facility in our sample is large: it employs 590.9 workers who are paid
on average $37,510 per year; it invests $44,770,000 in building and other structures, and
it generates $243,700,000 of real output per year. The average firm in the sample uses a
significant amount of debt but is not close to bankruptcy, as the leverage ratio is equal to
0.7439 and the average Z-score is 3.54. Moreover, the average firm has a Tobin’s Q of 1.719.
The average pollution generated is significant. For a given chemical, a firm generates 29,000
pounds of on-site waste per year. A bit less than one-third (10,500) is regulated under
CERCLA and the remainder is released through the air. Almost half of these chemicals
are toxic, as they cause cancer. A total of 5.7% of facilities in the sample report investing
in process-related abatement technology, and 11.9% of observations in the firm-year sample
have at least one environmental violation.

1.5. Empirical design
1.5.1. Empirical specifications
The baseline specification for chemical-level outcomes is in line with previous works that
use the TRI database. Namely, I estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS) the following
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equation:17
Ycit = CAS FEc × Facility FEi + CAS FEc × Year FEt + Legal status FEi × Year FEt
+NAICS FEi × Year FEt + Firm-level controlsit + Postt × Groupi + ϵcit
(1.1)

I also estimate triple difference-in-differences to perform cross-sectional tests, where I decompose the main effect according to a variable in 1995:
Ycit = CAS FEc × Facility FEi + CAS FEc × Year FEt + Legal status FEi × Year FEt
+NAICS FEi × Year FEt + Firm-level controlsit + Postt × Groupi + Postt × Crossi
+Postt × Crossi × Groupi + ϵcit
(1.2)

Some variables are available at the facility-year level. Therefore, for these outcomes, I
estimate instead a slightly different equation defined as follows:
Yit = Facility FEi + Legal status FEi × Year FEt + NAICS FEi × Year FEt
+Firm-level controlsit + Postt × Groupi + ϵcit

(1.3)

where Ycit is the outcome of interests defined at the chemical, year, and facility level. Similarly, Yit is the outcome defined at the facility-year level. I consider three chemical-level
outcomes: (1) 1(Process-related abatement)cit , (2) Production ratiocit , and (3) log(on-site
CERCLA pollution+1)cit . I consider the following facility-year level outcomes: log(emp)it ,
log(wages)it , log(Q)it and 1(RCRA environmental violation)it .
The specifications are estimated with many fixed effects. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect
17

A recent literature has shown econometric biases when using a difference-in-differences specification
with two-way fixed effects estimators with multiple treatments (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020),
Borusyak and Jaravel (2017)). This problem does not arise here, because the treatment takes place for one
specific group and time. Indeed, the empirical design used in this paper does not have a staggered structure,
where different groups receive different treatments at different times.
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that is defined at the CAS registry number level. It groups chemicals that are identical
under the same fixed effect. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed
effect, and NAICS FEi is a fixed effect at the two-digit NAICS code. Legal status FEi is a
fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the variable
lfo from the LBD. CAS FEc × Year FEt controls for any different trends that happen at
the component level. It captures time-varying aggregate technological and economic shocks
that affect the common usage of a chemical. SIC FEi × Year FEt captures any trend in the
usage of a component that is similar for an industry. CAS FEc × Facility FEi controls for
the fact that each facility could have a specific usage of a component that is constant over
time. Finally, Legal status FEi × Year FEt controls for any differential trend between firms
with different legal statuses.
Firm-level controlsit include 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level, which are
commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx,
capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the
net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity (ROE), the
tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms liability.18
The main coefficient of interest is the interaction Postt ×Groupi . Postt is a dummy that takes
the value one after 1996 and zero otherwise. Groupi is a dummy that takes the value one
for plants located in the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. The direct inclusion of Postt and
Groupi are omitted because they are absorbed respectively by Year FEt and Facility FEi . If
the treatment is conditionally exogenous, then the interaction term Postt ×Groupi measures
the causal impact of the Lender Liability Act of 1996 among plants in our treated group.
The treatment is at the Circuit level. Therefore, the standard errors are clustered at this
level as in Akey and Appel (2020). As shown in the robustness section, the results remain
similar with different levels of clustering and when the standard errors are computed using
18
For a small fraction of observations, some variables are missing. To obtain the same number of observations when the controls are included, I input the missing observation by the firm average. If this quantity
is missing, then I set the value equals to zero. I verify that the results are robust without the inclusion of
these controls.
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a bootstrapping approach or different clusterings at the firm or chemical-level.
In equation 1.2, I perform a triple difference-in-differences where I decompose the baseline
average treatment effect with another group Crossi . This allows me to investigate whether
the effect is stronger for firms with some specific characteristics, such as high initial leverage
or more environmental liability risks. Notice that the inclusion of Crossi , Postt , Crossi ×
Groupi are omitted, because they are strictly collinear with the fixed effects.
1.5.2. Common trend assumption: Contemporaneous shock?
One important hypothesis of the empirical design —that the treatment is conditionally
exogenous— can be expressed as the common trend assumption (Angrist and Pischke
(2008)). It means that the difference in outcomes between plants located in the 11th Circuit
and the others would have been the same before and after 1996 without the law change.
While this assumption is not directly testable, one way in which it could be violated is if a
major regional macroeconomic shock affected plants located in the 11th Circuit after 1996
but not plants outside of the 11th Circuit.
Table 1.1 shows that 12 variables defined at the state level do not generate a statistically
significant and economically meaningful difference between states in the 11th Circuit after
1996 and the others. Specifically, column (1) focuses on whether tax variables, namely state
corporate, income tax, sales tax, personal income tax, and property taxes predict the variable Postt × Groupi . Column (2) focuses on state-level employment and economic growth
variables (employment insurance (in level), the unemployment insurance rate, the unemployment insurance base wage, the state level gross domestic product, and the unemployment
rate), and column (3) replicates the exercise with state-level variables that capture the state
financial health, such as its total and general revenues, and the state budget balance. No
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% threshold, and the magnitudes are economically small. Columns (4) to (7) combine the variables in different ways, and the results
remain the same. Overall, this exercise supports the view that there is no salient state-level
macroeconomic shock that affected our treated group after 1996 differently than our control
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group.
1.5.3. Balance tests
Observationally equivalent control and treated groups before the treatment are not a necessary condition for identification in a difference-in-differences specification (Yagan (2015)),
but strengthens the credibility of an empirical design. Therefore, table 1.3 investigates how
the treated and control groups differ according to observable characteristics before 1994
(included), that is before the treatment happened. Two stylized facts emerged. First, consistent with the notion that firms in the 11th Circuit face more scrutiny by lenders, they
have lower pollution and better environmental compliance outcomes on average. Specifically, on-site CERCLA pollutioncit is two times greater for firms in the control group than
firms in the treated group, but the difference is not statistically significant. Firms in the
treated group invest more in abatement activities (1.59 percentage points more), and the
number of other liabilities (including environmental ones) is almost two times lower. The
differences are statistically significant. Interestingly, this cross-sectional pattern holds for
regulated pollution exclusively. In particular, firms have almost the same amount of air
pollution, is not regulated under CERCLA: 22,290 pounds for the treated group and 21,020
for the control group.
Second, firms in the treated and control groups have similar non-environmental outcomes
before the treatment. In particular, they have the same Tobin’s Q, ROE, ROA, capital
intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, tangibility ratio, leverage, and production ratio. This finding is consistent with the notion that the cross-sectional variation in
lender liability standards as adjudicated by Federal Circuit Courts is not driven by firms’
characteristics.

1.6. Impact of lenders’ liability on environmental and safety efforts
1.6.1. Dynamic event studies
I investigate whether there is a pre-trend before the shock between the treated and control
groups for the outcomes of interest using event studies.
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I start by plotting the raw average per year of both the treated and control groups with
respect to a reference year. That is, I take the raw averages of the dependent variable for
each year or group and then subtract the raw average in 1994 (the reference year). This
method implies that the plotted raw average is equal to 0 in 1994 for both the treated and
control groups. Doing so makes the reading of the figures easier and allows me to visually
inspect the existence of a pre-trend.
Panels A of figures 1.5 and 1.7 contain the normalized raw averages for the following pollution
measures: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit and 1(RCRA environmental violation)it . As
can be observed, all the confidence intervals overlap before 1995. Small changes can be
observed while the law was being voted on (between 1995 and 1996), and then a significant
change is observed after 1996, consistent with the view that the federal statute affected the
treated and control group differently.
Although the raw averages presented show indirect evidence of an absence of a pre-trend
and a sharp effect localized after the shock, these raw averages do not control for any type of
heterogeneity between the control and treatment groups. Therefore, I estimate the dynamic
event window of equation 1.1, that is, I replace the variable Postt × Groupi of equations 1.1
by
[j

P
̸= 1994j = 1992]1999 γj 1t=j ×Groupi . 1t=j is a dummy variable that takes the value one

if the year t is equal to j and zero otherwise. γj represents the conditional average difference
in the outcome variable Ycit for equation 1.1 between our treated and control groups during
year j with respect to 1994.
Panels B of figures 1.5 and 1.7 plot the estimated γj for the following measures of pollution:
log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit and 1(RCRA environmental violation)it . As can be
observed, there is no pre-trend before 1995. The effect grows stronger in 1996 and 1997,
when the law was passed and communication about it to the public ended. Overall, the
dynamic graphs suggest that the effect is not driven by the existence of a pre-trend and
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support the view that the effect took place when the law was passed.
1.6.2. Net effect and economic magnitudes
Panel A of Table 1.4 reports the results of equation 1.1 when the dependent variable is
log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit . There is a statistically significant increase in such
pollution for plants located in our treated group after 1996 compared to the other plants.
Column (1) reports the estimated coefficient of Postt × Groupi on abatement investment
when only the year and a chemical-facility fixed effect are included. Columns (2) to (4) add
CASc ×Yeart and a NAICSi ×Yeart fixed effect, firm level-controls and a Legal statusi ×Yeart
fixed effect. The coefficient is equivalent to 0.132 when all the controls and fixed effects are
included. This result means that the reform has increased on-site pollution by 13.2% in our
treated group (11th Circuit) compared to the other Circuits.
Panel B of Table 1.4 replicates the same exercise of estimating variations of equation 1.1,
except that the dependent variable is now equal to the 1(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit .
It captures an extensive margin of on-site CERCLA pollution. The coefficient is equivalent
to 2.105, which implies that facilities located in the 11th Circuit released 2.105 percentage
points more chemicals on-site. As on average, firms release 12% of their chemicals on-site,
this finding represents an increase of 17.54% for the average firm in the sample.
Finally, Table 1.5 reports the firm-level regression of equation 1.3 where the dependent
variable is 1(RCRA environmental violation)it , which takes the value 100 if the facility has
committed at least one RCRA violation. Specifically, column (1) reports the results of a
difference-in-differences specification where only a year and plant fixed effect are included.
Columns (2) and (3) add a NAICSi × Yeart fixed effect and a legal statusi × Yeart fixed
effect, respectively. Finally, column (4) includes firm-level controls in the regression. The
coefficient with all the fixed effects and controls is equal to 2.521, which means that after
the new statute of 1996, plants in the treated group are 2.521 percentage points more likely
to incur at least one environmental violation than those in the other states. Given that
the average rate of firms with at least one environmental violation is equal to 11.9%, this is
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equal to an increase representing 21.2% of the average rate of environmental violations.
1.6.3. Sensitivity analysis of the inclusion and exclusion of controls
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 rely on several assumptions regarding the specification choices, namely
how I include the controls and fixed effects. It is important to evaluate how sensitive the
results are to different combinations of controls. To evaluate this sensitivity comprehensively,
I adopt the approach suggested by Simonsohn et al. (2019) and plot the specification curves
of equation 1.1 for the environmental outcomes. This approach allows me to investigate the
range of estimates that can be obtained with the controls and examine whether they are
statistically significant.
The specification curve plots the results of 32 different regressions with different controls and
fixed effects when a plant-CAS fixed effect is included. I include a plant-CAS fixed effect
to make the specification consistent with the way the sample is constructed. Indeed, firms
do not report chemicals that they do not use. As a result, if a chemical is never reported,
then whether it is reported as a zero over the whole period or not is irrelevant because the
plant-CAS fixed effect absorbs these cases.
Figure 1.8 plots the specification curve for each environmental outcome. Specifically, Panel
A of figure 1.8 depicts 16 point estimates of the coefficient Postt × Groupi from equation
1.1 when the fixed effects and controls vary for the dependent variable log(on-site CERCLA
pollution+1)cit . All the coefficients are positive and statistically significant. They range
from 0.13 to 0.19, implying a reduction of 13% to 19% of on-site releases. Finally, Panel C
of figure 1.8 shows the specification curve when the dependent variable of equation 1.1 is
1(RCRA environmental violation)it . All the coefficients are statistically significant. They
are however negative when no time-trend control is included in the regression. When a time
trend is included, the coefficients are always positive and range from 2.52 to 2.77, implying an
increase of 21.17% to 23.27% in the sample baseline rate of RCRA environmental violations.
These exercises support the view that the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of
controls.
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Overall, this section shows that reducing the responsibility of lenders for the environmental
cleanup of their debtors under CERCLA negatively impacts the environmental practices of
their debtors, as firms increase their on-site releases both on the extensive and intensive
margins and incur more environmental violations.

1.7. Is the impact on environmental practices driven by a change in production?
The increase in pollution found in the previous section is consistent with two opposite views
that I distinguish here. The first interpretation is that these deteriorated environmental
practices are driven by increased production, which mechanically increases toxic releases.
The economic channel explaining such an effect is that protecting lenders from the environmental liability attached to their collateral makes lending less costly for lenders, which thus
reduces the cost of capital and increases credit. The second interpretation is that production is not affected, but lenders’ influence and monitoring of their debtors’ environmental
practices drops, because they are less incentivized to do so.
1.7.1. Impact on production
The first test replicates the specification of equation 1.1, where the dependent variable is
Production ratiocit , the production ratio collected by EPA data. The production ratio at
year t captures how much of the component c was used in year t with respect to year t − 1.
Panel A of Table 1.6 reports the results. When all the fixed effects and controls are included,
the relative impact of the Lender Liability Act of 1996 on the Production ratiocit is equal to
0.0178. This marginal effect is equivalent to 2.66% of the baseline production ratio in the
sample. The magnitudes are low and non-statistically significant, even at the 10% level.
I then use the confidence intervals to bound the maximum plausible impact of the treatment.
With a 95% confidence interval, one cannot reject that the coefficient is equal to .039 —at
most— in the baseline specification of equation 1.1. This result implies an increase in the
production ratio of at most 5.82%.
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In Panel A of figure 1.11, I explore the sensitivity of this result by plotting the coefficients
of 16 regressions that explore how the effects change when different sets of controls are
added. The coefficients are non-statistically significant for 14 regressions. The remaining
two specifications that predict a statistically significant result on production are of negative
sign, which is not consistent with an increase in production. When the coefficient is positive,
the point estimates range from .01 to .02, which implies an increase in the production ratio
from 1.49% to 2.98%.
I then replicate the exercise with another measure of production. Specifically, the second test
estimates a specification similar to equation 1.3, where the dependent variable is log(Q)it ,
that is, the log of the real production as found in the ASM/CMF surveys. Similar to the
result using the production ratio, there is no significant impact of environmental lender
liability on production for firms located in the 11th Circuit after 1996, as shown in Panel B
of Table 1.6. Specifically, the point estimate where the firm-level controls and the industry,
legal status time trends are included, is equal to -0.0183 and is not statistically significant.
I use the confidence intervals to bound the maximum plausible impact of the treatment.
With a 95% confidence interval, one cannot reject that the coefficient is at most equal to
.003 in the baseline specification of equation 1.3. This finding implies a marginal semielasticity of 0.3%.
In Panel B of figure 1.11, I evaluate the sensitivity of this result by plotting the coefficients of
16 regressions that explore how the effects change when different sets of controls are added.
When one does not account for any time-trend, the impact on production is positive and
statistically significant: the coefficient ranges from .09 to .1. However, the coefficients are
non-statistically significant for 14 regressions and the sign is negative when a time trend is
included in the regression.
Overall, these two tests reject the idea that the increase in pollution that we observe was
driven by a concomitant large surge in production, coming from reduced financial constraints.
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However, the absence of evidence of an effect is not evidence of an absence of an effect.
Therefore, I provide additional tests in the following subsections to better validate the idea
that a change in production scale does not drive the increase in pollution.
1.7.2. Controlling for production, input quantity and costs
The deterioration in environmental compliance could be entirely driven by these minimal
real effects on production, consistent with the view that credit was initially constrained when
lenders were responsible for the environmental cleanup costs of their debtors and contrary to
the disciplinary role of lenders. For some production functions, small increases in economic
activity could cause significant positive changes in pollution.
One way to measure whether the weakened environmental practices observed after 1996
in the 11th Circuit were fully driven by changes in production is to replicate the baseline
specifications of Table 1.4 and add controls for firms’ costs of production, input quantity
and real output that are not directly designed to reduce pollution, such as capital and labor
choices. If changes in production drive the efect entirely, then the controls will absorb the
effect and make the coefficient Postt × Groupi non-significant.
Table 1.7 reports the results when detailed production controls are added. I add the real
production of the facility, the quantity of capital and labor input, and the input costs. The
reason to do so is that they correlate heavily with total production. This addition increases
the precision of the controls in case the real production is measured with noise. Capital input
is proxied by two variables: (1) new and used machinery and equipment and (2) new and
used buildings and other added structures. The quantity of labor is captured by the number
of employees, their payrolls and the total number of hours worked. Finally, I capture the
cost of input through the cost of materials or the cost of electricity, fuels or heat. The results
remain statistically significant and economically meaningful when such controls are added.
Specifically, treated facilities increase their total on-site CERCLA pollution by 13.7% and
increase the releases of new chemicals (extensive margin) by two percentage points.
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The specification curves of figure 1.10 show how a particular set of real controls affect the
point estimates. I run a total of 128 regressions each time. I also add an interaction term between the quantity of output and costs to capture potential economies of scales. Moreover, I
add an interaction term of labor with capital, to account for a potential substitution or complementarity effect in total production between these two inputs. Overall, the estimates are
stable across all the specifications, rejecting the view that controlling for observable output
or labor-capital variables does not fully account for the baseline reduction in pollution.
1.7.3. Abatement activities
In this subsection I report direct evidence that lowered environmental efforts by treated firms
drove the reduction in pollution. To do so, I consider the impact on abatement activities.
I focus on process related activities, which consist of modifying how the product is made
to reduce pollution. For instance, firms can reuse chemicals or reduce the packaging or
the chemicals contained in their product. According to the EPA, as shown in the Waste
Management Hierarchy (see figure A.1 in the appendix), this approach to reducing pollution
is the most preferred one as it reduces pollution at the source.
Panel A of figure 1.6 contains the normalized raw averages per year of both the treated and
control groups with respect to 1994 for 1(Process-related abatement)cit . Panel B of figure
1.6 plots the dynamic event window of equation 1.1 for the same variable. Both figures show
that the effect is not driven by the existence of a pre-trend and support the view that the
effect took place when the law was passed.
Table 1.10 contains the regression results of equation 1.1 where the dependent variable is
equal to 1(Process-related abatement)cit . When all the controls and fixed effects are included, treated establishments reduced investment in process-related activities on average
by 2.917 percentage points. This decrease consists of a reduction of 36.64%, which is economically meaningful and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the result is
consistent with the view that firms reduced their environmental efforts when their secured
lenders were less responsible for the environmental cleanup costs of their collateral.
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1.7.4. Placebo regarding air pollution
If the baseline effects were driven by an increase in production scale or a strategic change in
the production mix, then all types of pollution should experience an increase in pollution.
In this subsection, I exploit the fact that air pollution is not regulated by CERCLA to
investigate whether the treatment caused a change in this variable.
Table 1.11 contains the regression results of equation 1.1 where the dependent variable is
equal to log(on-site air pollution+1)cit . The effects are not statistically significant, even at
the 10% threshold. The sign of the point estimate is negative and the economic magnitudes
are small. Specifically, the results imply a decrease in air pollution of 0.289%. This magnitude is small, compared to the 13.7% increase for on-site releases, which supports the view
that only regulated pollution under CERCLA was changed, alleviating any concern that a
change in production would have shifted all types of pollution.

Overall, all the different tests point to the interpretation that the weakening of environmental
practices is unlikely to be driven by a change in production scale at the facility level.

1.8. Variations in lenders’ monitoring and influence efforts
The results of the two previous sections do not support the idea that lending was cut after
the Lender Liability Act, as we do not observe a drop in economic activity that would have
automatically lessened pollution. Rather, they support the view that lenders decreased their
monitoring effort upon passage of the Lender Liability Act. In this section, I exploit crosssectional variations among firms to provide additional evidence on this channel. I first show
in subsection 1.8.1 that the effects on pollution were significantly stronger for firms that had
less bargaining power with their lenders. I then show in subsection 1.8.2 that the effects
were significantly higher for firms close to bankruptcy, consistent with the view that lenders
focused their costly monitoring efforts on firms with a higher probability of repossessing the
collateral. Finally, in subsection 1.8.3, I perform several tests showing that lenders focused
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their costly efforts on firms with higher environmental liability risks.
1.8.1. Impact for debt-dependent firms
As shown in the theoretical model of Balkenborg (2001), the marginal impact of an increase
in lender liability should be higher for firms with less bargaining power over their lenders. If
lenders have full bargaining power, they can reward borrowers that have sound environmental
practices by sharing some of the surpluses. Conversely, when lenders have no bargaining
power, they cannot reward their borrowers, as their participation constraints are saturated.
In general, I am not able to observe an exogenous measure of lenders’ bargaining power and
rely instead on one proxy. The proxy I use is the firm’s leverage, as observed in Compustat.
The idea is that firms with high leverage cannot completely switch away from debt and are
more exposed to their lenders’ actions. As a result, they are more dependent on their lenders
than firms with a low level of debt. Consistent with this idea, Gilje et al. (2020) show that
firms with high leverage are more likely to act inefficiently during the loan renegotiation
process with their banks to maximize the perceived value of their collaterals.
Table 1.12 reports the results of equation 1.2 and confirms that the effects are significantly
stronger for firms with high leverage. Specifically, this table reports the estimates of the
baseline specification where the dependent variable is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit .
High Leverage in 1995i is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the facility has a
leverage above the sample state-median leverage in 1995 and zero otherwise. The results of
the triple interaction are statistically significant at the 1% level and the economic magnitudes
are meaningful. On average, treated firms with high leverage have an additional 15.5%
increase in on-site releases than the treated firms with low leverage. Overall, the effects are
consistent with the view that firms with high leverage are more subject to monitoring by
their secured lenders, increasing pollution more when secured lenders have less incentive to
influence them.
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1.8.2. Impact for different levels of default risks
Lender monitoring is costly. As a result, it should be observed more when its benefit is
the highest, meaning for firms with a higher probability of undergoing a CERCLA action. CERCLA remedial actions are used for bankrupt firms, so the effects should be observed mainly for firms close to bankruptcy. The predictions of the previous subsection also
support this idea because firms with high leverage could be more financially constrained
(Gilje and Taillard (2015)), and firms that face financial constraints are more likely to file
for bankruptcy. However, in this subsection, I present additional and more direct tests of
this idea.
Firms that are close to filing for bankruptcy differ in many dimensions from firms with
robust financial health. For instance, firms in financial distress are more likely to lose their
key employees (Baghai et al. (2020)). With this caveat in mind, Table 1.14 compares firms
with different financial strengths using the specification of equation 1.2. Distress in 1995i
is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the establishment has a Z-score below the
state-median level in 1995 and zero otherwise. The results of the triple interaction are
statistically significant at the 1% level, and the economic magnitudes are meaningful. This
finding implies that the effect of less environmental lender liability on pollution outcomes
for establishments in the 11th Circuit is significantly stronger for firms that have a low
Z-score and are thus more likely to file for bankruptcy. On average, treated firms with a
high probability of filing for bankruptcy have an additional 14.1% increase in on-site releases
than the treated firms with a low probability of filing for bankruptcy.
Overall, these cross-sectional variations are consistent with the idea that lenders more closely
monitor firms with a greater likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.
1.8.3. Impact for firms with high environmental risks
Lenders’ influence is costly. As a result, it should be observed more among firms that benefit
the most from improved environmental practices. Moreover, it should also matter more for
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chemicals that are more likely to trigger an environmental response. In this subsection, I
run three different tests that all support this interpretation.
First, I test whether the effects are significantly stronger for firms that have more ongoing
environmental liabilities. I measure contingent environmental liability in the same way
as Akey and Appel (2020), that is, by using the variable lo in Compustat. This variable
captures non-financial liability, including accrual for expected future environmental costs. I
create the variable High LO in 1995i that takes the value one if the establishment has the
variable “lo” above the state-median level in 1995 and zero otherwise.
Panel A of Table 1.8.3 shows the results of the triple difference-in-differences. The point
estimate of the triple interaction is statistically significant at the 1% level and equal to
20%. This result means that establishments with high contingent environmental liability
have 20% more on-site pollution following the Lender Liability Act of 1996 compared to
establishments in the 11th Circuit Court that have lower contingent liability and facilities
that are not located in the 11th Circuit. The coefficient of the sign is robust across different
specifications. Overall, this is consistent with stronger lenders’ influence for firms that have
more ongoing environmental liabilities.
Second, I investigate how lower lender liability affects firms that are young compared to
older firms. This distinction is relevant, as older facilities are more likely to rely on obsolescent capital. Old facilities are more prone to leakages, as they have been eroded by past
production and time. They also have lower embedded technology that would make them less
prone to accidents, such as up-to-date safety equipment. As stated by Barclays in its first
“key considerations” to evaluate the environmental risks of a firm:19 “How long has the site
been used for this purpose? The contamination risk increases with time.” This statement is
consistent with the notion that younger firms have fewer environmental risks.
Table 1.16 shows the triple difference-in-differences according to firm age. Specifically, I
create a dummy variable Youngi that takes the value one if the firm has an age above the
19

Environmental and Social Risk Briefing (ESRB), Barclays, Version 6.0 March 2015, page 18
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median sample value of the state where the establishment is located and zero otherwise.
The age comes from the LBD. The coefficient Postt × Groupi is statistically significant at
the 1% level, and the economic magnitudes are close to the baseline estimates. However,
the sign of Postt × Groupi × Youngi is negative and equals -0.0905. The net effect for young
firms on pollution is still positive but is significantly lower than the effect for older firms.
This finding is consistent with the view that younger firms were less subject to the influence
of their lenders because they were facing fewer environmental liability risks.
Third, I test whether the effects are stronger for more toxic chemicals. EPA responses are
more robust for sites that pose higher environmental and public health threats. Sites that
exploit more toxic components are thus more likely to create more critical contamination,
with more serious damage to the local population and the environment.
Panel B of Table 1.8.3 lists the results of the triple difference-in-differences where the group
interaction is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the chemical causes cancer
and zero otherwise. The point estimate of the triple interaction is statistically significant
and equal to 0.169, which means that the increase in pollution is significantly stronger for
chemicals that cause higher environmental liability.
Overall, these three tests support the view that lenders are more likely to influence firms
with greater exposure to environmental risks and when the payoffs of reducing pollution are
higher.

1.9. Labor outcomes
In this section, I quantify the impact of this lower compliance on employment and wages
to provide a more precise picture of the benefits caused by the Lender Liability Act. Understanding its impact on labor is important. There is a lingering policy debate of whether
environmental regulation imposes costly job transitions for workers of regulated firms. Moreover, investors and lenders who commit to ESG principles often highlight the inherent complementarities between the environmental and social aspects, including paying workers a
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higher wage.
Panel A of Table 1.17 shows that employment slightly increased in the 11th Circuit compared
to the control group after 1996. Specifically, the coefficient is equal to 0.0208 when the
dependent variable is log(emp)i and all the controls are included, namely the facility, NAICS
year and legal status year fixed effects, as well as the time-varying controls from Compustat.
Such a coefficient implies a 2% increase in the number of employees. For a firm with 500
employees, the sample average, this increase is equivalent to 10 additional employees. Panel
A of figure 1.12 investigates the robustness of this relationship to the inclusion of different
controls. Overall, the relationship is always statistically significant at the 10% level. The
16 coefficients range from 1.74% to 3.3%, implying and increase of 8.7 to 16.5 additional
employees.
Panel B of Table 1.17 shows the impact on wages. The point estimate is economically
negligible, equivalent to a 0.508% decrease in the average annual payroll for the treated
facilities. Given the sample average wage, this is equivalent to a loss of $190.55 per year.
Although the point estimate remains stable, the statistical significance of the results depends
on the controls added. Specifically, as shown by the specification curve from Panel B of figure
1.12, 12 specifications give statistically significant results at the 10% level, which it is not
the case for the remaining four. Except when any time-trend fixed effect is included (two
coefficients among the 16), the coefficients are always negative and stable below zero.
Overall, the results support the view that there is a trade-off between environmental compliance and employment. This trade-off is consistent with previous work that has studied
environmental compliance in other empirical settings (Walker (2013, 2011)).
The reduction in employment does not stem from a lower production scale. Instead, the
results are consistent with a substitution effect caused by lenders’ influence. Specifically,
environmental compliance induced by banks led to lower employment levels and higher
capital investment in abatement projects, as these quantities reversed after 1996 when this
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environmental compliance was reduced. This result is consistent with the view that banks
optimally influence their debtors to adopt an abatement technology that is more capitalintensive, which is a rational response by banks, as this type of capital is pledgeable, can be
secured, and increases the value of the collateralized asset.

1.10. Sensitivity analysis
The results are robust to other definitions of pollution (subsection 1.10.1), when the control group is made up only of bordering states or excludes the bordering states (subsection
1.10.2), as well as to a shorter or longer time frame (subsection 1.10.3). The results still
hold when the regressions are estimated when the panel variables are collapsed into a pre
and post-average, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) or with different clustering approaches (subsection 1.10.4). Finally, the results are not driven by time-varying reporting
requirements or the enforcements of using chemicals (subsection 1.10.5).
1.10.1. Other measures of pollution
Previous papers that also use the TRI database (for instance Akey and Appel (2020, 2019);
Kim and Xu (2017)) apply the natural logarithm plus one to the measure of pollution releases. I also use this transformation in the paper. However, as on-site pollution can be equal
to zero, researchers add one to the original variable to correctly apply a logarithm transformation. Adding plus one to the dependent variable before taking the natural logarithm
changes the initial interpretation of a log-level regression as a semi-elasticity.
To verify that this transformation does not drive the results, I first apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which has been increasingly popular in empirical work (see for
instance Burbidge et al. (1988)). It is approximately equivalent to the natural logarithm but
is well defined at zero. Panel A of Table A.1 reports the results. The coefficient capturing
the causal impact of the Lender Liability Act is statistically significant and the economic
magnitudes are consistent with the baseline effect, predicting an increase in pollution of 14%.
Finally, Panel B of Table A.1 shows the results when the on-site releases are normalized by
the capital used by the plant. The results are consistent with the baseline effect and still
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predict an increase in pollution.
1.10.2. Adjacent circuits as a control group
The choice of the control group faces a trade-off between comparability and spillover effects.
If we compare two nearby plants, except that one is located in the 11th Circuit and the other
one is not, then the two plants are plausibly exposed to the same local economic shocks.
However, that there may be spillover effects, in the sense that the economic activity from
one plant could move to the other one following the treatment, as the transportation and
labor switching costs are low.
To maximize the level of comparability between plants, I first run the baseline specification
of equation 1.1 by selecting states from the 5th, 6th and 4th Circuits, which are all adjacent
to the 11th Circuit. Doing so increases the likelihood that regional economic shocks would
affect the treated and control group similarly. Table A.2 displays the estimated results,
which are consistent with the baseline results that use the entire sample.
To minimize possible spillover effects between plants, I run the baseline specification of
equation 1.1 by excluding states from the 5th, 6th and 4th Circuits in the control group.
This filtering translates to removing from the control group plants located in a Circuit
adjacent to the 11th Circuit (the treated group). Table A.3 reports the estimated results
for the main outcome variables. The effects are consistent with the baseline results that use
the whole sample.
1.10.3. Changes in the panel time frame
The choice of the sample time frame is subject to a trade-off between statistical power
and robustness. The longer the sample time frame, the higher the statistical power of the
estimator, as they rely on a large time dimension. However, this comes at the cost of
robustness, because it increases the likelihood of having a random and concomitant statelevel shock that would affect the treated and control groups differently.
I exploit different time horizons: 1993 to 1998 (Table A.4), then 1994 to 1997 (Table A.5)
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and 1995 to 1996 (Table A.6). The time horizon of 1995 and 1996 is highly restrictive, as it
compares pollution decisions for firms within the time the legislation was discussed (1995)
in Congress and passed (1996). Despite such a restriction, the results are always statistically
significant, both on the extensive and intensive margins.
1.10.4. Clustering and standard errors
The environmental compliance variables that are used are potentially highly serially correlated. Firms’ pollution decisions depend on many factors, some of which could be fixed for
several years. Even if these factors are strictly exogenous, they could create a bias in the way
standard errors are computed, as shown by Bertrand et al. (2004). This bias would lead to
inflated t-statistics, creating an over-rejection bias of the null hypothesis and more statistically significant results of our coefficient of interest, namely the interaction of Postt ×Groupi
.
As suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), one credible way to address this problem is to aggregate the data into a pre-treatment (before 1996) period and a post-treatment (after 1996)
period and then estimate the baseline model using this transformed dataset. Aggregating
the data in such a way removes the time-series dimension, which limits the time-series correlation problem. Column (1) of Table A.8 reports the results when such aggregation is made.
The economic magnitudes of this before and after comparison are slightlty higher than in
the baseline specification. Notably, the results remain statistically significant.
I then perform different ways of clustering and computing the standard errors. I first adopt
a bootstrapped approach to compute the standard errors. As the specifications include a
many fixed effects, which make the bootstrapped approach time-consuming, I take the first
difference of the before and after sample. These transformations of the sample allow me
to compute almost instantaneously an unbiased and asymptotically consistent estimator,
which makes the bootstrapped approach implementable. Column (2) of Table A.8 shows
the standard errors and point estimate without the bootstrapped approach, while column
(3) of Table A.8 reports the p-value of the significance of the coefficient of interests using the
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bootstrapped standard error. Finally, I cluster the standard errors at the firm level (column
(4) of Table A.8) and at the chemical level (column (5) of table A.8). The significance of
the results remains identical.
1.10.5. Changes in the coverage of chemicals reporting
The list of chemicals eligible establishments must report changes with time because of evolving needs of the public and EPA priorities as well as advances in innovation and information
technology. Enforcement and the ability to report also change with time. For instance, the
chemical component hydrogen sulfide was supposed to be added to the reporting list in 1995,
but some issues were raised in an administrative stay, so the chemical was not added to the
list that year.
Given this time-varying coverage in the number of chemicals, one concern could be that the
estimated causal effects rely more on the cross-sectional variation’s post-treatment rather
than on double differences pre and post-treatment. While having an effect estimated using only the cross-sectional variations is still consistent with the message of the paper, it
would rely on more identifying assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity than a
difference-in-differences specification does, where the comparison post and pre-treatment is
an important source of credibility.
I design a test to show that this is not a concern in the sample. Specifically, I drop all the
chemicals that were never reported before 1995 and re-run the baseline estimates. Table
A.7 shows the results, which are consistent with the baseline effects estimated using the full
sample, ruling out an explanation of the effect driven by an endogenous change in the list
of chemicals to be reported.

1.11. Conclusion
The US federal regulation heavily protects secured lenders from the cleanup costs attached
to their collateral since the Lender Liability Act of 1996. For instance, lenders are protected
from environmental liabilities if they ask their debtors to conduct an environmental audit,
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include an environmental covenant in the debt contract, or require their debtors to improve
their environmental practices (“safe harbors”). However, lenders are not incentivized to
perform these monitoring tasks because they bear no direct consequences of ignoring the
environmental aspects attached to their collateral in case of an accident. If the asset is
contaminated, the federal government will clean it up, and the secured lenders will sell
the repossessed asset at a higher price.20 This practice is akin to a significant implicit
subsidy. Proponents of this implicit subsidy have argued that, as modeled in Pitchford
(1995), reducing lenders’ liability decreases the cost of capital and incentivizes firms to
invest in pollution reduction-projects.
The first set of results of this paper shows that, contrary to the narrative that led to the
Lender Liability Act of 1996, protecting lenders from the environmental cleanup costs attached to their collateral can decrease their incentives to influence debtors to adopt better
environmental practices. Specifically, this paper develops an identification strategy that
compares establishments in the 11th Circuit—which were more exposed to environmental
lender liability because of a Circuit Court of Appeals decision—to other firms, both before
and after the Lender Liability Act of 1996 that overruled these court decisions. Using this
empirical design, the paper shows that the level of investment in process-related abatement
activities decreased by 36.64%, on-site pollution increased by 13.7% and firms faced 21.2%
more environmental violations when secured lenders were less exposed to the cleanup costs
of their collateral. The reduction was not driven by a change in production but was mostly
consistent with reduced influence from lenders, as this effect was driven by firms close to
bankruptcy, with high initial debt and facing more environmental liability risks.
The second set of results of this paper quantifies the incidence of this environmental compliance induced by lenders’ monitoring on firms’ real outcomes, using detailed and high-quality
data from the US Census Bureau. As measured by two different variables, firms’ production
remained the same for the treated group after the Lender Liability Act. It slightly benefited
20

Purchasers of an asset are liable for the full cleanup costs attached to their purchase, even if the environmental contamination took place before they became the owner of the asset.
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employment but not wages. This finding is consistent with a trade-off between employment
and environmental sustainability, which this paper quantifies in the context of this 1996
CERCLA amendment.
The findings should not be taken as a blanket endorsement for more substantial environmental lender liability. While protecting lenders from the environmental cleanup costs of
their collateral does not increase workers’ payroll on average, it slightly benefits employment
for the treated firms, thus reducing costly job transitions by increasing the total number of
available jobs. It is outside the scope of this paper to make a welfare claim and put a societal
weight on total employment versus environmental sustainability. However, confirming this
inherent trade-off in another empirical setting (Walker (2011, 2013)) is relevant, especially
for ESG investors and policymakers who aim to improve both environmental sustainability
(the “E” of ESG) and workers’ welfare (often representing the “S” of ESG).
An open question that is important to answer in any welfare analysis concerns the cost to
lenders of monitoring the environmental practices of their debtors. Secured lenders plausibly
monitor their debtors regarding the non-environmental operational aspects of their business
to ensure that their collateral value is preserved and that the firm avoids bankruptcy. The
marginal cost of monitoring the environmental practices, given that lenders already engage
in monitoring, could be low and the results of this paper indirectly support this statement. Indeed, it is likely that higher monitoring costs would result in higher capital costs.
Firms facing capital costs are more likely to cut production, fire workers, and reduced their
abatement investments. The fact that the paper does not find evidence of such an effect is
consistent with the view of strong complementarities between the environmental monitoring
tasks of lenders and their usual tasks of monitoring the collateral value and the repayment
capacity of debtors.
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Figure 1.1: Types of on-site Pollution
E. Injection well
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Note: This figure depicts the different ways of releasing on-site toxic pollutants that are
included in the measure log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit , the log of the on-site releases
minus air pollution plus one for chemical c, time t and facility i.
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Figure 1.2: Treated and Control Groups
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Note: This figure plots the courts that adjudicated the secured creditor exemption, either
according to the capacity to control test (11th Circuit, in green) or some notions of actual
controls (in red). The treated groups are plants located in the 11th Circuit, and the control
group is made up of all plants that are not located in the 11th Circuit.
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Figure 1.3: Validation of the Dataset (1/2)
Panel A: Real Production and Pollution
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Figure 1.4: Validation of the Dataset (2/2)
Panel C: Altman Z-score and Pollution
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Note: The goal of these figures is to investigate the quality of the matching, by replicating
the well-known relationships between firms’ production size and pollution as well as the
probability of bankruptcy and pollution. Specifically, Panel A plots the average level of
on-site CERCLA pollution (in log) for each 5th percentile of log(Q)it , the log of the real
production at the facility level. There is a monotonic relationship between production and
pollution, consistent with the idea that larger plants generate more waste. Panel B uses
another measure of facility’s scale, namely the capital invested in building and structure of
the facility. For each 5th percentile of this variable, it plots the average of on-site CERCLA
pollution (in log). Similarly, there is a positive relationship between pollution and facility
size. Finally, Panel C reports the relationship between the probability a firm will file for
bankruptcy, as proxied by the Altman Z-score, and the variable on-site CERCLA pollution
(in log). For each 5th percentile of the Z-score, the graph plots the average of on-site
CERCLA pollution (in log). Consistent with economic theory, firms that are more likely
to file for bankruptcy and thus have a lower Z-score are more likely to pollute. Estimates
have been rounded to four significant digits according to the disclosure avoidance practices
in place at the Census Bureau.

51

Figure 1.5: Effect on on-site Pollution
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Note: Both figures represent the dynamics of outcomes around the Lender Liability Act, which was introduced to Congress in 1995 and enacted in 1996. The figure of Panel A reports the sample average of
log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit per year for both the treatment and control groups. The averages are
taken with respect to their level in 1994 for each year for both the treated (in red) and control groups (in
black). Confidence intervals are constructed at the 5% level. Panel B reports the coefficients of an event
study difference-in-differences, where the dependent variable Ycit is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit .
Specifically, the estimated coefficients (γk ) of the following equation are reported:
Ycit =

CAS FEc × Facility FEi + CAS FEc × Year FEt + Legal status FEi × Year FEt
1999
P
+NAICS FEi × Year FEt + Firm-level controlsit +
γk .Yeartk × Groupi + ϵcit
k=1992
k̸=1994

where Yeartk is a dummy variable that takes the value one if t is equal to k and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical
fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi
is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect. The two-digit NAICS code is defined in
the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status
as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity,
cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the
return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability.
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Figure 1.6: Effect on Abatement Investment
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Note: Both figures represent the dynamics of outcomes around the Lender Liability Act, which was introduced to Congress in 1995 and enacted in 1996. The figure of Panel A reports the sample average of
1(Process-related abatement)cit per year for both the treatment and control groups. The averages are taken
with respect to their level in 1994 for each year for both the treated (in red) and control groups (in black).
Confidence intervals are constructed at the 5% level. Panel B reports the coefficients of an event study
difference-in-differences, where the dependent variable Ycit is 1(Process-related abatement)cit . Specifically,
the estimated coefficients (γk ) of the following equation are reported:
Ycit =

CAS FEc × Facility FEi + CAS FEc × Year FEt + Legal status FEi × Year FEt
1999
P
+NAICS FEi × Year FEt + Firm-level controlsit +
γk .Yeartk × Groupi + ϵcit
k=1992
k̸=1994

where Yeartk is a dummy variable that takes the value one if t is equal to k and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical
fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi
is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect. The two-digit NAICS code is defined in
the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status
as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity,
cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the
return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. The
dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999.
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Figure 1.7: Effect on Environmental Violations
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Note: Both figures represent the dynamics of outcomes around the Lender Liability Act, which was introduced to Congress in 1995 and enacted in 1996. The figure of Panel A reports the sample average of 1(RCRA
environmental violation)it for both the treatment and control groups. The averages are taken with respect
to their level in 1994 for each year for both the treated (in red) and control groups (in black). Confidence
intervals are constructed at the 5% level. Panel B reports the coefficients of an event study differencein-differences, where the dependent variable Ycit is 1(RCRA environmental violation)it . Specifically, the
estimated coefficients (γk ) of the following equation are reported:
Ycit =

Facility FEi + Year FEt + Legal status FEi × Year FEt
1999
P
+NAICS FEi × Year FEt + Firm-level controlsit +
γk .Yeartk × Groupi + ϵcit
k=1992
k̸=1994

where Yeartk is a dummy variable that takes the value one if t is equal to k and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical
fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi
is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect. The two-digit NAICS code is defined in
the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status
as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity,
cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the
return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. The
dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999.
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Figure 1.8: Specification Curves: Pollution Outcomes (1/2)
Panel A: on-site releases
Coefficients:
.2

.15

.1

.05

0
Controls:
Facility FE x CAS FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE x CAS FE

p-value < 0.01

p-value ≥ 0.01

Panel B: Abatement activities
Coefficients:
0

-1

-2

-3

-4
Controls:
Facility FE x CAS FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE x CAS FE

p-value < 0.01
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p-value ≥ 0.01

Figure 1.9: Specification Curves: Pollution Outcomes (2/2)
Panel C: Environmental violations
Coefficients:
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
Controls:
Facility FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE

p-value < 0.01

p-value ≥ 0.01

Note: The goal of these figures is to show how the coefficient of Postt × Groupi varies for changes in the
controls and fixed effects for the baseline specification of equation 1.1. Specifically, the figures of Panel
A, B and C report the coefficient of Postt × Groupi when the dependent variable is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit , 1(Process-related abatement)cit , and 1(RCRA environmental violation)it respectively.
CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year
fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together
firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the
firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the
net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s
Q, and total firms’ liability.

56

Figure 1.10: Specification Curves: Pollution Outcomes with Real Controls
Panel A: Abatement activities
Coefficients:
0
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-1.5
-2.25
-3

Controls:
Output x Costs
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Cost inputs
Capex
Labor costs
Total output

p-value < 0.01

p-value ≥ 0.01

Panel B: On-site releases
Coefficients:
2
1.5
1
.5

Controls:
Output x Costs
Labor x Capex
Inventory
Cost inputs
Capex
Labor costs
Total output

p-value < 0.01

p-value ≥ 0.01

Note: The goal of these figures is to show how the coefficient of Postt × Groupi varies for changes in
the controls and fixed effects for the baseline specification of equation 1.1 where additional controls
are included. Specifically, the figures of Panel A and B report the coefficient of Postt × Groupi when
the dependent variable is 1(Process-related abatement)cit , and 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit ,
respectively. Output represents the real output of the facility. Cost inputs includes as controls
the following variables: cost of fuels, cost of materials and parts, cost of resales, cost of contract
work, and cost of purchased electricity. Inventory includes the total value of shipments and workin-process inventory end. Labor costs regroups the total employment, the total worker hours and
earnings. Capex represents the capital expenditure on new and used buildings and other structures.
Labor is the total employment and is interacted with Capex .
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Figure 1.11: Specification Curves: Production Outcomes
Panel A: Production ratios
Coefficients:

.025
0
-.025
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-.075
-.1
Controls:
Facility FE x CAS FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE x CAS FE

p-value < 0.10

p-value ≥ 0.10

Panel B: Real output
Coefficients:
.1
.075
.05
.025
0
-.025
Controls:
Facility FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE

p-value < 0.01

p-value ≥ 0.01

Note: The goal of these figures is to show how the coefficient of Postt × Groupi varies for changes in the
controls and fixed effects for the baseline specification of equation 1.1. Specifically, the figures of Panel
A and B report the coefficient of Postt × Groupi when the dependent variable is Production ratiocit and
log(Q)it respectively. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level.
Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed
effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect
that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes
12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset,
the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE,
tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability.
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Figure 1.12: Specification Curves: Workers’ Outcomes
Panel A: Employment (log)
Coefficients:
.04

.03

.02

.01

0
Controls:
Facility FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE

p-value < 0.1

p-value ≥ 0.1

Panel B: Average annual payroll per employee (log)
Coefficients:
.12
.09
.06
.03
0

Controls:
Facility FE
Firm-level controls
Legal Status FE x Year FE
NAICS FE x Year FE
Year FE

p-value < 0.1

p-value ≥ 0.1

Note: The goal of these figures is to show how the coefficient of Postt × Groupi varies for changes in the
controls and fixed effects for the baseline specification of equation 1.1. Specifically, the figures of Panel A
and B report the coefficient of Postt × Groupi when the dependent variable is log(Emp)it (the log of the
total number of employees at the facility) and log(wages)it (the annual payroll of the facility divided by the
total number of employees at the facility) respectively. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined
at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and
NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset.
Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the
LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly
used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash
holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset
(ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability.
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Table 1.1: Prediction of The Shock with State Level Variables
Dependent variable: Treated group × Post 1996 (included)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Corporate income tax

-0.001
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.003)

Sales tax

-0.000
(0.003)

-0.002
(0.004)

-0.002
(0.003)

-0.003
(0.005)

Personal income tax

-0.006
(0.006)

-0.007
(0.006)

-0.006
(0.006)

-0.006
(0.005)

Property taxes (state)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Unemployment insurance

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Unemployment insurance rate

-0.024
(0.024)

-0.033
(0.029)

-0.026
(0.024)

-0.032
(0.029)

Unemployment insurance base wage

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Unemployment rate

-0.012
(0.013)

-0.010
(0.012)

-0.009
(0.011)

-0.010
(0.012)

Gross domestic product

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Total revenues (state)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

General revenues (state)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

State budget balance

0.043
(0.055)

-0.025
(0.043)

0.058
(0.061)

-0.009
(0.054)

459
0.026

459
0.065

459
0.079

Observations
R-squared

459
0.020

459
0.055

459
0.0070

459
0.074

Note: This table reports state-year level regressions to investigate whether our treated group
experienced potential state-level shock post 1996. It reports regressions where the dependent variable
takes one if the state is in the 11th Circuit after the year of 1996 (included) and zero otherwise.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample (1/2)
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Total releasescit
On-site releasescit
1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
On-site CERCLA pollutioncit
Toxiccit
1(Process-related abatement)cit
Air pollutioncit
IHS(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
Production ratiocit
Log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
Log(air pollution+1)cit
On-site CERCLA pollution per facility capitalcit
1(Environmental violation)it
Capital intensityit
Cash Flowit
Cash Holdingit
Cost of Capitalit
ROAit
ROEit
Tangibilityit
Tobin’s Qit
Leverageit
Employmentit
Wageit (thousand, $)
Z Scoreit
Capital (structure, thousand, $)it
Other liabilities (LO, thousand, $)it
Real Outputit (thousand, $)

33,150
29,000
12
10,500
0.467
5.62
18,500
0.7476
0.669
0.6719
3.497
0.6628
11.9
0.06388
0.09876
0.05419
6.055
0.04629
-0.5101
0.371
1.719
0.7439
590.9
37.51
3.54
44,770
606.9
243,700

562,000
547,000
32.5
389,100
0.498
23
381,100
2.344
0.793
2.155
4.228
63.7
32.4
0.03929
0.06952
0.07527
106.2
0.09525
54.59
0.1585
0.8519
1.825
1374
14,15
2.139
168,000
1,250
733,100

Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical
analysis. Estimates have been rounded to 4 significant digits according to the disclosure avoidance
practices in place at the Census Bureau.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics: Balance Test (2/2)

Variables

Group treated

Control group

Diff

P-value

Production ratiocit
Total releasescit
On-site CERCLA pollutioncit
1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
Toxiccit
1(Process-related abatement)cit
Air pollutioncit
Capital intensityit
Cash Flowit
Cash Holdingit
Cost of Capitalit
ROAit
ROEit
Tangibilityit
Tobin’s Qit
Leverageit
Other liabilities (LO)it

0.727
35,110
6,495
11.5
0.475
7.96
22,290
0.0455
0.0702
0.0456
4.974
0.0258
0.0078
0.3122
1.086
0.7477
855.8

0.74
36,890
12,650
11.6
0.466
6.37
21,020
0.0467
0.0698
0.0435
4.363
0.0249
-0.0011
0.3035
1.043
0.7243
1,469

0.0133
1,777
6,157
0.0511
-0.0094
-1.59∗∗
-1,272
0.0012
-0.0004
-0.0021
-0.611
-0.0009
-0.0089
-0.0087
-0.0434
-0.0234
613.2∗∗∗

0.192
0.8235
0.2613
0.975
0.238
0.0162
0.7458
0.6541
0.8554
0.3336
0.2785
0.4583
0.1667
0.6782
0.1357
0.8959
0.0003

Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main
analysis, for both the treated group (facilities in the 11th Circuit)
located in the 11th Circuit), before 1994 (included), that is when
introduced. Estimates have been rounded to four significant digits
disclosure guidelines.
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variables used in the empirical
and control group (facilities not
the Lender Liability Act is first
according to the Census Bureau

Table 1.4: Net Effect on Pollution Measures
Panel A: on-site pollution (continuous variable)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.149∗∗∗
(0.0122)

0.138∗∗∗
(0.0156)

0.136∗∗∗
(0.0166)

0.132∗∗∗
(0.0158)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

210,000
70.3
x
x

210,000
72.4
x

210,000
72.5
x

210,000
72.5
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Panel B: on-site pollution (discrete variable)
Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

2.084∗∗∗
(0.253)

2.160∗∗∗
(0.287)

2.132∗∗∗
(0.298)

2.105∗∗∗
(0.279)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

210,000
68.4
x
x

210,000
69.9
x

210,000
69.9
x

210,000
69.9
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Asset Conservation Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act was passed. The dependent variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit ,
the log of the on-site releases minus air pollution plus one for chemical c, time t and facility i. The dependent variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit a dummy variable that takes the value 100 if
the on-site releases (excluding air pollution) of chemical c, for facility i at time t are strictly positive and 0
otherwise. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999. Postt is a variable that takes
one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th
Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number
level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry
fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed
effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit
includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate
finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital,
total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, tobin’s Q and the total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been
rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.5: Effect on Environmental Violations
Dependent variable: 1(RCRA Environmental violation)it
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

2.772∗∗∗
(0.642)

2.584∗∗∗
(0.624)

2.581∗∗∗
(0.643)

2.521∗∗∗
(0.643)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi
Year FEt
NAICS FE FEc × Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Mean Dep. Var.

27,000
28.5
x
x

27,000
28.5
x

27,000
28.7
x

27,000
28.8
x

x

x
x

11.9

11.9

11.9

x
x
x
11.9

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable is 1(RCRA environmental violation)it , a dummy variable that takes the value one
if the establishment has an environmental RCRA violation and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the
establishment-year level. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise.
Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise.Year FEt
is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed
effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is
a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by in the LBD.
Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly
used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash
flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity,
the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’
liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four significant digits according to the
Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.6: Effect on Production
Panel A: Production (real output)
Dependent variable: log(Q)it
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

-0.0310∗∗
(0.0130)

-0,0198
(0.0127)

-0,0208
(0.0123)

-0.0183
(0.0109)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi
Year FEt
NAICS FEc × Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

22,500
95.3
x
x

22,500
95.4
x

22,500
95.4
x

22,500
95.5
x

x

x
x

x
x
x

Panel B: Production ratio
Dependent variable: Production ratiocit
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.00756
(0.0107)

0.0151
(0.0116)

0.0152
(0.0115)

0.0178
(0.0113)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

210,000
35.6
x
x

210,000
41.3
x

210,000
41.4
x

210,000
41.4
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Asset Conservation Lender Liability
and Deposit Insurance Protection Act was passed. The dataset is at the establishment-year level for
panel A and at the chemical-establishment-year level for panel B. They both go from 1992 to 1999.
The dependent variable of Panel A is log(Q)it , which is the log of the real production for facility i at
time t. The dependent variable of Panel B is the Production ratiocit of the component c for plant i at
time t . Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the
value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed
effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi
is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS
code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with
the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls
defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are
the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log
of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE,
tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded
to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.7: Baseline Effects with Real Controls (1/2)
Panel A: on-site pollution (continuous variable)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.152∗∗∗
(0.00909)

0.142∗∗∗
(0.0129)

0.140∗∗∗
(0.0130)

0.137∗∗∗
(0.0132)

Observations
R-squared
Input it , Input costs it and Output
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

183,000
70.5
x
x
x

183,000
72.7
x
x

183,000
72.8
x
x

183,000
72.8
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

it

Table 1.8: Baseline Effects with Real Controls (2/2)
Panel B: on-site pollution (discrete variable)
Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

1.965∗∗∗
(0.218)

2.065∗∗∗
(0.267)

2.044∗∗∗
(0.270)

2.016∗∗∗
(0.261)

Observations
R-squared
Input it , Input costs it and Output
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

183,000
69
x
x
x

183,000
70.5
x
x

183,000
70.5
x
x

183,000
70.5
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

it

66

Table 1.9: Baseline Effects with Real Controls (2/2)
Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Asset Conservation Lender Liability
and Deposit Insurance Protection Act was passed. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between
1992 and 1999. Inputit includes the following variables as controls: (1) new and used machinery and
equipment, (2) New and used buildings and other structures as well as (3) the number of employees
and (4) total hours worked. Input costit includes the annual employee payrolls, the cost of materials,
cost of resales, cost of contract work and the cost of electricity, fuels or heat. Outputit is the real
output of the facility. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise.
Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc
is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed
effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups
together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12
time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total
asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have
been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.10: Effect on Abatement Technology
Dependent variable: 1(Process-related abatement)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

-2.935∗∗∗
(0.231)

-3.001∗∗∗
(0.226)

-2.999∗∗∗
(0.222)

-2.917∗∗∗
(0.242)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Mean Dep. Var.

210,000
50.4
x
x

210,000
51.4
x

210,000
51.4
x

210,000
51.5
x

x
x

x
x
x

5.62

5.62

5.62

x
x
x
x
5,.62

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Asset Conservation Lender Liability
and Deposit Insurance Protection Act was passed. The dependent variable is 1(Process-related
abatement)cit , a dummy that takes the value 100 if the establishment invested in an abatement
technology that changes the production process and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the chemicalyear level between 1992 and 1999. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero
otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise.
CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a
year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based
upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that
groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes
12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate
finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of
capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA),
the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and
sample size have been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure
guidelines.
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Table 1.11: Placebo on Air Pollution
Dependent variable: log(air pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

-0.0306
(0.0529)

-0.0223
(0.0433)

-0.0291
(0.0409)

-0.0289
(0.0397)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

210,000
71.5
x
x

210,000
76.6
x

210,000
76.6
x

210,000
76.6
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable is log(on-site air pollution+1)cit , the log of air pollution plus one. The dataset
is at the chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996
(included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry
number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi
is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset.
Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined
by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital
intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income,
R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q,
and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four significant digits
according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.12: Role Of Creditors’ Bargaining Power and Default Risks (1/2)
Panel A: Effect according to high initial leverage
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi
Postt × Groupi × High Leverage in 1995i
Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

(3)

0.0877∗∗∗
(0.0217)
0.146∗∗∗
(0.00802)

0.0874∗∗∗
(0.0239)
0.144∗∗∗
(0.00781)

0.0760∗∗∗
(0.0232)
0.155∗∗∗
(0.0107)

170,000
73.9
x
x
x

170,000
73.9
x
x
x
x

170,000
74
x
x
x
x
x

Panel B: Effect according to high initial default probability
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi
Postt × Groupi × Distress in 1995i
Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

(3)

0.109∗∗∗

0.110∗∗∗

0.107∗∗∗
(0.0229)
0.141∗∗∗
(0.0222)

135,000
74.5
x
x
x

135,000
74.5
x
x
x
x

135,000
74.5
x
x
x
x
x

(0.0225)
0.164∗∗∗
(0.0177)
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(0.0225)
0.157∗∗∗
(0.0186)

Table 1.13: Role Of Creditors’ Bargaining Power and Default Risks (2/2)
Note: These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The dependent variable
is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit . Panel A studies the role of leverage and Panel B examines the role
of default risk. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999. High Leverage in 1995i
is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm has a leverage in 1995 that is above the median
sample value of the state where the establishment is located, and zero otherwise. High Leverage in 1995i
is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm has a leverage in 1995 that is above the median
sample value of the state where the establishment is located, and zero otherwise. Distress in 1995i is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm has a Z-score that is below the median sample value
of the state where the establishment is located, and zero otherwise. Postt is a variable that takes one after
1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit
and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level.
Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed
effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect
that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes
12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset,
the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE,
tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four
significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.

71

Table 1.14: Role of Environmental Liability Risk (1/2)
Panel A: Effect according to high initial other liabilities
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi
Postt × Groupi × High LO in 1995i
Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

(3)

0,0121
(0.0179)
0.218∗∗∗
(0.0114)

0,0197
(0.0178)
0.202∗∗∗
(0.0129)

0,0159
(0.0164)
0.202∗∗∗
(0.0121)

210,000
72.4
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x
x

Panel B: Effect for high toxic chemicals
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi
Postt × Groupi × Toxicc
Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

0.0574∗∗∗

(3)

(0.0149)
0.171∗∗∗
(0.0322)

0.0569∗∗

(0.0185)
0.168∗∗∗
(0.0319)

0.0524∗∗
(0.0171)
0.169∗∗∗
(0.0322)

210,000
72.4
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x
x
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Table 1.15: Role of Environmental Liability Risk (2/2)
Note: These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit . Panel A studies the role of contingent
environmental liability and Panel B examines the role of chemical toxicity. The dataset is at the
chemical-year level between 1992 and 1999. High LO in 1995i is a dummy variable that takes the
value one if the firm has a leverage in 1995 that is above the median sample value of the state
where the establishment is located, and zero otherwise. The variable lo captures variable captures
non-financial liability, including accrual for expected future environmental costs. Toxicc is a dummy
variable that takes the value one if the chemical is toxic according to the IRIS database and zero
otherwise. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a
chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed
effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups
together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12
time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total
asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have
been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.16: Role of Firms’ Age
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi
Postt × Groupi × Youngi
Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

(3)

0.151∗∗∗
(0.0158)
-0.103∗∗∗
(0.0183)

0.148∗∗∗
(0.0160)
-0.0903∗∗∗
(0.0232)

0.144∗∗∗
(0.0157)
-0.0905∗∗∗
(0.0240)

210,000
72.4
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x

210,000
72.5
x
x
x
x
x

Note: These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit . The dataset is at the chemical-year
level between 1992 and 1999. Youngi is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm
has an age that is above the median sample value of the state where the establishment is located,
and zero otherwise. The variable age comes from the LBD. Postt is a variable that takes one after
1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th
Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry
number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi
is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset.
Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined
by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital
intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income,
R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q,
and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four significant digits
according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table 1.17: Impact on Employment and Wage
Panel A: Employment
Dependent variable: log(emp)it
(1)
(2)
Postt × Groupi

0.0187∗
(0.00859)

Observations
27,000
R-squared
96
Facility FEi
x
Year FEt
x
NAICS FEc × Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Sample mean emp
590.9
Panel A: Payroll per employee

(3)

(4)

0.0222∗∗
(0.00831)

0.0226∗∗
(0.00898)

0.0208∗∗
(0.00873)

27,000
96.1
x

27,000
96.1
x

27,000
96.1
x

x

x
x

590.9

590.9

x
x
x
590.9

Dependent variable: Log(wages)it
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

-0.00699∗∗
(0.00263)

-0.00741∗∗
(0.00290)

-0.00612∗
(0.00322)

-0.00508
(0.00295)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi
Year FEt
NAICS FEc × Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Sample Mean Wages

27,000
83.2
x
x

27,000
83.3
x

27,000
83.4
x

27,000
83.4
x

x

x
x

37,510

37,510

37,510

x
x
x
37,510

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group)
and the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable of Panel A is log(emp)it where emp is the total number of employees in the LBD
and log(wages)it is the annual payroll divided by emp from the LBD. Postt is a variable that takes
one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within
the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed
effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in
the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal
status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the
firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales,
capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the
net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio,
Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four significant
digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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CHAPTER 2
Does Private Equity Ownership Make Firms Cleaner? The Role
Of Environmental Liability Risks
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2.1. Introduction
Whether PE ownership leads to more environmentally friendly policies is theoretically unclear and has been the subject of recent attention. In the United States, some members
of Congress and the Senate have expressed concern that “the private equity industry poses
significant threats to international environmental protections and efforts to combat global
climate change.” 1 At the core of these concerns is a characterizing feature of PE firms,
namely their strong incentives to maximize the profit of their acquisition. Indeed, general
partners are paid a fraction of the value of the company upon its sale, typically employ
a large amount of leverage in their deals, and closely monitor the CEOs of their portfolio
companies. As such, PE-backed firms could be incentivized to maximize profits by saving
the cost of reducing pollution, thus harming local communities. Similar behaviors, where
PE firms create value in a way that is detrimental to stakeholders, have been observed in
the health care (Gupta et al. (2020)) and education (Eaton et al. (2019)) sectors, where the
quality of services offered to consumers decreased following a PE buyout.
Despite these concerns, PE firms often present themselves as sustainable investors. The
Blackstone Group, for instance, prominently hails their commitment to people and the
planet, stating that “protecting the environment of the communities in which we operate
is critically important.” 2 This statement echoes a view advocated by both regulators and
practitioners that adopting environmentally friendly policies is consistent with shareholders’ interests, either as a way to implement non-pecuniary preferences or as a strategy to
maximize risk-adjusted firms’ returns. Conversely, non-PE-backed firms that face agency or
financial frictions may not find it optimal to adopt environmentally friendly policies. Such
frictions limit the investment in profitable abatement activities, such as energy efficiency
projects with a long payback period. PE ownership, therefore, could diminish these frictions, as observed by Bernstein et al. (2019) and Lerner et al. (2011), thus leading to more
1
Elizabeth Warren, Mark Pocan, Raúl M. Grijalva, Deb Haaland, Rashida Tlaib, Jesús G. “Chu” García,
and Sheldon Whitehouse (December 16, 2019).
2
See appendix B for additional citations of major PE firms.
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environmentally friendly policies.
To understand the role of PE ownership on pollution, this paper exploits novel highfrequency project-level data on environmental corporate policies from the oil and gas industry. Specifically, I look at two variables that give a novel picture of environmental
corporate policies. The first variable is whether firms release toxic chemicals. I measure this
by merging administrative data on the chemicals used in the production process for 139,809
US wells fracked between 2010 and 2019 with detailed information on the characteristics of
each well. The second variable is whether firms engage in “flaring,” which involves burning
the gas contained in oil wells to save the fixed cost of connecting the well to a pipeline or to
treat the gas (Elvidge et al. (2009)), remediations that cost several million dollars per well.
I measure this by building on advances in satellite remote sensing (Elvidge et al. (2013)) to
create and validate a database on whether firms practice flaring at the well level.
My analysis shows that PE ownership leads to a 70% reduction in the use of toxic chemicals
and a 50% reduction in flaring compared to non-PE backed firms. To test for pre-trends
and evaluate the immediacy of the effects, I present dynamic difference-in-differences event
study plots around 110 PE acquisitions in a specification that includes firm fixed effects
(FE), hyper-local area FE interacted with year FE, and a large set of well-level characteristics. This specification allows for a comparison of observationally equivalent projects
completed in the same year and in the same hyper-local area within firms. Making the level
of comparison at the hyper-local area is a notable advantage of my empirical setting, as it
controls for salient differences between projects from PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms.
For instance, projects that are near one another drill in the same rock formation, have the
same distance to pipelines and local chemical suppliers, and the same exposure to the local
population. All these variables drive the marginal cost and benefit of polluting and could
also affect the acquisition decision of PE firms. These unobserved variables are mitigated
by the geographical comparison at the hyper-local level.
What are the economic channels driving the effect? I hypothesize that PE ownership confers
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strong incentive to maximize shareholders value3 , which leads to less pollution, when environmental regulation is likely to increase in the future. There are at least two non-mutually
exclusive explanations for why abstaining from polluting is value maximizing where regulation risk is high in the context of the oil and gas industry. First, if regulation is more likely
in the future, there is a benefit to over-comply now if the cost function of abatement exhibits
dynamic increasing returns to scale, such as learning by doing effects. In the oil and gas
industry, there is much evidence of learning effects, which makes this channel likely4 . Second, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act imposes
liabilities to oil and gas firms in case of a contamination if chemicals are used. A profitmaximizing agent decreases environmental risks when this enforcement risk is expected to
become stronger in the future.
While this interpretation that PE-backed firms are more sensitive to environmental liability
risks is broadly consistent with the institutional context of the oil and gas industry and
provides a rational for the average reduction observed, I next exploit a natural experiment
that plausibly exogenously changes environmental liability risks to better validate this interpretation.
Specifically, I exploit a succession of legal and political shocks that blocked the ability of the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to regulate fracking on Native American reservations
and federal lands between 2016 and 2018. Fracking has been exempt from federal environmental statutes since 2005. But in 2015, under the Obama Administration, the BLM passed
a rule that would have imposed a comprehensive set of requirements aimed at curtailing
fracking activity. The ruling never went into effect because it was challenged in court and
3

A PE sponsor provides a form of ownership that better aligns the incentives of owners with the corporate
managers (Jensen (1989), Gompers et al. (2016), Morris and Phalippou (2020)). The use of greater debt
disciplines managers, and PE firms increase managerial incentives to maximize profit through performancebased pay or better management practices (Bloom et al. (2015)). General partners, on behalf of limited
partners, control the board of their portfolio companies and actively monitor them. Moreover, general
partners rarely have any personal connections with local communities that could interfere with pollution
decisions.
4
For instance, Kellogg (2011) shows that oil and gas firms gain learning experiences when working with
the same contractors, which increases joint productivity and Covert (2015) shows that passive learning is a
strong force in the fracking sector.
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blocked by a federal district court judge in Wyoming in 2016. The Trump administration
then rescinded the rule completely in 2017. However, in 2018, environmental activists and
the state of California challenged this decision, as the rescission was not economically motivated, contrary to the legal obligations of federal agencies. Therefore, between 2016 and
2018, the probability of having a new regulation in Native American reservations and federal
lands was low.
This natural experiment offers two main advantages. First, it plausibly removes the endogeneity of PE acquisition by saturating the specifications with a firm interacted with a year
fixed effect, which absorbs any unobserved and time-varying firm-level heterogeneity that
could jointly affect the decision of the firm to pollute and the acquisition decision of PE
firms. Second, the exogeneity assumption of the regulation shock to unobserved variables
affecting the cost of pollution is credible. The boundaries of Native American reservations
and federal lands were decided at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries and overlap shale basins in a quasi-random way, as horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing were not widely used until the beginning of the twenty-first century.
This quasi-random overlapping of shale boundaries and BLM areas is supported by the balance in characteristics before 2015 for projects around the borders of areas regulated by the
BLM.
Using this empirical design, I show that projects from PE-backed firms in areas that faced
lower regulation risks contained more toxic pollution than other projects from PE-backed
firms in areas with no changes to regulation risks. The relative increase in pollution following
the regulation shock is quantitatively large, equivalent to double the usage of pollution for
the average firm in the sample. This within-firm increase in pollution among PE-backed
firms is sufficient to slightly reverse the average reduction of PE ownership on pollution that
was documented during the whole period. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
this regulatory shock caused a net 30% increase in pollution in these areas between 2016 and
2018. However, this increase in pollution is highly localized for some specific areas and some
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specific time periods. This increase is not strong enough to reverse the average reduction in
pollution following a PE acquisition, observed during the whole sample and across all shale
basins. Thus, these results are consistent with the shareholder value maximization channel.
The result of this natural experiment does not support several alternative explanations. According to the technological upgrade channel, the reduction in pollution could be generated
by the adoption of a more productive technological process. More productive production
processes are also cleaner, as they are often new and require fewer inputs to produce the same
quantity (Shapiro and Walker (2018), Grinstein and Larkin (2020)). Further, private equity
firms improve the productivity of their target companies (Acharya et al. (2013), Davis et al.
(2014)). If the effect is fully driven by a technological upgrade channel, then we should
observe a reduction in pollution that is independent of changes in regulatory risks on Native
Americans and federal lands.
Similarly, the inverse relationship between environmental liability risks and PE-backed firms’
pollution decisions is not consistent with a reduction driven by a non-pecuniary channel.
If we view impact investing as a way to substitute for frictions that prevent governments
from implementing environmentally friendly regulations as in Bénabou and Tirole (2010),
then we should observe a decrease in pollution instead of an increase when regulatory risks
become less important.
A financial constraint channel cannot explain that the marginal impact of PE ownership on
pollution is a function of regulatory risks. PE firms reduce the financial constraint of their
portfolio companies (Boucly et al. (2011), Bernstein et al. (2019)). As such, they are deeppocket investors that typically have existing funds with undrawn capital (Gompers et al.
(2016)), and they are more likely to inject capital into their firms in case of financial distress
(Hotchkiss et al. (2014)). Moreover, in theory, their reputation increases the pledgeable
income of their portfolio companies (Malenko and Malenko (2015)). Financial constraint
affects pollution decisions, either because it makes the investment in abatement technology
more costly or because it makes survival less likely, creating an incentive for the firm to
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take more risks through greater pollution. According to this channel, we should observe
an increase in pollution among firms that are not PE-backed and thus more financially
constrained following lower environmental liability risks because financially constrained firms
have a higher marginal gain of polluting. However, this prediction is the inverse of the effect
we observe.
Returning to the shareholder value maximization channel, I then provide two stylized facts
that are consistent with this interpretation and bring indirect evidence in favor of the shareholder value maximization view of PE ownership. First, we do not observe a reduction in
pollution when the PE firm provides financing to a company without having the ability to
control the management team. To show this result, I rely on a type of PE deal that exists
only in the oil and gas industry: DrillCo contracts. This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to exploit and document this class of PE contracts. In such contracts, the PE firm
provides capital for projects in exchange for cash flow rights from a project. Interestingly
for my empirical design, the PE firm does not control the firm’s management in a DrillCo.
When comparing projects between firms with DrillCo contracts with their closest neighbors,
I show that firms do not reduce pollution when the PE sponsor has no ability to control
their portfolio companies – as when a DrillCo agreement is in place.
Second, I show that suppressing flaring has a high payback period; that is, not connecting
the well to a pipeline saves several million dollars when the project begins.5 However,
the loss in earnings is diffuse in time and difficult to detect for shareholders with limited
information. According to new data that I have collected from the Oil & Gas division of
the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, on average, half of the production of
gas that is flared is produced between the second and fifteenth year of the well. PE firms’
monitoring of the company reduces the agency frictions between managers and shareholders
5

Most of the costs to reduce flaring are paid at the beginning of the project. First, on-site facilities
and equipment, such as dehydrators and compressors need to be installed close to the well. According to
the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), such costs averaged $210,000 per well in the
Bakken. Then, the well needs to be connected to a pipeline, the pricing of which is a function of the distance
between the well and the pipeline and the diameter of the connecting facility. According to the INGAA, the
prices in 2017 range from $29,000 to $167,000 per mile for a diameter ranged between 2 and 22 inches.
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that lead to short-term actions (as modeled in Stein (1989) and Grenadier and Malenko
(2011)), creating greater long-term shareholder value.
This paper contributes to several literatures. One core question in sustainable finance is to
understand whether the adoption of better Environmental, Social, and Governance (henceforth, ESG) practices leads to higher firm profits or higher portfolio returns (Brest et al.
(2018), Zerbib (2019), Cole et al. (2020), Larcker and Watts (2020), Gibson et al. (2020),
Hartzmark and Sussman (2019), Pástor et al. (2020), Barber et al. (2021), Pastor et al.
(2021), Jeffers et al. (2021)). If sustainable corporate policies maximize firms’ expected
profits, then PE-backed firms should adopt them, given the strong incentives that general
partners have to increase firms’ pecuniary value. The reduction that we observe speaks in
favor of the idea that both social and financial expected returns can be improved simultaneously.
This paper complements survey-level evidence in understanding why financial investors engage with their portfolio companies on corporate environmental policies. Publicly listed
firms that have high ESG performance are less exposed to risks (Godfrey et al. (2009),
Oikonomou et al. (2012), Jo and Na (2012), Kim et al. (2014), Hoepner et al. (2018),
Ilhan et al. (2021), Albuquerque et al. (2019)). Krueger et al. (2020) show in a survey that
institutional investors report that managing environmental risks is the main reason they
engage with the firms they invest in. My paper complements this literature by focusing
on another class of investors, namely private equity firms, and shows that PE investors
negatively affect environmental outcomes when environmental regulation risk is low.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on the externalities of private equity
ownership. The channel I found in this paper offers a way to unify the a priori conflicting results of this literature. PE ownership benefits other stakeholders for tasks or industries with large liability risks that are highly regulated and has led to better outcomes in
other industries, including a reduction in food poisoning (Bernstein and Sheen (2016)) and
worker hazards (Cohn et al. (2019)) and better operational outcomes in the banking in83

dustry (Johnston-Ross et al. (2021)). The results of this paper suggest that these forces
are less prevalent in historically non-profit and opaque industries, such as the health care
(Gupta et al. (2020)) or education (Eaton et al. (2019)) sectors, where PE ownership leads
to worse consumer outcomes.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the externalities of private equity ownership
by studying the impact of PE ownership on the persons incurring the cost of pollution6 ,
whereas most previous papers focus exclusively on consumers, workers, and governments.
The exception is Shive and Forster (2019), who study the impact of listing status on environmental externalities, albeit in an empirical setting that is different from this paper, and
show that PE ownership is associated with an increase or no effect on pollution, while this
paper documents a decrease when regulation risk is high. The advantage of my empirical
setting that could explain the difference in results is the ability to control almost perfectly
for production and technology, to conduct the econometric analysis at a high-frequency and
highly disaggregated level, and to observe pollution decisions for all firms in my sample.
However, interpreting their results with the mechanism in this paper suggests that in the
US during the timeframe of their study environmental regulation risk was not prevalent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the institutional
background of the empirical setting and section 2.3 describes and validates the datasets used.
Section 2.4 details the main result that PE ownership causes a reduction of pollution, but
not for DrillCo contracts. Section 2.5 shows that the impact of PE ownership on pollution
is inversely related to environmental liability risks. Section 2.6 discusses the results. Section
2.7 performs several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of the findings. Finally,
section 2.8 concludes.
6

Other factors affecting pollution decisions include other financial investors (Akey and Appel (2019),
Dyck et al. (2019), Naaraayanan et al. (2019), Chu and Zhao (2019)), supply chains (Schiller (2018)),
CEO preferences (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Li et al. (2021)), financial constraints (Kim and Xu
(2017), Cohn and Deryugina (2018), Bartram et al. (2021), De Haas and Popov (2019), Levine et al. (2019),
Bartram et al. (2021)), and competition (Grinstein and Larkin (2020)).
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2.2. Institutional Background
This section presents the specificities of the oil and gas industry that are important to
understand for the empirical design. Namely, subsection 2.2.1 shows how shale gas and oil
operators produce pollution and why this pollution is important for regulators and for firms.
Then subsection 2.2.2 describes the regulation of the fracking industry. Finally, subsection
2.2.3 exposes the type and nature of PE contracts specific to the oil and gas industry.
2.2.1. Shale oil and gas drilling and pollution
The production of natural gas in the United States increased by more than 25% from 2007
to 2013, and the production of oil nearly doubled between 2009 (5.4 Mb/d million barrels
of oil per day) and 2014 (9.4 Mb/d at year-end 2014), following the discovery of hydraulic
fracturing and horizontal drilling.7 Horizontal drilling allows the exploitation of reserves
located in a horizontal reservoir and that could not be exploited with a traditional vertical
well. Hydraulic fracturing is the practice of creating cracks in the rock so that gas and
oil can circulate to the well for subsequent extraction. These cracks are made by injecting
high-pressure water mixed with different chemical components, technologies that enable
the exploitation of large, untapped reserves of hydrocarbons captured in porous and lowpermeability rocks.
Different ways of polluting
There are multiples ways through which the extraction of oil and gas, especially through hydraulic fracturing, generates pollution. The fracturing process is conducted using chemicals
that can be highly toxic for humans. For instance, proppants are injected to ensure that the
fractures remain open and to create a high-conductivity pathway so that the hydrocarbons
can easily reach the surface. Anti-bacterial agents are included in the fracking mix to reduce
bioclogging and corrosion. A clay stabilizer is added so that the clay does not swell. Other
toxic chemicals can be included depending on the situation. These components can come
into contact with humans, either by groundwater contamination or leaks from storage tanks.
7

Oil production from fracked wells accounts for nearly half of US production (EIA (2017)).
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Oil and gas activities also generate pollution by flaring, which consists of burning the gas
contained in oil wells instead of recovering it. The gas that is burnt allows the firm to
avoid investing in infrastructure —such as connecting the well to a pipeline— that would
allow its exploitation. The burnt gas can disperse toxic chemicals to the neighborhood, thus
contaminating the air.
Cost for firms and local communities
Toxic chemicals used by fracking firms affect the welfare of local residents. A wealth of
evidence suggests that this pollution affects the health of people living close to wells, which
is reflected in the reduced demand for houses close to fracking areas. To date, these toxic
pollutants have been exposed to 18 million households that live at least one mile from a well
(Konkel (2017)). This number will grow as US onshore production expands. According to
the 2010 decennial census, more than 55 million households live in a shale basin and thus
risk exposure to toxic chemicals.
In table B.1 of the online appendix, I provide an analysis of the costs and benefits of reducing
flaring. Connecting the well to a pipeline has two components: first, on-site facilities and
equipment, such as dehydrators and compressors, need to be installed close to the well;
second, the well needs to be connected to a pipeline. These components cost several millions
dollars at time 0 of the project. However, the benefits are not all reaped at time 0 because
reducing flaring causes an increase in gas production during the whole life of the well.
The pollution that flaring generates is quantitatively significant. Flaring is also an important
contributor to global warming, although estimates are hard to find. Worldwide flaring
burnt 145 billion cubic meters of gas in 2018, which is equivalent to the total annual gas
consumption of Central and South America.8 In the US, each day of flaring in the shale oil
fields of North Dakota and South Texas burns 1.15 billion cubic feet of natural gas, which
could provide power for 4 million homes or driving nearly 5 million cars for one day.9 Certain
8

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/12/increased-shale-oil-production-andpolitical-conflict-contribute-to-increase-in-global-gas-flaring.
9
https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/Permian-natural-gas-flaring-and-
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oil and natural gas-rich nations like Yemen, Algeria, and Iraq could meet their national CO2
reduction targets under the UN Paris Agreement just by eliminating flaring (Elvidge et al.
(2018)). Given the importance of such pollution, the World Bank has launched the Zero
Routine Flaring initiative, aimed at suppressing routine flaring by 2030 (Bank (2015)).
2.2.2. The regulation of pollution in the US oil and gas industry
The release of toxic components in natural surface waters —such as lakes, rivers, streams,
wetlands, and coastal areas— is controlled in the United States by the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Among other federal statutes, the practice of hydraulic fracturing has been exempt from the SDWA and from important permitting and pollution control requirements included in the CWA since the Energy Policy Act
of 2005.10
The highly controversial exemption is based on the idea that fracking does not affect local
communities.11 I exploit these exemptions in my empirical analysis to define a variable
of overcompliance. I select chemicals that are reported as toxic and hazardous for human
health, in the United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce
report from April 2011. Health scientists agree on the high degree of toxicity of these
chemicals, and anecdotal stories of local contamination due to these components have been
reported. As a result, these chemicals have a high media exposure and have been reported
by several environmental organizations as threatening human health. With one exception,
all these chemicals are all regulated by the SDWA and CAA but subject to the fracking
industry exemption. Table 2.1 reports the names of all the chemicals used in the analysis,
venting-reaching-all-time-high/.
10
This exemption does not apply to diesel fuels from hydraulic fracturing.
11
In 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was ordered by a decision from the US Court of
Appeals of the 11th Circuit to include hydraulic fracturing in the SDWA. In 2001, a special task force led
by Vice President Dick Cheney asked that Congress exempt hydraulic fracturing from the SDWA. Then,
the EPA released a controversial report in 2004 claiming that hydraulic fracturing “poses little or no threat”
to drinking water. As a result, the 2005 energy bill withdrew the ability of the EPA to regulate hydraulic
fracturing activities. This exemption was highly controversial. In March of 2005, evidence of potential
mishandling in the EPA study of 2004 was officially found. Moreover, the Oil and Gas Accountability
Project (OGAP) organized a review of the 2004 report and found proof that the EPA removed from the
initial drafts any section that suggested unregulated fracturing could be detrimental to human health.
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as well as their CASN number and whether they are regulated by SDWA and CAA.
The extent to which this exemption applies to the Bureau of land management (BLM) has
been the subject of an ongoing legal dispute. The BLM, a federal agency within the US
Department of the Interior, is responsible for the environmental regulation of federal land
and Native American reservations and oversees one-eighth of the land in the continental
United States. Its core mission is “to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the
public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations.” Within its scope
of work, the BLM supervises the leasing of oil and gas reserves and provides technical advice
for drilling operations on Native American reservations.
In appendix B, I provide more additional details on the legal dispute regarding the ability of
the BLM to regulate fracking, which I summarize here. In 2012, the BLM started drafting a
regulation to reduce the negative externalities caused by hydraulic fracturing. The regulation
was supposed to go into effect on June 24, 2015. On March 20, 2015, various petitioners
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to challenge the fracking rule.12 The preliminary
injunction was granted by the Federal Court of the 10th Circuit, which found that “BLM
did not have the authority to regulate fracking” (Williams (2015)). The rule was abrogated
in 2016 by the District of Wyoming.
On January 20, 2017, former-President Donald Trump was inaugurated and changed the
political orientation of the BLM, which withdrew its support for the fracking rule. An
Interior Department Assistant Secretary stated that an “initial review has revealed that the
2015 Rule does not reflect... the current Administration’s policies and priorities concerning
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing on Federal and Indian lands.”
Following this rescission, the state of California and a group of environmental activists sued
the BLM on January 24, 2018, for voiding the fracking rule, because the Administrative
Procedure Act requires that any agency that decides to change its policy should explain
12
The petitioners included the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), the Western Energy
Alliance (“Alliance”), the states of Utah, North Dakota, Wyoming, and Colorado, and the Ute Indian Tribe.
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why the new policy is better. These details were absent from the decision. As a result, it
was highly likely that the BLM could not regulate fracking between 2016 and 2018.
2.2.3. Private equity in the oil and gas industry
Several features of the oil and gas industry make it attractive for PE investment. First, this
industry is a capital-intensive sector. For instance, in 2009, the median well cost was above
$4 million (Gilje and Taillard (2015)), and the average cost for a proposed onshore US gas
pipeline was $7.65 million per mile in 2015-2016. Second, the oil and gas industry is risky,
as the sector is highly cyclical and vulnerable to changes in oil and gas prices. Third, there
is ample asymmetric information regarding the investment opportunity set of oil and gas
companies, as it is difficult to observe the quality of their reserves. Adverse selection is so
pervasive that oil and gas firms make inefficient production decisions to prove the quality of
their reserves (Gilje et al. (2020)). The presence of risk and asymmetric information, which
deter classical bank lending, and the high demand for capital make the industry attractive
to PE firms. Figure 2.1.B shows that the oil and gas industry has concentrated more than
8% of transactions for deals that involve a transfer of control rights in the United States
since 2010, according to Preqin. This is quantitatively significant, as the equivalent number
for the health care, insurance, or retail sector is lower. The software industry is the only
sector that has a larger number of deals in dollar value than the oil and gas industry.
ESG concerns are prevalent among the main PE firms, as shown in the citations of appendix
B, although I lack comprehensive detailed data on ESG commitments by PE funds. A
common theme of these citations is that reducing pollution and increasing the quality of life
for the local population allow PE firms to earn extra risk-adjusted returns.
Another unique feature of the oil and gas sector is the presence of DrillCo contracts, a joint
venture between a financial investor and an exploration and production (E&P) company.
They do not imply the creation of a new firm, contrary to what the name suggests. There is
a large variety of DrillCo contracts, and their features are only limited by the creativity of
the contracting parties. In its basic form, an investor provides cash in exchange for a working
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interest in a group of wells drilled and operated by the E&P company. Most of the time, a
DrillCo contract contains three main components. In each tranche,13 the investor provides
a capital commitment. This capital commitment is used to pay the development costs of
the well(s) and part of the E&P working interests as a form of a carry (“carried amount”).
In exchange for the capital commitment, the investors acquire a working interest in each
tranche. This working interest can be subject to partial reversion once pre-determined
IRR hurdles are met. More complexity among DrillCo contracts can then be found. For
example, the location of the acreage can be made confidential to avoid direct competition
with potential competitors. The DrillCo contract can also contain an alternative plan in case
the initial wells are dry. The working interest is defined at the wellbore, but can be depth
limited. Another important source of heterogeneity in DrillCo contracts is the timing of the
payment, regarding both the moment when the investor transfers the funds and when the
operator pays back the investors. The development costs of the well(s) can have a specific
limit or, for some deals, a budget can be agreed upon.
DrillCo transactions differ in several ways from a traditional PE acquisition. They imply
less control from the investors than when an acquisition is made. Most of the operational
decisions are undertaken by the E&P company. As Tim Murray from Benefit Street Partners14 explained: “We don’t micro-manage operational details about how you’re fracking
the wells.” Another difference is that there is no change in capital structure, contrary to a
leveraged buyout. Finally, in a DrillCo, all the income made by PE investors comes from
the working interest in a tranche of wells, and does not come from the exit value of the
deal. Therefore, DrillCo contracts are financed from PE funds but without any transfers of
control rights, change in capital structure, or pressure to exit the investment.
13

In this case, a tranche is a group of oil and gas wells.
Nissa Darbonne, "The DrillCo," in Oil and Gas Investor, Money Redefined: Capital Formation, June
2016.
14
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2.3. Data, Validation and Summary Statistics
2.3.1. Data
Oil and gas datasets
The Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission
launched FracFocus in April 2011, a repository of chemicals used during the fracking process.
This repository was first a voluntary disclosure database to report the chemicals used for
each well, but states slowly began to impose mandatory reporting to this database. Figure
B.1 reports the year in which each state mandated reporting. By 2013, 75% of 28 oil and
gas-producing states had instituted mandatory reporting to FracFocus. In 2015, the latest
states (Kentucky and North Carolina) had a mandatory reporting to FracFocus.
This administrative dataset allows us to investigate the input used during the production
process with an extremely fine degree of granularity. The data report information at the
well level, such as longitude and latitude, the API14 number (the regulatory ID of the
well), the dates upon which the well job started and was completed, and the name of the
operator. The dataset also contains the total number of chemicals used with their CAS
number, which allows us to perfectly identify the presence of a toxic chemical. Operators
can report a chemical as confidential, and, in this case, the CAS number will be hidden.
I merge the API14 number with detailed data from the private vendor Enverus, which
provides information on production (for the first six months of oil and gas extraction), the
horizontal length, the vertical depth, and the basin in which the well is drilled. These
variables are essential because the first six months of production predict overall future well
production with great accuracy. Once the well starts producing, it follows a stable and
predictable decline curve.15 The horizontal and vertical size of the well captures the type of
technology used (whether it is a horizontal well) and the cost required during the drilling
process (as larger wells are more costly). Moreover, knowing the basin in which the well
15

For instance, in the ARPS model, there is a stable linear relationship between the log production of the
month and the log of the month.
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is located allows us to define an important layer of comparison among wells, as they are
more likely to be established within the same infrastructure and rock formation. I drop 30
observations that are not located in the United States onshore because they contain mistakes
in the latitude or longitude or because they are offshore projects. I chose to drop offshore
projects because they are usually more capital intensive and require specific infrastructures,
although all the results remain the same when they are included.
Satellite datasets and a new flaring measure
I construct the measure of flaring using satellite data from the NASA IR public files. I
rely on the approach of Elvidge et al. (2013), which can be summarized as follows. First, a
satellite pyrometer —NASA/NOAA Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)—
is used to measure the radiation emitted by hot sources on the earth. Then, I exploit the
fact that we can recover the temperature using the Max Planck equation, which relates the
spectral radiance to the wavelength and the temperature of the material, and the Wien’s
displacement law, which states that the wavelength of maximum spectral radiant emittance
shifts to a shorter wavelength as the temperature increases (Elvidge et al. (2009, 2013)).
I identify the practice of flaring using the fact that it emits a temperature between 1600º C
and 2000º C, not to be mistaken with forest fires, which generally reach about 800º C. The
FracFocus data contain the longitude and latitude of each well. I use this information to
investigate whether the temperature is between 1600º C and 2000º C at a point within 500
meters around the location of the well. One main limitation of this dataset is that if the
wells are too close to each other, then we cannot disentangle which one is flaring with a high
degree of precision. Therefore, I create a variable to distinguish the cases in which such a
situation occurs. I validate the quality of the satellite data in several ways. First, as shown
by figure B.2, the spatial detection of flaring is consistent with the geographical distribution
of oil and gas basins. Second, the probability of observing a flare before the completion of
the well is extremely low. After the well is completed, this probability surges and starts
decreasing, consistent with observed practices. Figure B.3 shows that the non-parametric
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probability of observing flaring equal 3% before the well is completed; this probability rises
to 15% within 90 days following well completion.
Data on private equity
I use several distinct sources to construct a database of PE deals that result in a transfer
of ownership. I download all “add-on,” “buyout,” and “growth capital” deals and exits from
Preqin that I manually match to the oil and gas dataset using the operator name. The
results remain robust if I focus only on buyout deals. Consequently, I am able to match a
total of 146 deals. I cross-check the accuracy of the date of the deal, the type, and the firm
identity using both Pitchbook and Enverus market intelligence. I drop the observation if
one of the source documents shows no transfer of ownership (such as mezzanine debt) or if
I observe that the add-on relates to only part of the assets of the target firm and not the
total assets of the firm. I also drop an observation if the acquirer is not a PE or VC firm
but rather a hedge fund or other investment structure. This process results in 110 firm-deal
observations made by 55 different financial sponsors.
2.3.2. Summary statistics
Sample
My sample includes 139,809 US wells fracked between 2010 and 2019. On average, firms
use 0.3 toxic components per well and flare 21% of their wells. A sample-average firm has
a total of 100 projects scattered among 11 different locations in 1.37 states. Table 2.2 the
reports the additional basic descriptive statistics of the sample.
Pre-acquisition
Panel A of table 2.3 reports the raw differences at the firm-level between PE target firms and
those that were never acquired. Although quantitatively small, there is a selection problem
taking place at the firm level. Targeted firms are more geographically focused than the
others, with projects in 0.98 states instead of 1.7 states for the other groups.16 As a result,
the targeted group drills in fewer basins than the non-targeted group. The total number of
16

The total is not equal to 1 because we do not observe the states for 2% of the projects.
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projects is statistically similar between the two groups, and on average, equals 100.
Panel B of table 2.3 depicts the raw differences at the project level, which are much more
pronounced than at the firm level. Several stylized facts appeared. First, our targeted
group is less productive. On average, they take 12 days longer to drill a well and obtain
less production for each fracturation. Second, they drill in more rural areas. The wells they
have are in places with fewer housing units and persons. Third, they drill more oil and
less gas. Finally, although imprecise and non-statistically significant, they pollute less: they
flare less, and, on average, use 0.1 fewer toxic chemicals than companies that were never
acquired by PE firms.
Panel B of table 2.3 shows the differences in characteristics once the location-year fixed
effects.17 The observable differences between the two groups are severely reduced and become non-statistically significant for most. Importantly, the adjusted differences have a
lower standard deviation (except for the completion time, which increases slightly). The
differences between the well production per fracturation, population and housing where the
well is located, its size (horizontal length and vertical depth), and gas production diminish
considerably and become non-statistically significant, despite a lower standard deviation of
the difference. The difference in the number of toxic chemicals goes to -0.109 without fixed
effects to -0.086, and the standard deviation is nearly divided by two, which implies that
the difference becomes significant at the 10% level. The remaining differences in observables
that are statistically significant after adding the fixed effects are the completion time and
the amount of oil produced. Overall, this supports the view that wells located in the same
area are a plausible counterfactual for the wells of PE-backed firms.
Panel A of table 2.4 reports the raw differences between firms that signed DrillCo deal and
those that did not before such a transaction occured. Firms that sign a DrillCo are, on
average, bigger; they have 387 projects, whereas the control firm has only 89 projects. As
17

The location-year fixed effect interacts with a year fixed effect with a location dummy defined as the
first two digits of the latitude and longitude of the well, which is equivalent to a square of 6 by 6 miles.
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a result of having more projects, firms that will sign a DrillCo are drilling in more places
and states. However, these differences are not statistically different, except for the number
of coarser locations, which is significant at the 90% threshold.
Panel B of table 2.4 reports the raw differences for a DrillCo transaction using projectlevel information. There are differences between the firms that sign DrillCo deals and those
that did not. For most, the raw differences are economically important but imprecise and
exhibit a large standard deviation. These differences are thus non-significant, except for the
production of gas, which is significant at the 10% level. The average firm signing a DrillCo
transaction uses slightly more toxic components, is less productive and efficient as captured
by the completion time and the production per fracturation, and uses more technologically
advanced projects as measured by their vertical depth and horizontal length.
Panel B of table 2.4 shows the differences in characteristics between firms before they signed
a DrillCo and those that did not, once the location controls are added, which also supports
the identifying assumption. Most of the differences in absolute terms are strongly diminished
between the two groups after the location is controlled for. For instance, the difference in
production per fracturation rises from -16 to -2.44 after such location controls are added.
The difference in the production of oil for the first six months goes from -4,759 to 2,627.
Overall, this supports the view that wells located in the same area are also a plausible
counterfactual for the wells of firms that signed a DrillCo.
Similarities between federal and Native American regions and others
I exploit the legal events taking place after 2015 regarding the ability to regulate fracking
in Native American and Federal territories in the identification strategy. Therefore, it is
important to investigate whether the projects that are drilled in Native American reservations and federal lands were similar to the others before the fracking rule was announced in
March 2015. One concern would be that contract enforcement18 or local labor costs would
18
Brown et al. (2017, 2019) exploit the 1953 enactment of PL280 to create plausibly exogenous variations in
the enforcement of contracts within Native American reservations, where litigations were enforced following
the shock on state courts instead of tribal courts for some reservations. The authors show that it affects
credit markets, income, financial literacy, and trust. The shocks that are exploited in this study are different
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create fundamental differences between the two groups and would command different usages
of toxic pollutants, making causal inferences difficult to obtain.
Panel A of table 2.5 shows the raw differences according to whether a well was drilled in Native American reservations and federal lands before March 2015. Pollution is higher among
Native American reservations and federal lands, as captured by both the number of toxic
chemicals and the level of flaring. This group is also less productive, as captured by completion time and production per fracturation, and produces less oil and gas per well. Projects
have a lower horizontal length outside of federal lands and Native American reservations.
Although statistically non-significant, projects on Native American reservations and federal
lands are also located in places that have lower population density.
Once the location fixed effects are added, most of the differences in characteristics are
reduced by an important magnitude and become non-statistically significant at the 5%
threshold. This is consistent with the idea that location is an important driver in the
heterogeneity of projects. Specifically, the differences in the production of oil goes from
2,015 to 43,47 BO, which is a division by 46, and the production of gas is greatly reduced,
divided by 17. Both differences are non-statistically significant. The differences in the
size and length of wells are also economically and statistically non-significant. The only
remaining statistically significant differences are for variables on productivity and population
density, if we set a confidence interval of 90%. However, the economic magnitudes are nonsignificant: for instance, projects take one day more to be completed on Native American
reservations and federal lands or contain seven fewer persons per county. Overall, these
adjusted differences suggest that projects in their vicinity have similar characteristics that
are not affected by their regulation by the BLM before March 2015.
and exploit the regulatory power of the BLM to intervene in Native American reservations and federal lands
on environmental matters. It is a shock on the ex ante ability to regulate fracking rather than a shock on
the enforcement of contracts.
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2.3.3. Validation of the dataset
In this section, I present several tests that validate the consistency of this new dataset.
Specifically, I show in dynamic event-windows that the measures of pollution increase just
before a chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, but then drop. Moreover, the measures of pollution
correlate with proxies for corporate short-termism. While these correlations do not have a
causal interpretation, they are consistent with previously established findings.
Firms closer to filing for bankruptcy are more likely to pollute. They are riskier and therefore
face a higher cost of capital, which reduces their investment in abatement projects. Moreover,
firms close to bankruptcy are more likely to pollute due to a risk-shifting effect: they reap
the full benefit of polluting, but part of the expected cost as these are discharged through
bankruptcy. The fact that firms that are more financially constrained or close to bankruptcy
are more likely to pollute has received extensive empirical support (Kim and Xu (2017),
De Haas and Popov (2019), Levine et al. (2019), Cohn and Deryugina (2018)). Figure B.8
reports the yearly average of the number of toxic chemicals (panel A) and the fraction of
wells flared (panel B) among firms that file for chapter 11 bankruptcies in an event study
around the year of filing, which validates the results found in other settings. Specifically,
pollution levels increase steadily before filing, peak the year of filing, and then decrease once
the probability of default lessens.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Davis and Hausman (2020) suggest that shareholders in publicly listed companies in the oil and gas industries do not closely monitor their
corporate executives, who are thus able to extract a rent by being paid for outcomes untied to
their efforts. These frictions create incentives to boost short-term performance, potentially
at the expense of long-term performance as in Stein (1989) and Grenadier and Malenko
(2011). Recent papers (Shive and Forster (2020), Kim and Xu (2017)) show that agency
frictions create an incentive for firms to pollute.
I find this relationship between proxies for corporate short-termism and pollution. First,
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I begin by investigating whether publicly listing is associated with more toxic pollution. I
compare pollution levels both before and after the IPO, exploiting six IPOs that take place
during my sample period. Panel A of Table B.9 shows that the production of toxic chemicals
increases significantly following the IPO. The magnitude of the effect of the IPO on pollution
is an increase of 0.14, which is close in absolute terms to the reduction (-0.19) caused by PE
ownership. One limitation of this specification is its reliance on a small number of firms.
Second, I show that firms missing the mean forecast of their annual earnings per share
(henceforth, EPS) are more likely to increase pollution. Firms that have a realized EPS
that is below the one expected by financial analysts are more likely to pollute. Figure B.7
reports the estimates of a regression of toxic pollution on the nine deciles of the sample EPS
forecasting errors, after adding the geographical-year and firm fixed effect and controlling for
the realized EPS. Being among the first two deciles of the errors on EPS, which means having
the 20% lowest differences between the expected and realized EPS, leads to an increase in
pollution of 0.1. In contrast, the other deciles are not associated with an economically and
statistically significant effect on pollution, except for the highest decile (q9). Columns (4)
and (5) of table B.9 confirm the effects of EPS on toxic pollution. After controlling for the
realized EPS, if analysts expect a higher EPS than realized, then firms are more likely to
pollute. The relationship does not hold for firms that are above the expectation of analysts.
These tests are consistent with the view that firms that experience high expectations of their
one-year earnings are more likely to pollute to meet these expectations.

2.4. The net effect of PE ownership on pollution
This section studies the net impact of PE ownership on the production of toxic pollution.
The identification strategy is described in subsection 2.4.1. The baseline results are presented
in subsection 2.4.2, and subsection 2.4.3 provides a sensitivity analysis of the baseline results.
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2.4.1. Identification strategy
Empirical design and identifying assumption
The key identifying assumption of this paper is that heterogeneities in the marginal costs
and benefits of polluting at the project level are driven by geographical variables. In the
oil and gas industry, the main source of value creation comes from constructing an acreage,
which is a portfolio of lease contracts that provide the right to drill oil and gas within a
specific time range and location. The type of rock and its properties –such as its porosity
and permeability, and the distance from existing infrastructure (such as pipelines), which
increases the cost of flaring– are similar for two wells that are located in close proximity.
Similarly, specific chemical suppliers in the region affect the prices and types of components
sold to oil and gas operators. By comparing how oil and gas companies emit pollution when
facing the same marginal costs and benefits both before and after a PE deal —in a differencein-differences setting—, we can uncover whether firms tend to grow cleaner following a PE
acquisition.
The first way to translate the identifying assumption into an econometric specification is to
estimate the following equation on the full sample:

Yijt = Firmi +Yeart ×Locationj +

10
X

γτ .(τ semester(s) after the PE deal)+Controlsijt +ϵijt

τ =−6

(2.1)

where Yijt is a measure of pollution (toxic chemicals or flaring); Firmi is an operator fixed
effect, which captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through time
and affects the decision to use toxic chemicals; and Locationj is a geographical fixed effect
and is equal to one for projects that are located in places with the same first two digits
of latitude and longitude. Figure B.4 illustrates such groupings by plotting the wells with
same color if they have the same first two digits of latitude and longitude and are situated
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in one half of the Marcellus formation. Yeart is a year fixed effect. Controlsijt includes the
first six months of oil and gas productions, which is a good measure of well production. I
also include vertical depth and horizontal length as additional controls to capture potential
time-varying heterogeneity in the type of technology used.
The second way to translate the identifying assumption in an econometric specification is to
perform a matching approach at the project level. Contrary to previous studies that have
matched firms before a buyout to another firm (following Boucly et al. (2011)), I perform the
matching at the project level both before and after the deal. Specifically, for each project of
the treated group, I match a project from the control group that is made in the same basin
during the same year and has the closest size (both horizontal length and vertical depth)
and level of production (both six months of oil and gas production) using the Mahalanobis
distance metric. Then, using this matched sample, I estimate the following equation:

Yijt = Firmi + Yeart × basinj + γ.( Post PE deal)it + Controlsijt + ϵijt

(2.2)

where ( Post PE deal)it is a variable that takes one if the firm i at time t is under PE
ownership. Controlsijt includes the size of the project (horizontal length and vertical depth)
and its production (both six months of both oil and gas production). As I have a matching
sample made with the nearest neighbor matching approach, this implies that the sample
size is smaller. I cannot include all the fixed effects of equation (1) in this sample without
dropping a significant number of observations. As a result, I include only a firm fixed effect
and a basinj fixed effect interacted with a Yeart fixed effect.
2.4.2. Results
Raw relationship
I start the analysis by the simplest way of statistically summarizing a database: plotting
the data points and the fitted line, both before and after the year of a PE deal. Figure
2.4 shows the binscatter in red square dots. As we can see, the probability of using a toxic
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chemical during the production process increases before the year of the deal: it rises from
around 0.00-0.05 one year before the deal to a peak of 0.2 the year of the deal. After the
year of the deal, the mean number of toxic chemicals per project doubles to 0.4. It then
starts to decrease slowly to reach the level of 0.2. The binscatter suggests that a linear
specification can be used as a good parametric functional form for the econometric tests.
The raw relationship suggests that PE ownership is associated with an increase in toxic
pollution that decreases slowly before the sale of the firm.
The increase in pollution associated with PE ownership is not causal, as it is strongly exposed
to a composition effect. The type of projects used by PE-backed firms changes following the
acquisition. Figure 2.4 illustrates in blue dots the binscatter of the control projects from
the matching sample,19 a direct way to correct for this composition effect. We observe a
common visual trend before the year of the deal. Two to three years after the deal, the
production of toxic chemicals still increases for our control group, while it decreases for the
group of PE-backed firms, highlighting a negative impact of PE ownership on pollution.
As the binscatter ignores time-unvarying shocks and geographical-specific trends as well as
standard errors, the next part of the paper examines their relationship by exploiting the full
panel dimension of the dataset and adding fixed effects.
Difference-in-differences
Toxic chemicals. Figure 2.5 reports the estimated (γτ )τ =−6,...,4,10 of equation (1) and confirms the negative relationship between PE ownership and pollution. While all the post-deal
estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level (except for the sixth semester after the
deal, which is significant at the 10% level), none of them are statistically significant before
the deal. Further, there is no visual and significant pre-trend after the PE deal. We can
observe a small but non-significant drop in the number of toxic chemicals used after the year
of the deal. The negative impact of PE ownership grows stronger over time. After the first
19

Recall that we construct the matched sample by matching each project of our treated group with a
project from the control group in the same basin during the same year with the closest size (both horizontal
length and vertical depth) and production level (six months of oil and gas production) using the mahalanobis
distance metric.
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three years, the number of toxic chemicals is reduced by 0.4. As can be seen in table 2.2, the
sample standard error of the number of toxic chemicals used during the production process
is .55. Therefore, the reduction in pollution is economically meaningful, corresponding to
a drop of more than half of the standard error. None of the coefficients of the controls are
significant, and the point estimates are economically non-significant (below the 10−6 level),
which is an indication that the observed heterogeneity between projects that is potentially
correlated with proxies of productivity and technology has already been controlled with the
fixed effects.
Table 2.6 contains the net post effects. Both columns (1) and (2) of panel A show that PE
ownership leads to a mean average effect of -0.198, which is economically and statistically
significant. The sample mean of toxic chemicals used is 0.282. A reduction of -0.198 implies
that the drop is equivalent to 70% of the baseline usage of toxic chemicals. Column (3)
of panel A contains the net effect using the matching approach of equation (2). Although
the sample and fixed effects are different, the magnitudes are close, and the effect of PE
ownership using this specification equals -0.209.
Flaring. I estimate the baseline equation (1) with a different measure of pollution, flaring.
Figure 2.6 depicts the dynamic effect around the deal estimated on the sample, where we
can unambiguously identify the identity of the owner of the well, when the wells are not too
close to one another. Similar to the results of using toxic chemicals, we can observe a drop
in pollution coming due to reduced flaring. Most of the decrease in flaring appears after
year three, where PE ownership plausibly causes a drop by 10% in the probability of flaring.
This is quantitatively significant, as the standard deviation in the practice of flaring is equal
to 0.16. Columns (1), (2), and (3) of panel B from table 2.6 report the full post-deal effect
of PE ownership on flaring. The overall net effect of PE ownership is negative, equals to
-0.044, and stable to the inclusion of controls as well as statistically significant. Moreover,
when estimated on the matched sample, we find magnitudes that are close to the results
using the full sample.
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The dynamic difference-in-differences specification shows no pre-trend before the deal is
signed. Figure 2.5 reports the pre-trend before the deal happens, where the dependent
variable is the number of toxic chemicals. The line is flat, slightly below 0, and the coefficients
are not statistically significant. Similarly, Figure 2.6 depicts the pre-trend coefficients for
another measure of pollution, the practice of flaring. In this graph, the coefficients are close
to 0, the line is slightly above 0, and none of the coefficients are statistically significant.
2.4.3. Sensitivity analysis
I replicate the baseline specification of dropping projects that are in locations that account
for a large fraction of the total firm projects. PE firms’ purchase decisions are based on
variables that are mostly driven by the main basin(s) where firms operate. The extreme
case would be a situation where a PE firm purchases a target company after only considering
its core assets. If the PE firm reduces pollution on all the projects of the target company,
then dropping these core assets and focusing the analysis on the other wells would alleviate
the endogeneity problem. By dropping these basins from the analysis, we are more likely
to focus our attention on places that are not driving the decision of the PE to purchase the
company.
of projects in basin j for firm i
To perform such a test, let us define C= Number
Total number of projects for firm i . Table B.2 of panel

A reports the baseline regressions where I drop firms that have a C value higher than a
specific threshold. Specifically, in column (1), I drop all the projects where C=1, eliminating
firms that are drilling in only one basin. The effect on this sample is equal to -0.183,
close to the -0.198 found in the baseline specification. Columns (2), (3), and (4) estimate
the relationship where C falls below 0.77 (75th percentile), 0.21 (median), and 0.11 (25th
percentile). Although the baseline equation is estimated for different samples, the effects are
within the same magnitude range and equal -0.174, -0.268, and -0.162 for columns (2), (3),
and (4), respectively. Overall, this exercise suggests that the baseline results are robust and
persist when we drop the assets within the firm that are more likely to lead to its purchase
by a PE firm.
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Next, I focus the analysis on projects that account for a small fraction of the total number
of projects in the basin. If a firm owns a large fraction of projects within a location, this
results in a higher ability to negotiate the cost of inputs used as well as other costs that
could change the project-level marginal costs and benefits of using toxic chemicals. To
handle this concern, I first define the following ratio: M =

Number of projects in basin j for firm i
Total number of projects in basin j .

M is equal to 1 when the firm owns all the wells in the basin. Table B.2 of Panel B reports
the baseline regressions, where I drop firms that have an M higher than a specific threshold.
No firm has all the projects in one location. Columns (1), (2), and (3) drop if M is higher
than 0.085 (75th percentile), 0.046 (median), and 0.01 (25th percentile), respectively. The
coefficients for columns (1), (2), and (3) are equal to -0.198, -0.219, and -0.297 respectively.
These coefficients imply an effect similar to the baseline magnitude, if not more important.
Overall, the tests suggest that the effect is not driven by differential local bargaining powers
correlated with PE ownership.
2.4.4. DrillCo contracts
I adopt a specification similar to equation (1) to investigate the impact of PE firms on
pollution when they sign a DrillCo agreement with a firm. Figure 2.8 reports the estimated
(γτ )τ =−6,...,4,10 of equation (1) when the deal variable is for DrillCo transactions and the
dependent variable is the number of toxic chemicals. There is no pre-trend before the
DrillCo contract is signed, and it is difficult to observe a subsequent effect.
I confirm the absence of a statistically significant effect following a DrillCo transaction by
using different specifications and measures of pollution. Equations (4) to (6) of panel A from
table 2.6 contains the net post effects for DrillCo contracts on the number of toxic chemicals.
The point estimate is small in magnitude, around -0.03, close to 0, and statistically nonsignificant at conventional thresholds. Equations (4) to (6) of panel B from table 2.6 report
the estimate when the dependent variable is flaring following DrillCo contracts. Similarly,
the point estimate is close to 0 and statistically non-significant.
Overall, this test provides evidence that reducing pollution is not caused by a lack of financ104

ing for positive NPV projects. The reason for this is that the signature of a DrillCo contract
is a positive wealth shock for a firm. Financing a set of projects through a DrillCo agreement
preserves the cash reserves and the debt capacity of the firm. A firm with more financing
capacity can invest in other positive NPV projects, including abatement technology that
has a high payback period. If a financial constraint is hindering managers from investing
in such a project, then we should also observe a drop in pollution when the constraint
becomes less binding following a DrillCo contract, which is not the case. This non-result
implies that corporate executives face specific incentives not to invest in pollution abatement
projects and that such incentives are reversed when PE firms control the management team.
Understanding these incentives is the focus of the next section.

2.5. The Role of Environmental Liability Risks
The timeline of events suggests that projects drilled on federal land and Native American
reservations were subject to a lower amount of environmental regulation risks from June 2016
to January 2018, as evidenced by the court decision against the fracking rule in 2016, the
Trump inauguration, and the subsequent shelving of the fracking rule, all of which created
important hurdles regarding the ability of the BLM to regulate fracking. I exploit these
factors in the identification strategy through two different empirical specifications.
The first specification is a difference-in-differences estimated within the sample of PE-backed
firms. Specifically, I estimate by OLS the following equation:

Yijt = Firmi × Yeart + Locationj × Yeart +

2019
X

(year=τ ) × (BLM)i × θτ + Xit + ϵijt (2.3)

τ =2013

The second specification is a triple difference-in-differences over the full sample, where I
estimate the differences for each year between PE-backed firms and non PE-backed firms,
both before and after the regulatory shocks, for projects in regulated and non-regulated
areas. Specifically, I estimate by OLS the following equation:
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Yijt = Firmi ×Yeart +Locationj ×Yeart +

2019
X

(year=τ )×(BLM)i ×(γτ +βτ .PEit )+Xit +ϵijt

τ =2013

(2.4)

For both equations, (BLM)i is a variable that takes one if the well is located on federal
lands or Native American reservations. The fixed-effect specification is similar to the one
used before in equation (1). PEit is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm i is PEbacked and 0 otherwise. The coefficients allow the differences to vary over time to capture
potentially dynamic effects. The inclusion of firm fixed effects interacted with a year fixed
effect is a notable empirical advantage of the oil and gas empirical setting. In particular, it
allows us to absorb any time-varying firm-level unobserved variables that drive the decision
to use toxic chemicals. These unobserved factors typically lead to the decision of PE firms
to purchase a company.
The triple difference-in-differences specification allows us to compare projects drilled in the
same year by the same firm in the same rock formation, where they differ because the only
difference is that one is located on a federal land or a Native American reservation, and
the other is not. This effect is decomposed between the impact of the regulation by non
PE-backed firms, captured by γτ , and the one driven by PE-backed firms, measured by βτ .
2.5.1. Results
Figure 2.7 plots the estimated coefficients (θτ )τ =2013,...,2019 of equation (3), that is, the
dynamic difference between regulated and non-regulated areas among PE-backed firms. We
can observe a jump after 2016 in the usage of toxic chemicals for projects located in areas
supervised by BLM and for PE-backed firms. After the preliminary injunction was granted,
PE-backed firms started to use more toxic chemicals in their wells than the other firms, but
this difference disappears after 2018. After 2018, the effect is economically and statistically
small, consistent with the fact that the state of California’s decision to sue the BLM created
an increase in the probability of having a fracking rule. The effect peaks in 2017, the year
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when Trump took office and the rule was rescinded.
Table 2.7 reports the estimates of the triple difference-in-differences setting of equation (4).
The variable Post Injunction takes a value equal to one between 09/30/2015 (the day of the
preliminary injunction) and 01/24/2018 (the day when the state of California sued the BLM
over the rescission), and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the full interactions with
separate firm fixed effects and location-year fixed effects. Controls are added in column (2),
and column (1) contains the results without any project-level controls. Columns (3) and
(4) of panel A report the coefficients when firm-year fixed effects are added. Across all
specifications, the coefficients of interest —namely the triple interaction coefficients between
PE ownership, BLM, and post injunction— are positive and statistically significant, ranging
from 0.3 to 0.38.

2.6. Economic Discussion
2.6.1. Suggested channel
The results are consistent with a channel driven by better monitoring of corporate executives
and firms’ profit objective. There are at least two ways through which increasing pollution
enhances expected profits when environmental risks are lower. First, if regulation is more
likely in the future, there is a benefit to over-comply now if the cost function of abatement
exhibits dynamic increasing returns to scale, such as learning-by-doing effects. There is
extensive evidence of such learning effects in the oil and gas industry, which makes this
channel likely. For instance, Kellogg (2011) shows that oil and gas firms learn when working
with the same contractors, which increases joint productivity, and Covert (2015) shows that
passive learning is a strong force in the fracking sector.
Second, the shock could be interpreted as a reduction in the environmental enforcement of
federal statutes. While oil and gas firms are exempt from the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, this exemption no longer holds if they use toxic
chemicals during the extraction process. A profit-maximizing agent increases environmental
risks when this enforcement risk is lower.
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The fact that suppressing flaring has a high payback period, as shown in appendix B.1,
is indirect evidence in favor of the monitoring channel. Suppressing flaring costs several
millions of dollars at time 0, but the benefit of it is diffuse over time. As modeled in
Stein (1989) and Grenadier and Malenko (2011), the separation of ownership and control
creates a moral hazard problem. As a result, the managers have an incentive to boost shortterm profits. One way to maximize short-term profits is by flaring the wells, which saves
several million dollars when a well is drilled20 at the cost of future economically viable gas
production.
2.6.2. Discussion of other possible channels
PE-backed firms reduce pollution less following lower regulation risks, which allows us to rule
out a channel driven entirely by non-pecuniary motives, unless there are agency frictions
between limited and general partners. Limited partners could prefer socially responsible
investments and ask the general partners to invest accordingly. Standard models of moral
hazard dictate that optimal effort should be exerted in states of the world where the signal is
more informative about the agent’s efforts. Litigation from federal agencies is a strong signal
that the general partners polluted and did not adopt high environmental standards. As a
result, the general partners will exert more effort —in our setting, pollute less— when the
precision of the signal is higher; that is, when polluting can lead to litigation and fines from
federal agencies, which is precisely what happened when the fracking rule was discussed
and about to be implemented. However, this interpretation is unlikely, as we are using
information that was also available to the limited partners and could have been used to
monitor the general partner.
One way to explain the existence of non-pecuniary preferences among corporations and
20
As mentioned earlier in the paper, most of the cost of reducing flaring is paid at the beginning of the
project. First, on-site facilities and equipment, such as dehydrators and compressors, need to be installed
close to the well. According to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), they were on
average $210,000 per well in the Bakken. Then, the well needs to be connected to a pipeline, and the price
is a function of how far the well is to a pipeline and the diameter of the connecting facility. According to
the INGAA, the prices in 2017 ranged from $29,000 to $167,000 per mile for a diameter range between 2
and 22 inches.
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investors is to suppose the existence of frictions that prevent governments from implementing
a regulatory framework consistent with social preferences (Bénabou and Tirole (2010)). For
instance, if voting or representative democracy are limited in creating a legal environment
that maximizes citizen welfare, then the for-profit world can adopt the role of realizing social
preferences by taking non-profit actions. According to these theories, the BLM litigation
can be thought of as a case where the government lacked the tools to implement social
preferences. Therefore, if the results were driven by non-pecuniary motivations, as explained
by this channel, then we should observe a decrease in pollution instead of an increase when
regulatory risks become less important.
This result is not consistent with the idea that the reduction is driven by a technological
upgrade. For this to be the case, we would have to assume a technological innovation that
is worth using on Native American reservations and federal land between 2016 and 2018 but
not in the wells in their vicinity. Moreover, the inclusion of controls that strongly correlate
with a technological upgrade in this industry, namely the total production extracted and
the size of the wells, does not affect the parameter of interests. This finding also implies
that technological innovation should not alter these variables significantly. Overall, these
results do not support the view that the effects are driven by a technological change inside
the firm following PE acquisition.
Further, the results are not consistent with an effect of PE ownership on pollution fully
driven by a reduction in financial constraints. Financially constrained firms have a higher
marginal gain of polluting, as investing in abatement activities is costly. As a result, we
should observe more pollution from non-PE-backed firms following a change in regulatory
risk relative to PE-backed firms. This is the inverse of the effect that we observe.
Similarly, the lack of significant reductions following a PE DrillCo contract provides evidence
that reducing pollution is not caused by a lack of financing for a positive NPV project.
Indeed, the signature of a DrillCo contract is a positive wealth shock for a firm and financing
a set of projects through a DrillCo preserves the cash reserves and the debt capacity of the
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firm. A firm with more financing capacity can invest in other positive NPV projects. For
example, a positive NPV project could be an investment in abatement technology with a
high payback period. If a financial constraint is hindering the manager from investing in
such a project, then we should also observe a drop in pollution when the constraint becomes
less binding following a DrillCo contract, which is not the case. This non-result implies that
corporate executives face specific incentives not to invest in pollution abatement projects
and that such incentives are affected when PE firms control the management team, which
is again consistent with the monitoring channel. However, this evidence is only indirect, as
different selection patterns could also explain the non-results for DrillCo contracts.

2.7. Identification Threats
In this section, I address two plausible identification threats: (1) a composition effect not
captured by the fixed effects, and (2) an effect driven by strategic reporting, where PE firms
report a toxic component as a confidential item instead of not using it. Finally, I replicate
the results using another definition of toxicity.
2.7.1. Endogenous sorting on population and housing density
One potential concern is that PE firms could drill in places with higher populations or more
housing units, implying that PE firms increase human exposure to pollution despite reducing
production. The fixed-effect specification partially mitigates this concern by having a level
of geographical comparison that is coarse, namely a square of 6 by 6 miles. However, there
could still be population variation among these locations. This section shows that wells
drilled by PE-backed firms are not located in census tracts with higher populations or more
housing units and that controlling for these factors has no impact on the final results.
The first test is to adopt a specification similar to both the baseline results and the natural
experiment, where the dependent variable is the total population of the census tract or the
number of housing units where the well is located. Panel A of table B.7 contains the results
for the baseline effects. The magnitudes are economically small: PE-backed firms drill in
areas that have —at most— less than two housing units or one person, and the effect is
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not statistically significant at the 5% threshold. Panel B of table B.7 shows the results of
the natural experiment. Similarly, the magnitudes are not economically and statistically
significant. Specifically, after the BLM shock, PE-backed firms drill in areas that have at
most less than four housing units or nine persons. Overall, the specifications suggest that
the results are not driven by a composition effect where PE-backed firms compensate for
reducing pollution by drilling in areas with a higher population or greater housing density.
The second exercise is to replicate the baseline tests and the natural experiment, adding the
housing and dependent variables as controls. Table B.5 contains the results for the baseline
specifications and table B.6 for the natural experiment. The controls are added in a linear
way. Then, the controls and their squared value with their full interactions are added to
capture potential non-linearity effects. Finally, I create a sample decile for the number of
housing units or the total population of the census tract where the well is located and add it
to the specifications as a fixed effect. Overall, the results remain similar when such controls
are added.
2.7.2. Role of strategic reporting or greenwashing
The next verification tests whether the observed drop in toxic pollution is driven by firms
reporting toxic components as confidential. This could be a concern as firms can report a
component as a trade secret instead of providing its specific CAS number. PE-backed firms
could simply be better at manipulating state disclosure.
The first test is to replace the dependent variable as the number of confidential items that
is reported, in both the baseline results and the natural experiment specification. Table
B.4 contains the results. Panel A shows that both PE ownership and financing through
DrillCo contracts are associated with an improvement in reporting quality, as they lead to
an important drop in the number of confidential items reported, which is both economically
and statistically significant. Specifically, PE ownership and financing lead to a drop of four
confidential items reported. Panel B shows that the BLM shock has no significant impact on
the number of confidential items reported. The magnitudes are not statistically significant
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and minimal, below one item.
The second test adds the number of confidential items reported as a control. If the effect
is driven by a substitution effect, then the drop in the number of toxic chemicals should be
absorbed by the control. Table B.3 reports the results of this exercise. The controls are
first added linearly or as a fixed effect for each number of confidential items. The baseline
magnitudes are similar for both the natural experiment and the baseline effect.
Overall, these two tests suggest that the effects are not driven by a strategic reporting
motive, where PE-backed firms report their toxic chemicals as confidential items.
2.7.3. Other measures of toxic chemicals and geographical distance
In appendix B.8, I replicate the results with another definition of toxic chemicals, using the
EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) instead of Congressional reports. While
the IRIS classification is noisier, contains components that have not been proven toxic by
scientific papers, and aggregates different levels of toxicity, the results are qualitatively the
same. Panel A shows that PE ownership leads to a drop in pollution. The magnitudes are
lower, as the effect is equal to -0.089 instead of 0.19. The effect is statistically significant.
Similar to the baseline results, we find a small and statistically non-significant effect of
DrillCo deals on pollution. Panel B confirms the results of the natural experiment, that
PE-backed firms pollute more following an increase in regulatory risks. Consistent with
the idea that this measure is noisier, the magnitudes are lower and equal to 0.17 but are
statistically significant.
I estimate different variants of the baseline results to ensure that the main results are not
entirely driven by how the econometrician groups the wells. Specifically, I estimate the
dynamic event-study windows with a new set of fixed effects. I include a geographical-time
fixed effect, that regroups within the same year, wells in the same basin, the same state,
and the same latitude and longitude unit. Figure B.5 maps the different regions used to
construct the same latitude and longitude unit. The results can be seen in Figure B.6 and
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are similar to the baseline estimation.

2.8. Conclusion
This paper has two main empirical results. First, on average, PE ownership leads to a
reduction in pollution that is quantitatively significant, equivalent to a 70% reduction in
the usage of toxic chemicals and a 50% reduction in flaring. The reduction is shown using
dynamic differences-in-differences event study plots around 110 PE acquisitions in a specification that includes firm fixed effects (FE), hyper-local area FE interacted with year FE,
and a large set of well-level characteristics. While I lack a complete randomization of PE
acquisition, I provide several pieces of evidence that support a causal interpretation. The
purchase decision by PE firms is more likely driven by firms’ core assets, rather than peripheral projects. The effect still holds when I focus on projects from areas that do not belong to
the core activities of the target firm. The reduction is not driven by strategic reporting from
firms, different exposure to local population or housing and holds for different measures of
chemical toxicity and geographical distance.
I hypothesize that PE ownership confers strong incentives to maximize shareholders value,21
which leads to less pollution, when environmental regulation is likely to increase in the
future. More environmental liability risks diminish the marginal benefit of over-complying.
This benefit could take the form of more enforcement actions or passive learning effects on
how to produce with a cleaner technology. While this interpretation is consistent with the
context of the fracking industry, I exploit a natural experiment in a second step to better
identify this channel.
Specifically, I show that PE firms relatively double the amount of toxic components in Native American and federal territories when the Bureau of Land Management faced important
21

A PE sponsor provides a form of ownership that better aligns the incentives of owners with the corporate
managers (Jensen (1989), Gompers et al. (2016), Morris and Phalippou (2020)). The use of greater debt
disciplines managers, and PE firms increase managerial incentives to maximize profit through performancebased pay or better management practices (Bloom et al. (2015)). General partners, on behalf of limited
partners, control the board of their portfolio companies and actively monitor them. Moreover, general
partners do not generally have any personal connections with local communities that could interfere with
pollution decisions.
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legal hurdles to regulating fracking, caused by court decisions and the Trump administration’s hostility toward environmental regulation. This highly localized relative increase in
pollution does not reverse the average reduction observed during the whole period and for
all shale basins. It also confirms the initial interpretation of the baseline results and allows
us to plausibly reject an explanation fully driven by a non-pecuniary, financial constraint or
technological upgrade channels.
This average reduction in pollution is conditional on production happening with a given
technology and geological basins. This study is silent on any possible general equilibrium
effects of PE financing on the total amount of pollution that this sector generates. Measuring
such impact at the industry level is not in the scope of this study, as it would require knowing
(1) how the financing provided by PE firms can be substituted by other sources of funds,
(2) how the lack of PE financing delays production, and (3) how exogenous technological
progress in the oil and gas industry affects pollution. Moreover, this study is silent regarding
cross-industry effects. Acemoglu et al. (2019) highlight that shale gas activities can also have
general equilibrium across industries. If shale activities reduce the usage of coal, which is
more CO2 intensive, they also increase pollution by increasing total output and reducing
the incentive to innovate in clean energy.
There are at least two questions for further work. First, it would be interesting to investigate
whether private equity is an investment class that has superior contractual features for
implementing the non-pecuniary preferences of their limited partners. This question is
unclear and relevant given the recent surge of impact investing and the existence of impact
investing in private markets (Barber et al. (2021)). The ability of PE firms to closely monitor
their portfolio companies for environmental matters, as shown in this paper, is one way they
could provide an advantage to investors interested in implementing more environmentally
friendly policies. However, it becomes more difficult for limited partners to monitor PE’s
firms actions because of their private nature. Second, recent work highlights the importance
of environmental liability risks in firms’ ability to secure their debt (Bellon (2021) and
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Choy et al. (2021)) and document an important growth in ESG loans (Kim et al. (2021))
and green bonds (Flammer (2021)). How banks’ sensitivity to environmental factors —either
for risk or non-pecuniary motivations— affects the operational outcomes of PE leveraged
buyouts through their ability to improve the pledgeable income of PE’s portfolio companies
is unknown.
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Figure 2.1: Importance of pollution among PE deals
Figure 1.A
Fraction of deals in value by group, 2010-2020
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Figure 1.B

Note: Figure 1.A reports the fraction of PE investment in dollar value where a control right
is transferred in industries that emit a significant amount of pollution. This includes natural
resources, energy, transportation, infrastructure and manufacturing industries. Figure 1.B
reports the cumulative amount of the deal size in million of dollars between 2010 and 2020
for the ten industries that have the highest amount of deals in dollar values. For both graphs,
the investment types are: Add-on, Buyout, Growth Capital and PIPE. I use deal-level data
from Preqin to compute the figures.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution Of Projects
Figure 2.A: all projects

Figure 2.B: projects owned by PE-backed firms

Note: These two figure show the location of the projects that I use in the statistical analysis.
Sub-figure (a) shows all the projects, whereas sub-figure (b) only plots the projects that are owned
by a PE-backed firm at some point in the sample.

117

Figure 2.3: Structure Of A DrillCo Deal

Capital commitment:
• Development costs
• Carried amount

E&P

Investor assigments:
• WI in Tranche Wells
• Par:al reversion at IRR
hurdle(s)

PE

Note: This figure summarizes the structure of a DrillCo deal between a Private Equity (PE) firm
and an exploration & production (E&P) company.
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Figure 2.4: Raw Binscatter Of Pollution Around The PE Deal
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Note: This figure reports the binscatter of the toxic chemicals used during the production process
around the year of the PE deal. Each dot is the average of the number of toxic chemicals calculated
on 5% of the sample that have the closest distance in days after or before the deal for both the
treated and control group. Our treated group is the sample of projects made by firms that will be
purchased by a PE, whereas our control group is the sample of projects made by firms that will
not be purchased by a PE. The control group is constructed as follow: for each project among the
treated group, we select with replacement the project in the control group that has been completed
in the same basin and year, and has the closest size (horizontal length and vertical depth) and
production (both oil and gas) using the mahalanobis metric. We restrict the analysis on the sample
of firms that exist both before and after the deal for the treated group, although the graph remains
similar if we include unbalanced firms. Notice here that we are performing the matching both before
and after the deal, at the project level. The pattern observed is supporting the view that PE firms
reduced pollution, and the effect is the strongest three years after the deal. This analysis should be
interpreted in a non-causal way, as no fixed effect and controls are included.
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Figure 2.5: Impact Of PE Buyout On The Number Of Toxic Chemicals
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Note: This figure reports the dynamic difference-in-differences estimates around the PE buyout as
well as its confidence interval estimated in the full sample. More specifically, the (γτ )τ =−6,...,9,10 of
the following estimated equation are reported:
Yijt = Firmi + Locationj × Yeart +

10
X

γτ .(τ semester(s) after the PE deal) + controlsit + ϵijt

τ =−6

Where Yijt is the total number of toxic chemicals used for a well and as defined in Table 2.1. Firmi
is an operator fixed effect, that captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through
time and affects the decision to use toxic chemical. Locationj is a geographical fixed effect, that
regroups all wells that have the same first 2-digit longitude and latitude. To illustrate this grouping,
Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color if they have the same first two digits of latitude and
longitude and if they are situated in one half of the Marcellus formation. This location fixed effect
is interacted with a year Fixed effect (Yeart ). controlsit includes the production of oil and gas of
the well, its vertical depth and horizontal length. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
confidence intervals at the 5% level are reported.
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Figure 2.6: Impact Of PE Buyout On Flaring
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Note: The dependent variable takes one if the firm is flaring gas for the well i, 0 otherwise. I
construct the depend variable using satellite data, available starting from 2012. I validate this data
source by showing that the measure correctly captures the geographical (see figure B.2) and temporal
(see figure B.3) distribution of well activities. I restrict the sample to wells that are not too close one
from the other, although as we show in the online appendix, the results remain the same without
this restriction. The dynamic difference-in-differences estimates around the PE buyout as well as
its confidence interval are estimated using the full sample. The (γτ )τ =−4,...,9,10 of the following
estimated equation are reported:
Yijt = Firmi + Locationj × Yeart +

10
X

γτ .(τ semester(s) after the PE deal) + controlsit + ϵijt

τ =−4

where Yijt is whether the company is flaring the well i. Firmi is an operator fixed effect, that
captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through time and affects the decision to
flare. Locationj is a geographical fixed effect, that regroups all wells that have the same first 2-digit
longitude and latitude. To illustrate this grouping, Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color if
they have the same first two digits of latitude and longitude and if they are situated in one half of
the Marcellus formation. controlsit include the vertical depth and horizontal length of the well, but
does not include the production variables, as they are mechanically correlated with the dependent
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and confidence intervals at the 5% level are
reported.
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Figure 2.7: Impact Of Decreased Litigation Risks
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Note: This figure shows the dynamic difference-in-differences estimates on how PE-backed firms
reacted to changes in BLM authority to regulate fracking in Federal lands and Native American
reservations. It plots the difference in the usage of toxic pollutants for each semester between projects
in regulated and non-regulated areas within PE-backed firms. More specifically, the (θτ )τ =2013,...,2019
of the following estimated equation are reported:

Yijt = Firmi × Yeart + Locationj × Yeart +

2019
X

(year=τ ) × (BLM)i × θτ + Xit + ϵijt (2.5)

τ =2013

Yijt is the total number of toxic chemicals used and as defined in Table 2.1. BLMi is a dummy that
takes one if the well is located in a Federal land or a Native American reservation, 0 otherwise. Firmi
is an operator fixed effect, that captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through
time and affects the decision to use toxic chemical. Locationj is a geographical fixed effect, that
regroups all wells that have the same first 2-digit longitude and latitude. To illustrate this grouping,
Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color if they have the same first two digits of latitude and
longitude and if they are situated in one half of the Marcellus formation. This location and firm
fixed effect are both interacted with a year Fixed effect (Yeart ). Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and confidence intervals at the 10% level are reported. 2016 to 2017 include the time
when the preliminary injunction was granted, the rule stroke down by the district of Wyoming and
when the rule was voided by BLM (July 25, 2017) following the Trump administration. Finally, the
period between 2018 and 2019 correspond to the time during which the State of California Jan. 24,
2018 sued BLM for his decision to rescind the rule.
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Figure 2.8: Role Of Financial Constraints: Impact Of PE DrillCo On Pollution

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1 0
1
2
3
4
Semester around the deal

5

6

7

8

10

Note: This figure reports the dynamic difference-in-differences estimates around PE DrillCo deals
as well as its confidence interval estimated in the full sample. DrillCo deals are PE funding without
any transfer of control rights or changes in the firm’s capital structure. The (γτ )τ =−6,...,9,10 of the
following estimated equation are reported:
Yijt = Firmi + Locationj × Yeart +

10
X

γτ .(τ semester(s) after the PE deal) + controlsit + ϵijt

τ =−6

Where Yijt is the total number of toxic chemicals used for a well and as defined in Table 2.1. Firmi
is an operator fixed effect, that captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through
time and affects the decision to use toxic chemical. Locationj is a geographical fixed effect, that
regroups all wells that have the same first 2-digit longitude and latitude. To illustrate this grouping,
Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color if they have the same first two digits of latitude and
longitude and if they are situated in one half of the Marcellus formation. This location fixed effect
is interacted with a year Fixed effect (Yeart ). controlsit includes the production of oil and gas of
the well, its vertical depth and horizontal length. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
confidence intervals at the 5% level are reported.
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Table 2.1: Definition And Source Of Toxic Chemicals
Chemical name

CAS number

Toxicity

2-butoxyethanol

111-76-2

Xylene
Toluene
Ethylbenzene
Benzene
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate
2-Propenamide
Copper
Lead

1330-20-7
108-88-3
100-41-4
71-43-2
117-81-7
79-06-1
7440-50-8
7439-92-1

cause hemolysis (destruction of
red blood cells), spleen, liver, and
bone marrow.
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA
human carcinogen, SDWA, CAA

Note: The Table reports the chemicals used as our main dependent variable. They have in common
that they are both highly toxic and salient as they have been reported in environmental reports as well
as reports from the United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (for
instance, April 2011). Most of them are regulated at the federal level, but the hydraulic fracturing
benefits from several exemptions: this industry is not subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) and to several permitting and pollution control requirements from the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Human carcinogens are substances that promote the formation of cancers.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, full sample (project level)
Mean
.282
.216
8.043
48.092
107.571
47.1048
8984.05
6552.907
256476.3
45543.9

Number of toxic chemicals
Flaring
Productivity
Production per fracturation
Density population
Density housing
Vertical depth
horizontal depth
First 6 months gas
First 6 months oil

S.D.
.546
.411
32.632
75.930
616.922
258.970
2463.7
2503.967
376568.3
45877.21

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
628
0
0
0

Max
4
1
2208
2340.63
6211.5
2479.6
36386.56
19982.37
8030048
608979

Panel B: Descriptive statistics, full sample (Firm level)
Projects
Basin
Coarser location
Location
State

mean
97.49
1.70
10.68
2.94
1.372

S.D.
490.65
1.82
36.83
5.42
1.1740

min
1
1
1
1
1

max
7765
23
603
85
18

Note: These tables report the baseline descriptive statistics. Panel A reports information for the
full sample at the project level and Panel B when data at the firm level are used.
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Table 2.3: Comparison: PE ownership
Panel A: Firm level
Variables
Group treated

Control group

Diff

S.D.

Projects
Basin
Coarser location
Location
State

98.26
1.71
10.58
2.91
1.38

2.740
-0.397*
2.092
0.031
-0.375*

70.204
0.219
5.827
1.014
0.203

101.00
1.23
12.52
2.94
0.98

Panel B: Project level
Nb toxic chemicals
Flaring
Completion time
Prod. per Frac.
Population
Housing
True Vertical Depth
Horizontal Length
First 6 Gas
First 6 Oil

Treated
0.18
0.14
12.28
30.06
56.16
25.12
9284.62
5840.44
127451.91
44577.78

Control
0.29
0.15
6.15
58.64
146.32
63.29
8472.03
6606.14
231403.38
29711.73

Diff.
-0.109
-0.009
6.127∗∗∗
-28.577∗∗∗
-90.158∗∗∗
-38.174∗∗∗
812.586∗∗∗
-765.703∗∗∗
-103951.476∗∗∗
14866.054∗∗

S.D
0.091
0.015
2.179
5.550
25.584
10.729
270.587
192.083
24957.240
6836.856

Adj Diff
-0.086∗
-0.007
6.649∗∗∗
-1.145
6.343
2.393
-92.787
-57.728
-2383.608
11747∗∗∗

Adj S.D.
0.050
0.017
2.307
1.500
6.905
3.034
80.136
67.369
6038.700
3986.702

Note: These tables report descriptive statistics. Panel A depicts the difference in characteristics
when there is no PE ownership for both the control and treated group. Panel B reports the difference
in characteristics at the firm level when there is no PE ownership for both the control and treated
group. Adj diff and adj p are after the inclusion of the following FE, that are used in the regressions:
(1) geographical groups based on the first two digits of the latitude and longitude interacted with a
year FE. Standard errors are clustered at the basin-year level. S.D. stands for the standard deviation
of the difference.
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Table 2.4: Comparison: DrillCo Transactions
Panel A: Firm level
Variables
Group treated

Control group

Diff.

S.D.

Projects
Basin
Coarser location
Location
State

89.03
1.67
10.17
2.85
1.36

298.914
0.504
17.576∗
2.438
0.214

197.390
0.615
9.064
1.706
0.413

387.89
2.18
27.75
5.29
1.57

Panel B: Project level
Variables

Treated

Control

Diff.

S.D.

Adj. Diff.

Adj. S.D.

Nb toxic chemicals
Flaring
Completion time
Prod. per Frac.
Population
Housing
True Vertical Depth
Horizontal Length
First 6 Gas
First 6 Oil

0.31
0.1
4.54
43.08
136.82
59.99
8650.31
6637.25
168061.98
25676.5

0.28
0.15
6.46
59.22
142.2
61.49
8487.59
6543.04
233148.38
30436.48

0.027
-0.048
-1.92
-16.139
-5.375
-1.507
162.719
94.209
-65086.401∗
-4759.975

0.123
0.031
1.513
11.509
91.913
38.614
427.494
554.741
35680.1
8054.986

0.071
-0.022
0.582
-2.441
-0.815
-0.618
20.226
173.417∗∗
10744.812∗
2627.599

0.053
0.034
0.401
2.244
3.794
1.811
60.098
86.767
5901.011
2269.102

Note: These tables report descriptive statistics. Panel A depicts the difference in characteristics
before a DrillCo is signed for both the control and treated group. Panel B reports the difference
in characteristics at the firm level when there is no DrillCo signed for both the control and treated
group. Adj diff and adj p are after the inclusion of the following FE, that are used in the regressions:
(1) geographical groups based on the first two digits of the latitude and longitude interacted with a
year FE. Standard errors are clustered at the basin-year level. S.D. stands for the standard deviation
of the difference.
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Table 2.5: Comparison: Native American reservations / Federal Lands And The Others
Variables

Treated

Control

Diff.

S.D.

Adj. Diff.

Adj. S.D.

Nb toxic chemicals
Flaring
Completion time
Prod. per Frac.
Population
Housing
True Vertical Depth
Horizontal Length
First 6 Gas
First 6 Oil

0.31
0.17
4.38
44.2
135.41
54.83
8803.85
6559.74
129676.43
20226.34

0.21
0.12
4.19
57.04
137.34
60.28
8384.6
6010.92
189215.88
22241.5

0.105∗∗
0.051∗
0.189
-12.842∗
-1.929
-5.457
419.254
548.824∗
-59539.453∗∗
-2015.155

0.05
0.029
0.811
7.637
48.067
18.154
364.981
327.777
24341.688
3715.142

0.017
0.013
1.067∗
-1.289∗
-7.175∗
-3.389∗
51.574
119.689
-3448.482
-43.474

0.029
0.009
0.547
0.762
4.189
2.023
41.177
101.757
2236.68
765.643

Note: These tables report descriptive statistics. This table depicts the differences in characteristics
between projects in federal lands and Native American reservations before the preliminary injunction
of September 2015. Adj diff and adj p are after the inclusion of the following FE, that are used in
the regressions: (1) geographical groups based on the first two digits of the latitude and longitude
interacted with a year FE. Standard errors are clustered at the basin-year level. S.D. stands for the
standard deviation of the difference.
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Table 2.6: Impact Of PE On Pollution: Baseline Results
Panel A: Toxic chemicals
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
PE deal with control rights
Drillco (no control rights)
Post deal
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Basin × Year FE
Adjusted R2
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3) NNM

(4)

(5)

(6) NNM

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.209∗∗∗
(0.036)

-0.038
(0.046)

-0.038
(0.046)

-0.022
(0.048)

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

0.56
135554

0.56
135554

0.55
135738

0.55
135738

X
0.35
21433

X
0.45
28581

Panel B: Flaring
Dependent variable: Whether the well is flared
PE deal with control rights
Drillco (no control rights)
Post deal
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Basin × Year FE
Adjusted R2
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3) NNM

(4)

(5)

(6) NNM

-0.044∗∗

-0.045∗∗

-0.028∗∗

0.039∗∗∗

0.040∗∗∗

0.038∗∗∗
(0.010)

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

0.37
96787

0.37
96787

0.37
96787

0.37
96787

(0.019)

(0.019)

(0.013)

X
0.21
14252

(0.010)

(0.011)

X
0.26
21324

Note: Columns (1), (2) and (3) report the impact of PE ownership on pollution and columns (4),
(5) and (6) study the impact of PE financing through DrillCo contracts on pollution. Column (1)
and (4) estimate the relationship without controls, that are added in column (2) and (5). The
coefficients remain stable when the controls are added. Column (3) and (6) contain the results when
the relationship is estimated on the matched sample using a nearest neighbor matching (NNM)
approach, both before and after the deal at the project level. The matched sample is constructed
as follow: for each project that belongs to a firm that is acquired by a PE, we matched within the
same geographical area (basin) and year, the project that has the closest size (horizontal length
and vertical depth) and production (6 first months production of oil and gas). For Panel A, the
dependent variable is the number of toxic chemicals used in the production process. Panel B reports
the results where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes one if the project has flared gas.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.7: BLM Natural Experiment
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Federal or Indian well
× Post deal × Post Injunction

0.383∗∗∗
(0.090)

0.382∗∗∗
(0.091)

0.308∗∗∗
(0.084)

0.309∗∗∗
(0.084)

Post deal × Post Injunction

-0.016
(0.054)
-0.053
(0.055)
-0.015
(0.052)
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.056)
0.033
(0.026)
0.014
(0.024)

-0.016
(0.054)
-0.052
(0.055)
-0.015
(0.052)
-0.191∗∗∗
(0.056)
0.033
(0.026)
0.015
(0.023)

-0.005
(0.058)
-0.032
(0.061)
-0.045
(0.046)
(.)
(.)
0.044∗
(0.024)
0.013
(0.024)

-0.005
(0.058)
-0.033
(0.061)
-0.045
(0.046)
(.)
(.)
0.044∗
(0.024)
0.013
(0.024)

X

X
X

X
0.62
135257

X
0.62
135257

Federal or Indian well × Post deal
Federal or Indian well × Post Injunction
Post deal
Federal or Indian well
Post Injunction
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Adjusted R2
Observations

X
X
X
0.56
135738

X
X
0.56
135738

Note: The table reports a triple difference-in-differences that estimate the differential impact of the
BLM litigation on pollution for Native American reservations and federal lands for firms that are
owned by a PE firm. The variable “Post Injunction” takes the value one if the project starts between
30/09/2015 (day of the preliminary injunction) and 24/01/2018 (day when the State of California
sued BLM over the rescission). The coefficient of particular interest is: Federal or Indian well ×
Post deal × Post Injunction and is negative, which shows that PE-backed firm increases pollution
following a reduction in litigation and compliance risks. Panel B reports the net effect. For both
panels, columns (1) and (2) contain a firm fixed effect, whereas columns (3) and (4) contain a firmyear fixed effect. Controls are added in column (2) and (4) and the coefficients of interest remain
stable.
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CHAPTER 3
Personal Wealth, Self-Employment, and Business Ownership
joint work with J. Anthony Cookson, Erik Gilje, Rawley Heimer
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3.1. Introduction
Liquidity constraints have long been thought to be a crucial barrier to entrepreneurship
(see e.g., Evans and Jovanovic (1989)). Despite significant academic attention, the empirical evidence on the role of liquidity constraints is inconclusive. Early work sought to
test this link by relating entrepreneurial decisions to wealth from inheritances (see e.g.,
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994); Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)). However, drawing causal inference between wealth and entrepreneurship has been challenging because wealth shocks
can correlate with other factors that drive business formation (Hurst and Lusardi (2004)).
More recently, the literature has studied shocks to households’ liquidity through their access
to credit markets. Yet, more access to credit has been found to have positive effects, negative
effects, or no effect at all (Dobbie et al. (2020); Bos et al. (2018); Herkenhoff et al. (2021)).
Given these ambiguous findings, how liquidity constraints affect entrepreneurial decisions
remains an open question.
This paper makes two contributions to our understanding of how liquidity constraints relate
to entrepreneurial decisions. First, we introduce a new set of individual wealth shocks that
makes progress on the identification challenges faced in prior empirical work. Specifically,
we collect data on cash windfalls paid to individuals from shale natural gas extraction.
Conditional on owning mineral rights, the size of the windfall is difficult to anticipate and
is driven by factors outside of the individual’s control, such as the timing and extent of
exploration by extraction companies. Thus, our identification strategy is to compare entrepreneurship choices (both self-employment and business formation) for individuals who
receive large cash windfalls (e.g., > $50,000) versus smaller or no windfalls. Second, we use
detailed credit profile information to study how the effects of cash windfalls differ for two
types of entrepreneurial activities – self-employment and business formation – that prior
work has tended to study independently. Using these comparisons, we develop insight into
how liquidity constraints affect entrepreneurship, including why prior work has produced a
range of conflicting findings.

132

Our main results show that the impact of personal wealth on entrepreneurial activity depends
critically on how entrepreneurship is measured. Our setting permits us to distinguish the
effects of personal wealth on self-employment from the effects on business ownership. Recent
survey evidence supports the interpretation that the formation of an incorporated business is
more closely linked to Schumpeterian growth, whereas self-employment reflects less growthoriented pursuits, such as subsistence work and a preference to be one’s own boss.1 Though
the survey literature identifies distinct types of entrepreneurial activity, many attempts to
estimate the effect of wealth on entrepreneurship do not distinguish these two, often due to
data limitations (see, e.g., Bos et al. (2018)). We observe striking differences by entrepreneur
type when we draw the distinction between self-employment and business formation. For
example, personal wealth shocks greater than $50,000 increase business formation by 0.8 to
2.1 percentage points, but these same wealth shocks do not spur new self-employment spells.
Viewing these results together, wealth shocks can increase entrepreneurship but the positive
effects are for the formation of incorporated businesses in which liquidity constraints are
more likely relevant.
We also test whether cash windfalls affect the likelihood of remaining in self-employment
or business ownership. We find that cash windfalls significantly extend pre-existing selfemployment spells. Conditional on being initially self-employed, those receiving large cash
windfalls (> $50,000) are 16.2 percentage points per year more likely to remain self-employed.
By contrast, wealth shocks do not affect the duration of business ownership beyond the initial
entry decision. Combined with the results on entry, the impact of wealth shocks on selfemployment versus business ownership are quite distinct, which suggests one reason why
prior work obtains conflicting findings.
Our setting and additional tests provide robustness and credibility to these results. First,
1

Hurst and Pugsley (2011) survey entrepreneurs and find that the non-pecuniary motives include factors
such as a desire to be one’s own boss, wanting flexible working hours, or to pursue one’s passion. In our
measurement, self-employment most closely maps to unincorporated businesses or subsistence entrepreneurs
(Schoar (2010)), whereas business owners identified in our data are explicitly incorporated business owners,
and thus, more likely to have greater entrepreneurial ambitions (Levine and Rubinstein (2017)).
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in using shale royalty payments to individuals, our results rely on variation in personal
wealth that the individual receiving the payment has no control of. In our most refined
specification, we compare individuals who both received payments, but one received a large
payment versus another received a small payment, holding constant the parcel size of mineral
acreage. Second, for each of our main results, we perform a specification curve analysis
(proposed by Simonsohn et al. (2015), and applied in Cookson (2018); Akey et al. (2021)),
which transparently shows the sensitivity of our conclusions to different specification choices.
For 64 specifications that span all the different choices of controls, we find these main
results hold across a wide array of potential controls after conditioning on mineral acreage
owned. Third, our tests exploit the timing of individuals receiving large payments in a panel
difference-in-difference setting. Prior to receiving the first cash payment, individuals are on
similar trends, which diverge upon realizing the windfall. Finally, we employ a placebo test
where we redefine the treatment group to be individuals who receive small payments (i.e,
lower than $50,000, but more than $10 with an average of $1,922.101 in payment received).
We find that small payments have no effect on both self-employment and business formation.
Turning to economic mechanisms, our findings on business ownership are consistent with
models of liquidity constraints as a barrier to entrepreneurship (e.g., Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979); Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Manso (2016)), as well as prior work on financial constraints of existing young firms (Hadlock and Pierce (2010); Robb and Robinson (2014)).
We find that large cash windfalls spur new business formation but they have no effect on
the continuation decision for those who already own a business. These findings support the
view proposed by the literature that financial frictions are acute at firm birth, but that they
diminish over time.2 In this way, our finding that personal wealth does not affect the business exit margin is consistent with conventional corporate finance teachings that business
2
For concrete evidence related to the lower importance of financial frictions after the initial business
formation, Robb and Robinson (2014) show that owners of young firms contribute significantly less capital
to their business after the first few years of business ownership. Specifically, capital injections from owners
of incorporated businesses decline sharply from $84,900 in year 1 (30% as a proportion of capital raised)
to $27,000 in year 4 (14.2% as a proportion of capital raised). At the same time, firms use more external
capital as time goes on, suggesting a rapid easing of financial constraints.
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owners should pursue projects with positive net present value, and thus, they should treat
unexpected cash windfalls as unrelated to the decision to continue business operations.3
Our findings on self-employment entry and exit contrast with the pattern of results for business ownership. Specifically, we find that wealth has little impact on inducing regularlyemployed individuals to start new self-employment spells.

On the other hand, wealth

shocks substantially extend pre-existing self-employment spells. These results suggest that
self-employment entry and exit dynamics require a distinct conceptual framework relative to business formation dynamics. One potential explanation is that self-employment
is akin to a luxury good for those who value its private benefits, an argument put forth in
Hurst and Pugsley (2017). Adapting this idea to our setting, we expect that individuals sort
into self-employment based on their preference for self-employment because they enter lowscale activities that have few barriers to entry. Accordingly, people who are self-employed
(not self-employed) before receiving wealth windfalls place high (low) value on the private
benefits of self-employment. Given that peoples’ initial choice reveals how much they value
self-employment, regularly-employed individuals are unlikely to use personal wealth shocks
to enter self-employment, consistent with our finding that wealth shocks do not encourage
new self-employment spells. Relating this framework to exits, self-employed individuals extend their spells after receiving wealth shocks because it allows them to be self-employed for
longer, appealing to the high value they place on the private benefits of self-employment.4
In further support of this idea, we find that individuals who continue self-employment after
3

In a related vein, Howell (2017) studies the impact of cash windfalls from R&D grants that are ostensibly
granted to a firm, but could be used for other purposes. Though the R&D grants were technically cash
windfalls that were unrestricted in their use, they were saliently linked to the firm itself, and could admit a
“flypaper effect.” By contrast, the windfalls we study are from an unexpected source (natural gas extraction
from shale) that is unrelated to the person’s business in most cases. Thus, from a conventional worldview
without frictions or private benefits from owning a business, an entrepreneur should not factor the shale cash
windfalls into the business continuation decision, a prediction that is consistent with our empirical evidence.
4
In a fully dynamic equilibrium without additional frictions, private benefits to self-employment give
rise to a potential extensive margin effect arising from a subset of people who exit self-employment who
subsequently receive a wealth windfall that would cause them to re-enter self-employment. However, it is
natural to expect that individuals incur a switching cost for transitioning between regular employment and
self-employment, which typically entails low scale, low prestige, subsistence activities (e.g., human capital
depletion, social status reduction, among others). Because tests that distinguish particular switching cost
mechanisms require data on the nature of these costs that are unavailable in our setting, it is beyond the
scope of our paper to pin down the precise frictions.
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receiving shale royalties earn lower incomes than those who exit self-employment.
We also evaluate how a larger set of theories may relate to the empirical patterns we observe
for self-employment. For example, according to the experimentation view of entrepreneurship (Manso (2016) and Dillon and Stanton (2017)), the wealth shock may alleviate a financial constraint that emerges at an intermediate stage of the venture. In this framework,
self-employment enables individuals to try out ideas at low scale before injecting capital at
an intermediate stage to eventually grow the business idea. Although this is a plausible
potential mechanism for why wealth shocks extend self-employment spells, we find no evidence that wealth shocks speed the transition from self-employment into business ownership.
Distinct from the experimentation view, behavioral theories, such as the sunk cost fallacy,
posit that self-employed individuals might double down on their struggling business ventures
when a wealth shock allows it. Such behavior would explain why individuals extend selfemployment spells after receiving a windfall, but without additional assumptions about who
exhibits the bias, this theory has a harder time explaining why windfalls do not also induce
business owners to remain in business ownership for longer. In contrast to these alternative theories, the private benefits framework explains why there could be different effects of
cash windfalls on business ownership versus self-employment because the framework predicts
that individuals sort into these different activities based on their preferences. Namely, individuals with strong non-pecuniary motivations choose low-scale entrepreneurial activities
like self-employment, and via this same selection mechanism, people who choose to own an
incorporated business tend to be motivated less by private benefits. The sorting across business ownership and self-employment in our setting aligns well with Levine and Rubinstein
(2017)’s survey evidence that the owners of incorporated businesses are more motivated by
business growth. Although the private benefits framework provides a parsimonious explanation for our findings on self-employment and business ownership dynamics, we acknowledge
that self-employment entry and exit behavior might also be influenced by these alternative
economic mechanisms.
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Our paper makes several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature.

First, we

present contrasting findings for self-employment and business ownership, which offers a
novel perspective within the literature that studies entrepreneurship types.

Notably,

prior work has identified a wide set of motivations that characterize entrepreneurial decisions (e.g., Puri and Robinson (2007, 2013); Astebro et al. (2014); Hvide and Panos (2014);
Lafontaine and Shaw (2016); Kerr et al. (2019); De Meza et al. (2019)), and has linked
these motivations to different types of entrepreneurship (Levine and Rubinstein (2017)).
From both a survey and theoretical perspective, these studies propose that the most impactful entrepreneurial ventures are found when individuals form incorporated businesses
(Hurst and Pugsley (2017)). Relative to this literature, the heterogeneous effects of personal
wealth windfalls draw a sharp distinction between self-employment and business formation
decisions. Beyond differing motivations, our results show that self-employment and business
ownership are economically distinct activities that likely respond differently to the same
policies.
Our evidence on personal wealth shocks also relates to the empirical literature on barriers
to entrepreneurship (e.g., Bianchi and Bobba (2013); Blattman et al. (2014); Gottlieb et al.
(2016); Naaraayanan (2019); Hombert et al. (2020)). For example, previous work has examined how entrepreneurship is affected by shocks from household balance sheets, and
separately, shocks to the broader banking sector (e.g., Black and Strahan (2002); Kerr et al.
(2015); Fracassi et al. (2016); Bernstein et al. (2018b)).5 Within this literature, our paper
shows how wealth shocks affect entry and exit decisions into self-employment versus business
ownership. By contrasting the effects for these distinct types of entrepreneurial activity, our
work shows emphasizes the importance of understanding the competing mechanisms that
drive entrepreneurial activity (e.g., initial liquidity constraints versus preferences for en5

Much related work uses shocks to credit supply that have enjoyed broad application in
the financial economics literature – e.g., housing wealth (Adelino et al. (2015); Corradin and Popov
(2015); Harding and Rosenthal (2017); Schmalz et al. (2017)) and intrastate banking deregulation
(Black and Strahan (2002); Kerr and Nanda (2009); Rice and Strahan (2010)). Beyond these shocks to
credit, the literature has studied how entrepreneurial activity responds to a wide variety of novel shocks
to households (see e.g., Andersen and Nielsen (2012); Hanspal (2016); Bernstein et al. (2018a); Fos et al.
(2019); Kleiner and Hacamo (2019); Babina (2020)).
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trepreneurship).
Further, we contribute to the understanding of the impacts of personal wealth windfalls
on entrepreneurial decisions.6 Specifically, our study of the impact of cash windfalls from
shale most closely relates to prior and contemporaneous work (e.g., Cespedes et al. (2019);
Mikhed et al. (2019); Bermejo et al. (2019)).7 In this respect, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996)
uses data from Sweden to argue that winning the lottery results in increasing transitions
into self-employment. However, even within the setting of Swedish lotteries, Cesarini et al.
(2017) find opposing results, and attribute the difference to the fact that they control for the
number of lottery tickets purchased. The analogous feature of the shale windfall setting is to
control for the amount of mineral acreage, as we do in all of our empirical tests. In this way,
our paper makes an identification contribution, which helps us to resolve inconsistencies in
the literature. Another distinguishing feature of our setting is that we study a broad sample
of individuals in the United States, which is not necessarily representative, but combined
with the insights of prior literature, our results help to complete the picture of how wealth
windfalls matter.

3.2. Setting and Data
3.2.1. Overview of Barnett Shale and Mineral Rights
Our study focuses on a sample of oil and gas mineral owners with claims to mineral extraction in the Barnett Shale of Texas from 2010 through 2015. The Barnett Shale was the
first shale gas development in the United States. Before the mid-2000s, shale gas had been
uneconomic to drill and develop. However, the combination of horizontal drilling with hy6

Beyond labor market outcomes, a kindred line of research studies the effects of wealth shocks on a
variety of other outcomes including asset market participation, credit market outcomes, personal happiness, and health (Hankins et al. (2011); Cesarini et al. (2016); Cookson et al. (2019); Briggs et al. (2021);
Agarwal et al. (2020); Lindqvist et al. (2020)).
7
Related work examines how aggregate new business opportunities originating from the Fracking Boom
affects the entry of new firms and the expansion of preexisting firms (e.g., see Decker et al. (2018)). Though
our work shares an interest in the entry and exit dynamics linked to fracking activity, our measurement of
the shock at the individual level allow us to speak to the role of personal income, as distinct from industrial
responses to regional opportunities, which has been the focus of most of the research on the role of new firms
in responding to the shale shock. More broadly, our work uses unique variation within the literature that
has exploited variation from the shale oil and gas extraction context. For example Gilje (2019), Gilje et al.
(2016), Cunningham et al. (2017), and Feyrer et al. (2017).
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draulic fracturing (“fracking”), by Devon Energy and George Mitchell, led to a technological
breakthrough which allowed vast new quantities of natural gas to be developed. According
to the U.S. Energy Information administration, shale gas production was less than 1% of
total U.S. natural gas production in the year 2000, but by 2015 accounted for 46.2% of total
U.S. gas production. Moreover, the Barnett Shale was the first shale development in the
United States. It was also among the most prolific – the four Barnett Shale counties in
our analysis accounted for 17.3% of total U.S. shale gas production when shale production
peaked in 2012. There is a 14-fold increase in shale wells during the time period of our
study. We start in 2010 largely because that is the first year in which we can construct
panel data with detailed work status and business ownership information. Even after development in the Barnett Shale begins, timing of payments and quantities are challenging for
mineral owners to determine. Moreover, our main specifications provide results that focus
on mineral owners that have similar sized mineral tracts (similar exposure to the shock), but
ended up having different quantities of natural gas produced. In the context of our empirical
design, Section 3.3.3 provides evidence that individuals did not anticipate the payments they
would eventually receive (even after 2010) – we find parallel trends in self-employment rates
between those who receive large windfalls against our control samples.
Who owns mineral rights in the United States? These rights typically reside with individuals whose families were involved in the initial permanent settlements of oil and gas
producing regions of the United States. The mineral rights were then often severed from
surface rights when those families migrated elsewhere. According to news articles and other
anecdotes about mineral ownership, the discovery of shale and the resulting wealth shock
was largely unexpected by individual recipients. For example, the following characterization
by Kiplinger’s Magazine is relatively common:
“Pam Cooner, 42, an occupational therapist in Houston, has collected about
$15,000 in the past year for a fractional ownership of mineral rights. Cooner was
surprised when contacted by a landman about the rights. She didn’t know she’d
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inherited them—as had 13 other distant family members. In August, Cooner
got a $400 royalty check for rights on another property, owned jointly with a
different, non-family group—again, a total surprise.”
For those fortunate to own minerals, which typically occurred through family ancestry, the
shale breakthrough caused the mineral rights, previously a deep out-of-the-money option,
to become a valuable cash-flow stream when natural gas was drilled. Therefore, although
people who own minerals are not a purely random sample of U.S. individuals, the increase
in personal wealth these mineral owners experience was due to an exogenous technological
breakthrough over which these individuals did not have control.
3.2.2. Oil and Gas Lease and Royalty Data
When an oil and gas firm decides to drill and develop an oil and gas reservoir, it must first
negotiate a contract, often with a private individual for the right to do so. These private
individuals constitute our sample of royalty recipients. Contracts to develop oil and gas
compensate a mineral owner in two ways. First, prior to any extraction, a mineral owner
will receive an upfront bonus payment, which will typically be a dollar per acre value. For
example, a person receiving a $5,000 per acre bonus that owns 10 net mineral acres would
receive a check for $50,000. Second, once extraction commences, individuals receive a royalty
stream based on their share in a well. In our sample, royalty percentages range from 12.5%
to 30%, with 18.75% being the most common. An individual’s dollar royalty payment is
also scaled by their interest percentage in a drilling unit. In Texas, the law is such that
royalties are computed based on gross revenues, and no costs can legally be deducted from
the gross revenue. For example, if a well generates gross revenue of $10,000 in a month, and
an individual owns 10 net mineral acres at a 20% royalty on a 400 acre drilling unit, that
individual would receive a check for $10,000*10/400*20% = $50 for that month.
Accurate data on payments that individuals receive is difficult to obtain and compute.
Fortunately, in the state of Texas, unlike in other states, mineral owners are required to pay
property tax. Texas requires all oil and gas firms to turn over their so-called “pay decks”
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with detailed well-by-well ownership interest information to the state. We use this royalty
interest information to compute an ownership value based on the production profile of each
well. Because property tax information is public information in the state of Texas, we used
open record requests to obtain the detailed title and ownership information that private
firms paid millions of dollars to construct. The data are provided in PDF format, which
required us to convert the images into usable data. In our study, we focused on compiling
mineral appraisal roll data for the four main producing counties in the Barnett Shale going
back to the year 2010. Though shale drilling eventually expanded to states outside of Texas,
the identities of individuals who own mineral rights to oil and gas wells in other states is not
easily attained. Public county court records can be used to compute ownership percentages,
but this often requires manually searching county indices and filings, and oil and gas firms
typically pay an average of $50,000 per well to compile accurate royalty owner information
from these public records. To put this in perspective, the number of wells in our sample is
7,041.
A crucial feature of our mineral roll appraisals is that they provide the address at which
each mineral owner receives tax bills. This accurate address is useful for ensuring a high
quality merge with credit bureau data. Furthermore, we used the well ownership percentages
to calculate individuals’ royalty payments. To do so, we matched these percentages with
well production and natural gas pricing. For each well in our sample, we compile monthly
production data from the oil and gas regulatory body in Texas -- the Texas Railroad Commission. We then multiply production by prevailing spot natural gas prices reported by the
U.S. energy information administration for a given month, this computation gives us the
total gross revenue of a well, which combined with ownership information from the mineral
rolls, is sufficient to calculate the amount of each individual check.
In our sample, royalty payments from production account for 60% of total payments. The
remaining payments are the bonus payments that mineral owners received at the time a
lease was signed. To compute bonus payments, we conducted public record requests for
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all oil and gas leases from the four counties in our study, as well as county indexes. The
lease bonus payment in many cases is not reported on a lease because it is not required to
be. However, many leases do have this information, as well as net acreage amounts. Based
on the leases that do have lease bonus information we estimate a regression to predict the
lease bonus payment on a dollar-per-acre basis using time fixed effects, county fixed effects,
and operator fixed effects. The R-squared we obtain from the regression is 0.82. We then
use this predicted amount to estimate the lease bonus amounts for the remaining sample in
which we do not have direct data on bonus payments.
Once we have computed lease bonus payments and royalty payments for the sample, we then
merge the royalty payment data and the lease bonus payment data to obtain our overall
payment amounts. Overall the payment that someone receives is a function of prevailing
natural gas prices, the amount of net mineral acreage they own, and the amount of natural
gas produced on their mineral acreage. Crucially, as shale development increased over time,
there was a high degree of spatial heterogeneity in well production. This variation frequently
caused individuals to receive vastly different payment amounts, even when these individuals
are from the same region and own similar amounts of mineral acreage.
3.2.3. Experian Data Overview
We contracted with Experian to merge the mineral rights data with two distinct data sets
that Experian maintains: (i) individual-level credit bureau data and (ii) business owner
credit data.8 We provided Experian information on payments, names and addresses, Experian conducted the merge on name and address, and returned to us the payments data
merged with credit bureau data without the personally-identifying data fields. In addition,
Experian provided us with two control samples, (i) a sample matched on the geography and
age distribution of our Experian records, and (ii) a nationally representative sample. The
merge with credit bureau data returned an 80 percent match rate.
8
Copyright 2018 Experian. All rights reserved. Experian and the Experian marks used herein are
trademarks or registered trademarks of Experian Information Solutions, Inc. Other product and company
names mentioned herein are the property of their respective owners.

142

Self-Employment and Business Ownership Data
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on the panel data set for person-year observations
in our merged sample (2010–2015). We restrict attention to mineral owners (and their
matched controls) who received their first mineral payment after 2010 because this is the
earliest year in which we can observe entrepreneurial decisions.9 To focus on a consistent
sample in the person-year panel, we restrict attention to mineral owners (and matched
controls) who received no mineral payments prior to 2011, and for whom we have complete
data from 2010 through 2015. These restrictions leave us with a sample of 85,102 mineral
owners (74,149 of whom received a cash windfall versus 10,953 who received no payment
despite owning mineral rights) and 85,102 control individuals drawn from the Experian
sample. We observe each of the 170,204 individuals in our sample across all six years in
our sample, adding up to 1,021,224 person-year observations. In the merged sample, we
observe annual snapshots of personal credit bureau characteristics for each individual and
business credit characteristics for businesses owned by the individual (if the individual is a
business owner). The consumer credit data contain fields that are commonly studied using
credit bureau data (e.g., credit score, estimated personal incomes modeled using actual W2
statements), together with a demographics file. Unique to our study, Experian provided
us with individual-year observations between 2010 and 2015 on two distinct entrepreneurial
decisions – self-employment and business ownership. These two variables are the primary
outcome variables in our regressions.
We infer self-employment status from a textual field from Experian’s demographics file.
This textual field lists the name of the employer of an individual (e.g., “Fort Worth Independent School District”). When someone is self-employed, the textual field is clearly indicated
as “self-employed.” Alternatively, an individual who starts a business may choose to in9

For a detailed discussion of this data merge in the context of household debt, see Cookson et al. (2019).
Although Cookson et al. (2019) uses the same data merge as this paper, the identifying variation from the
wealth windfalls is quite distinct. Cookson et al. (2019) study the impact of small-to-moderate payments
on household debt repayment. By contrast, the present paper gets identifying variation from large cash
windfalls (> $50,000 or > $100,000). Apart from this difference in identifying variation from the shale
windfalls, the lessons from these two papers apply to substantively different domains of life.
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corporate that business, in which case the name of the incorporated business would show
up as the employer. Thus, the self-employment measure is unlikely to reflect incorporated
entrepreneurship.
To measure incorporated entrepreneurship, we look to Experian’s business credit data. For
each individual in our sample, we observe annual snapshots of business credit characteristics
from 2010 through 2015 when the individual owns that business. Thus, we observe directly
whether someone is a business owner annually between 2010 and 2015 for businesses that
have applied for credit, and have an Experian business credit profile. In addition to the
requirement that the business applied for credit, the business credit data have a flag that
indicates whether the business is incorporated, which we use to insist that the individual’s
business is incorporated. This procedure helps us identify business ventures that are incorporated, which relates to similar classifications in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g.,
Levine and Rubinstein (2017)).
These two measures of entrepreneurial decisions have several properties that validate their
use. First, there is minimal overlap between self-employed individuals and business owners in our sample, which confirms that the two measures capture distinct entrepreneurial
activities. This can be seen in the subsamples presented in Panels B and C of Table 3.1.
For example, conditional on an individual being self-employed in 2010 (Panel B), only 3%
of person-year observations between 2010 and 2015 are business owners. Conversely, if an
individual is a business owner in 2010, only 5% of person-year observations between 2010
and 2015 correspond to that individual being self-employed.10 These summary statistics
clearly indicate that self-employment and business ownership are distinct economic activities, consistent with similar classifications in the literature (see. e.g., Levine and Rubinstein
(2017)).
10

The subsamples in Panels B and C of Table 3.1 are based on whether the individual was self-employed or
a business owner in 2010. Thus, some of the business owner observations in the self-employment sample could
reflect subsequent transitions from self-employment into business ownership. In this vein, Dillon and Stanton
(2017) study how self-employment provides a potential stepping stone toward future business formation. In
our setting, we find little evidence that cash windfalls facilitate transitions from self-employment to business
ownership (e.g., see the discussion in Section 3.4.2 and results in Table 3.8).
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Second, as an external validation exercise, we benchmark the propensity to be self-employed
from the credit bureau to two other data sources used in the literature — the American
Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS). To ensure the direct
comparability of the samples, we employ our nationally-representative sample for these
validation exercises. To illustrate this comparison, we plot self employment propensity
at the state-year level and find a high degree of correlation with measures of unincorporated
self-employment while obtaining a lower correlation with incorporated self-employment in
the public use microdata (see Figure 3.2). Further, it does not appear to be the case
that self-employment is a stand-in for being unemployed. For example, we report a similar
comparison between self-employment and unemployment rates (aggregated to the state-year
level), and we find that self-employment is actually negatively related to unemployment rates
(see the second panel in Figure C.2).11
Third, validating our use of annual updates to the employment fields, we also examine
whether the annual rate of job switches matches with other data sets that study flows of
employment (e.g., see Hahn et al. (2017)). Specifically, in Figure C.3 in the appendix, we
relate the annual job transition rate inferred from Experian’s employment field to the Jobto-Job (J2J) flow data. At the state-year level of aggregation, we find that job transition
rates in the credit bureau data have a moderately strong and positive correlation (0.47) with
transition rates in the J2J data, and that the baseline rates are similar (with around 90% of
individuals staying in their jobs annually). Overall, the credit bureau data offer a measure
of self-employment consistent with these other data sources at the levels of aggregation in
which we can draw the comparison. However, our entrepreneurship fields are useful because
they are observable at the individual-year level, and we have linked these entrepreneurial
decisions to plausibly exogenous variation in cash windfalls from natural gas extraction.
11
Because of the state-year aggregation, we address the concern that self-employment from the microdata
(ACS and CPS) is correlated with self-employment in Experian because unemployment is an omitted factor
that is potentially correlated with both. To do this, we present the conditional correlation between microdata
self-employment and Experian self-employment after controlling for unemployment at the state-year level in
Figures C.1 and C.2. Controlling for unemployment does not explain the raw correlation we report in the
main text.
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Fourth, we contextually validate the self-employment measure by manually extracting and
classifying the names of the firms that employ individuals who switched into or out of selfemployment. Though we can only examine firm names for individuals during their period
of regular employment, these jobs provide useful and granular contextual information on
the skills and professions for individuals who choose self-employment in our sample. For
firms we can classify industry or skillset reliably, the most common industry for switchers
is Real Estate, followed by Government, Construction, and Medical. These four categories
combined account for over half of the people who transition into or out of self-employment.
By contrast, individuals who work for Technology firms account for less than 5% of these
switchers. This classification exercise provides some additional context on the types of
individuals driving the self-employment decisions we identify in our main tests.
Finally, as an alternative check on data validity, we use the textual employment data field to
construct a measure of retirement by searching for the string “retired.” Because retirement
is a distinct life-cycle marker (with a normal retirement age of 65), this variable allows us to
verify whether the timing of the employment field is informative. We find that retirement
propensities are greater among individuals of typical retirement age, which further enhances
confidence in using the textual descriptions to measure self-employment.
When looking at our full sample in Panel A of Table 3.1, the mean self-employment rate of
1.96% is somewhat lower than self-employment rates reported in public use microdata (ACS
or CPS). The lower self-employment is also present in the nationally representative sample
(see the range on the horizontal axis in Figure 3.2), which indicates that the self-employment
measure provided by Experian undercounts some forms of self-employment (e.g., part-time
self-employed). The mean business ownership rate is 1.02%.
In addition, individuals in our sample have an average income of $54,377, an average credit
score of 708, and are 58 years old on average. Consistent with Levine and Rubinstein
(2017)’s observation that incorporated entrepreneurs are positively selected, the business
owner subsample has higher average income ($71,515) and credit scores (727) than the self146

employment sample ($57,153 and 707, respectively). These summary characteristics indicate
that our sample tilts slightly toward older individuals who have higher income and higher
credit scores. The fact that mineral rights owners tend to be older is likely because mineral rights tend to be inherited, which makes mineral ownership less likely at younger ages.
However, as we show in Figure 3.3, there is much overlap in individual characteristics (i.e.,
age, credit score, and W2 income) in our sample of mineral payment recipients versus the
nationally representative sample drawn from Experian.12
Cash Windfalls and Balancing Tests
The variable of interest in our regressions is whether an individual receives a large payment.
To give context for the underlying variation in payments, Figure 3.4 presents a histogram of
total payments received between 2010 and 2015, grouped by $10,000 bins. The distribution
is right skewed, with most individuals receiving relatively small windfall amounts. We
choose to set $50,000 as the cutoff for large payments because this cutoff is consistent
with the capital resources required to enter entrepreneurship based on existing literature.
Specifically, Robb and Robinson (2014) find that new businesses require on average $40,536
of equity capital, and total financial capital of $121,000. For individuals receiving payments
greater than $50,000 in our sample, the median payment is $75,000 and the average payment
is $110,000. Thus, the $50,000 cutoff matches closely with the minimum cash windfall needed
to overcome liquidity constraints as a barrier to new business formation. Moreover, these
cutoffs also have the attractive feature that they are approximately as large as a typical
individual’s annual income in the sample. As a robustness test, we also present results
based on the alternative cutoff of $100,000.
Our identification strategy is to focus on the large windfall recipients as the “treated” sam12
Using an analysis of the names from the mineral roll data, we were able to impute race of the individuals in our sample to provide some description of the distribution of individuals across various ethnic
backgrounds. The imputations from Nameprism are reported in a frequency distribution in Appendix Figure
C.4. Unfortunately, the Experian merged data set does not have the race field appended to it, because of
federal regulations regarding the use of race in credit services. Thus, we cannot construct sample weights to
match a nationally representative sample. However, the data – though tilted toward whites – does indicate
a mix of races in our sample of mineral owners.
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ple, and compare their entrepreneurial decisions before versus after their first payment to
“control” individuals who received smaller payments or no payments at all. Holding constant
the amount of mineral acreage owned, the identifying variation is driven mostly by the large
windfall recipient’s luck in owning a mineral parcel that led to a large amount of extraction.
This extraction decision is idiosyncratic to the individual mineral owner, and is controlled
by the extraction company.
To illustrate our estimation approach, we identify 460 people who received a large cash
windfall (> $50,000) out of 169,101 people who did not own a business in 2010. Of those
who received large cash windfalls, 12 formed incorporated businesses during our sample
(a business formation rate of 2.609%). By contrast, the control individuals who received
smaller or no cash payments formed 1,379 businesses (a much lower business formation rate
of 0.818%). When we look at new self-employment spells, we find that only 0.217% of
treated individuals entered self-employment by 2015 (1 out of 460), a similar rate of new
self-employment spells as in the treatment group (813 out of 166,352, or 0.489%). Figure
3.5 presents these inflow rates with 95% error bars. These raw comparisons highlight our
main results on inflows into business ownership and self-employment, which we subject to
fixed effects that account for potential confounds (e.g., ownership of mineral acreage and
different initial income) in Section 3.3.1.
As discussed previously, control individuals could differ from treatment individuals on a
number of observable dimensions. We address this possibility by creating a matched control
group for each of our key samples. Specifically, we conduct propensity score matching in
which we match on credit score and length of credit history, while we require that matched
controls live in the same three digit zip code as the mineral owner. Based on this procedure,
each person in our mineral roll data corresponds to one matched control individual whose
information was drawn separately from Experian. Within the set of people who receive
mineral payments, our empirical specifications focus on people who receive large payments
(> $50,000) as the “treated” group. Thus, our tests have two kinds of control individuals
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– matched controls drawn from Experian, and individuals from our mineral roll data who
received payments smaller than $50,000.
Table 3.2 presents a series of balancing tests that compare the initial characteristics of large
payment individuals to each of these control groups. For each comparison, we present the
residual differences of means after conditioning on the fixed effects in our tests (Adj Diff
column).13 Critically, the adjusted differences account for the amount of mineral acreage
owned, which holds constant background factors that could relate to entrepreneurial decisions (e.g., other economic opportunities). Focusing on the full sample comparisons in Panel
A, we see that, without controlling for background factors, large windfall recipients are older
on average (2.7 years older), have higher average incomes ($8,217 higher) and have higher
average credit scores (36.2 point difference). These differences are similar if we focus only
on the subset of control individuals who received small payments: 4.7 years difference in
age, $6,045 difference in income and a 27.1 point difference in credit score. However, for
both control samples, the adjusted differences become economically small and statistically
insignificant after including controls and fixed effects to focus on the idiosyncratic variation
in cash windfalls. For the initially self-employed and business owner subsamples in Panels
B and C, we see a similar pattern.14
Our empirical tests in the following section rely on difference-in-differences comparisons
of individuals receiving large cash windfalls versus matched controls. To account for any
further observable differences between these samples, we additionally include individual
fixed effects throughout the panel data sets in our main specifications. Nevertheless, the
specification analysis in Section 3.4.1 shows that their inclusion does not meaningfully affect
our conclusions.
13

The panel estimates also include individual fixed effects, which are not possible to include in these
cross-sectional balancing tests. Thus, the Adj Diff column reflects the residual difference in the means of
characteristics after conditioning on age, ZIP3, 2010 income quantile credit score decile, and mineral acreage
quantile fixed effects. In the appendix (Table C.1), we report a more detailed version of the balancing tests
that include a column for the raw differences.
14
Although credit score is statistically different after accounting for background factors, the adjusted difference is less than half a credit score point, which is unlikely to have economically meaningful consequences.
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3.3. Main Results
In this section, we present our findings on the effect of large cash windfalls on entrepreneurial
decisions. First, we examine the impact of windfalls on inflows into entrepreneurial activity
in Section 3.3.1. For these tests, we restrict attention to the subsample of individuals who
are not self-employed or who are not business owners in 2010. Next, we study the effect of
windfalls on flows out of entrepreneurial activity in Section 3.3.2. For these outflow tests,
we restrict to subsamples of individuals who are either self-employed in 2010 or business
owners in 2010.15 Taken together, these analysis show how shocks to personal wealth affect
the decisions to enter and exit from entrepreneurial activity.
3.3.1. Inflows into Entrepreneurial Activity
We study how large cash windfalls affect the inflow into entrepreneurial activity using the
following difference-in-differences specification, which we estimate via OLS in a panel data
setting:

Yi,t =F E + β1 P osti,t × Large paymenti + X′i,t β + ϵi,t ,

(3.1)

where the dependent variable Yi,t is an indicator (=1 multiplied by 100 for a percentage
interpretation) for whether individual i is self-employed (or a business owner) in year t.
The variable, large paymenti , is an indicator (=1) for whether individual i receives a large
payment (> $50,000 in total, > $100,000 for robustness). The variable P osti,t is an indicator
(=1) for whether individual i (or the matched control) receives the first mineral payment
in year t or earlier. The coefficient of interest β1 reflects the difference in entrepreneurship
15

For each entrepreneurship type, the inflow and outflow tests are complementary subsets of the full
sample. The inflow to self-employment (business ownership) tests have 1,000,542 (1,014,269) person-year
observations, whereas the outflow tests have 19,589 (6,093) person-year observations. These observation
counts from the regression tables are reported after dropping singleton observations that do not provide
identifying variation within our fixed effects structure (1,093 singletons in the self-employment specifications;
862 singletons in the business ownership specifications). Thus, these observation counts are slightly smaller
than observation count for the full sample (1,021,224 observations total).
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rates between (treated) individuals who receive large payments versus (control) individuals
who do not (before versus after the date when the individual receives the first mineral
payment). To account for individual clustering of payments and serial correlation over time,
standard errors are clustered by individual, although the results are robust to other forms
of clustering, such as at the three digit ZIP codes.
Our tests focus on variation in payments outside of the individual’s control. Specifically, we
condition on the amount of mineral acreage owned by individual i by controlling for acre
quintile x year fixed effects. In addition, our tests exploit the panel structure to flexibly account for person-level heterogeneity and heterogeneity by geography. The main specification
includes a set of granular fixed effects: individual fixed effects, age x year fixed effects (using
dummies for each year of age), ZIP3 x year fixed effects, income quintile x year fixed effects
(based on, 2005, pre-shock income levels), credit score centile fixed effects, and time-varying
controls for common household balance sheet characteristics (Xi,t ).16 In this specification,
therefore, the residual variation in payments is driven entirely by factors external to the
individual – the timing and intensity of drilling, as well as macro fluctuations in the price
of natural gas.
Table 3.3 presents the results from estimating equation (3.1). In Panel A, which focuses
on inflows into self-employment, we estimate a small negative impact of receiving a large
cash windfall on the flow of individuals into self-employment. For the specification with
Large paymenti (> $50k), the estimated impact of receiving a large payment is to slow the
transitions into self-employment by 0.232% per year. Though the negative estimate does
not square with the motivating economic intuition, the estimate is statistically insignificant
16

Across all our main specifications, the vector of time-varying controls Xi,t includes an indicator for
whether the individual has a mortgage, an indicator for whether the individual has an auto loan, the individual’s revolving credit utilization, the individual’s credit score, the debt-to-income score, the individual’s
income, an indicator for whether the individual has debt in collections, and the fraction of delinquent trade
lines. Per the specification curves in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, the inclusion or exclusion of these controls does
not meaningfully affect our conclusions. Because the timing of windfalls is idiosyncratic, the main effect of
P osti,t is identified from differences in the timing of treatment across individuals that is not accounted for
by the interactions between these characteristics and the year fixed effect. Thus, our estimation equation
allows for this main effect, and we report the estimates on P osti,t across all specifications, but similar to
the F E term, this main effect is not an economically important part of our interpretations.
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and sensitive to the specification employed. For example, changing the shock variable to
Large paymenti (> $100k) yields a statistically significant estimate. As columns (3) and
(4) show, these conclusions are virtually identical when focusing on the subset of individuals who received mineral payments, and thus, the controls were “unlucky” individuals who
received small payments despite owning minerals. Given the non-robustness and statistical insignificance of these estimates, we interpret the estimates from Panel A as a (noisy)
non-result for inflows into self-employment.
In Panel B, we consider business formation decisions by replacing the dependent variable
with an indicator for business ownership. In contrast to the self-employment specifications,
we estimate a positive impact of large cash windfalls on inflows into business ownership.
For the specification with Large paymenti (> $50k), the estimated impact of receiving a
large payment is to increase the rate of business formation by 0.897% per year, which is
quite large relative to the baseline rate of 0.420%. Replacing the treatment indicator with
Large paymenti (> $100k) leads us to obtain even larger estimated magnitudes: receiving a
large payment increases the business formation rate by 2.027% on average. These estimates
are statistically significant at the 10% level, and robust to choices of sampling frame (within
treated versus full sample).
Heterogeneity
In this section, we examine several dimensions of heterogeneity in the effect of personal
wealth on entrepreneurial activity. In Table 3.4, we present the results from estimating
equation (3.1) after sorting the data into subsamples based on the individuals’ incomes
before receiving shale royalties. We estimate heterogeneity in the effect of cash windfalls
by individuals’ initial incomes because, according to conventional theories of liquidity constraints, a positive wealth shock should have a larger effect on those who are initially more
constrained (i.e., individuals that have lower incomes prior to the shock). For inflows into
self-employment and business ownership, the main takeaway from this table is that the impact of cash windfalls is not significantly different for high income individuals versus low
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income individuals. That is, although there are some minor magnitude differences between
low income versus high income samples, these differences are statistically insignificant and
sensitive to the specification choices.
Similar to the heterogeneity by initial income, we also examine whether the effects of cash
windfalls are more pronounced by different age and education categories.17 Panel A of Figure
3.6 presents the result from allowing the effect of personal wealth to be different for younger
people versus older people, splitting by the median age of 58. Although these estimates have
larger standard errors, the estimated effect of cash windfalls is similar for young and old
individuals, indicating that the relatively old composition of our sample does not explain
our findings. In a similar vein, Panel B of Figure 3.6 presents the result from allowing the
effect of personal wealth to differ for college graduates versus people who have not attained
at least a college diploma. We find similar effects for low-education versus high-education
individuals, which are similar to the findings we present based on the overall sample. These
heterogeneity exercises show that our findings are not driven by particular segments of our
sample.
3.3.2. Flows out of Entrepreneurial Activity
We study how large cash windfalls affect the inflow into entrepreneurial activity using the
following difference-in-differences specification, which we estimate via OLS in a panel data
setting:

reg_employi,t =F E + β1 P osti,t × Large paymenti + X′i,t β + ϵi,t ,

(3.2)

where the dependent variable reg_employi,t is an indicator (=1 multiplied by 100 for a
percentage interpretation) for whether individual i is regularly employed in year t. As in
17

The evidence on age and education heterogeneity is derived from triple difference specifications that
interact P osti,t × Large paymenti with an indicator for below-median age, or separately an indicator for
obtaining a college degree. These specifications estimate different effects of personal wealth by age or
education, which we summarize graphically in Figure 3.6, Panels A and B.
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the inflows specification, the variable, large paymenti , is an indicator (=1) for whether
individual i receives a large payment (> $50,000 in total, > $100,000 for robustness). The
variable P osti,t is an indicator (=1) for whether individual i (or the matched control) receives
the first mineral payment in year t or earlier.
In these specifications, we condition the sample on individuals who were entrepreneurs at
the beginning of our sample in 2010, which implies that the coefficient of interest β1 reflects
the difference in rate of flowing out of entrepreneurship between (treated) individuals who
receive large payments versus (control) individuals who do not (before versus after the date
when the individual receives the first mineral payment). To account for local clustering of
payments and serial correlation over time, standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Our tests focus on variation in payments outside of the individual’s control. Specifically, we
condition on the amount of mineral acreage owned by individual i by controlling for acre
quintile x year fixed effects. In addition, our tests exploit the panel structure to flexibly
account for person-level heterogeneity and heterogeneity by geography. The main specifications include a set of granular fixed effects: individual fixed effects, age x year fixed effects
(using dummies for each year of age), ZIP3 x year fixed effects, income quintile x year fixed
effects (based on, 2005, pre-shock income levels), and time-varying credit score centile fixed
effects. In this specification, therefore, the residual variation in payments is driven entirely
by factors external to the individual – the timing and intensity of drilling, as well as macro
fluctuations in the price of natural gas.
Table 3.6 presents the results from estimating equation (3.2). In Panel A, which focuses on
flows out of self-employment, we estimate a large and significant negative impact of receiving
a large cash windfall on the flow of individuals into self-employment. For the specification
with Large paymenti (> $50k) in column (1), the estimated impact of receiving a large
payment is to slow the transitions out of self-employment by 16.16% per year, which is a
large effect relative to the baseline rate of approximately 88% of this subsample remaining
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in self-employment. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level and is robust
to choices of how to model the shock, as well as sampling frame. For example, changing
the shock variable to Large paymenti (> $100k) yields a statistically significant estimate of
−26%. As columns (3) and (4) show, these conclusions are similar when focusing on the
most refined sample of individuals who received mineral payments, which uses only variation
in whether an individual received small versus large payments.
In Panel B, we consider decisions by existing business owners by focusing on the subsample
of individuals who owned a business at the start of our sample in 2010. In contrast to the
self-employment specifications, we estimate a positive impact of large cash windfalls on flows
out of business ownership. This estimate is non-robust and sensitive to sampling decisions
employed. For the specification with Large paymenti (> $50k), the estimated impact of
receiving a large payment is to increase the rate of transition out of business ownership by
4.7%, which is relatively small in comparison to the self-employment estimates.18 These
conclusions are qualitatively similar when we restrict attention to the sample of mineral
owners who received payments. Given the non-robustness of the estimates and the small
sample size, we are cautious about offering strong conclusions about how wealth affects the
flow out of business ownership.
One potential channel for the different effects of wealth on outflows from self-employment
versus business ownership is that large windfalls may enable individuals to retire, and this
effect could be different for self-employed individuals versus business owners. To evaluate
this possibility, we estimate how outflows differ for people above versus below median age.
Specifically, we estimate equation (3.2), but as a triple difference specification that also
includes an interaction term P ost×Large payment and an indicator for the individual being
below the median age. We present the estimated effects from this specification for above18

Replacing the treatment indicator with Large paymenti (> $100k) changes the estimate dramatically,
increasing it to 37.14%. Nevertheless, this result is highly sensitive to specification choices, as is indicated
by the specification curves in the Appendix Figure C.7, Panel B. The result from a more conservative
specification (using Zip3 fixed effects instead of Zip3 x year fixed effects) matches closely with the economic
interpretation for the $50k threshold. See Appendix Figure C.8, Panel B, which reports the specification
curve that uses Zip3 fixed effects instead of Zip3 x year fixed effects.
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median age versus below-median age graphically in Figure 3.7.19 We observe no meaningful
economic differences for young people versus older people in how cash windfalls affect the
propensity to remain in business ownership or self-employment. Specifically, we find that
wealth extends periods of self-employment irrespective of whether the individual is young
or old. Also, consistent with our main set of interpretations, we find no significant effect of
wealth on the propensity to remain in business ownership, and this effect is indistinguishable
from zero for both young and older individuals.
3.3.3. Parallel Trends
We employ carefully chosen fixed effects to absorb differences across treatment and control
groups, including granular controls for mineral acreage owned. Conditional on these fixed
effects, we saw that the treatment and control samples were similar on observable characteristics (e.g., see Table 3.2). However, an important additional consideration is whether our
treatment (high payment group) and control (low payment group) have differential trends in
entrepreneurial decisions, which would confound the interpretation of our main differencein-differences tests.
We explicitly evaluate this parallel trends assumption for the two tests in which we obtain a
robust and statistically significant result – i.e., the increase in business formation (Table 3.3,
Panel B) and the decrease in exit from self-employment (Table 3.6, Panel A). Specifically,
for these specifications, we examine the propensity to be self employed or a business owner
in event time (time t = 0 is the year the first payment is received), and plot the estimated
coefficients on large_payment(> $50k) times lead and lag indicators in an event window
around the year the individual receives the first cash payment. Figure 3.8, Panels A and B,
presents these dynamic plots. In both figures, we see non-significant estimates prior to the
event date, with a significant effect emerging after the first payment date, a pattern that
19

Using the triple difference estimates, we sum the appropriate coefficients from this regression estimation
and compute 95% confidence intervals. The implied difference-in-difference estimates are the coefficient
estimate on P ost × Large payment for the effect for above-median age, and the coefficient estimate on
P ost × Large payment plus the coefficient on P ost × Large payment × Y ounger for the effect for belowmedian age.
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supports the parallel trends assumption.20
Beyond parallel trends, these dynamic specifications restrict attention to the subsample of
individuals who received mineral payments, focusing only on the variation in whether an
individual received a large windfall ($50,000 or more) versus a smaller windfall. Because the
estimates also condition flexibly on the amount of mineral acreage owned, the identifying
variation comes purely from mineral owners who were lucky to own minerals that had
significantly more natural gas extraction tied to them.

3.4. Mechanisms and Robustness
3.4.1. Robustness to Specification Choices
The main specifications (Tables 3.3 and 3.6) include a large number of specification choices.
Particularly given the potential small sample size, it is important to evaluate sensitivity to
the choices about which controls and fixed effects to include. To evaluate the sensitivity of
our conclusions to varying these sampling choices, we present a specification curve analysis, proposed by Simonsohn et al and previously applied in Cookson 2018, which presents
the estimates from all combinations of specification choices. This analysis is particularly
important given that two of our main tests (inflows into self employment and flows out of
business ownership) yield estimates that are not statistically different from zero. In particular, presenting the full range of reasonable specifications is informative of whether the result
is a robust non-result, or if different specification choices could reasonably lead to statistical
significance.
We plot specification curves for the estimated coefficient on P osti,t × Large paymenti (>
$50k) for our four main results, and these specification curves are presented in Figures 3.9
(inflows) through 3.10 (outflows). The estimates are organized as empirical CDFs of the
estimated coefficients, with each point reflecting a different specification choice described
20

One potential concern could be that transitions, or lack thereof, are driven by changes in economic
cycles and not mineral windfalls. This could be the case if natural gas prices were pro-cyclical in a growing
economy. We actually find that during the period of our study both stock prices and GDP growth are
negatively correlated with natural gas price changes. This result, combined with the saturated characteristic
by time fixed effects we employ in our specifications limit the potential for confounding effects.
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by the guide at the bottom panel. In each case, the red triangle indicates the reported
specification from Tables 3.3 and 3.6 with the full set of controls and fixed effects.
Figure 3.9 presents the specification curves for inflows into entrepreneurship. In Panel A,
we present the specification curve for the inflow into self-employment. Relative to our main
estimate that is slightly negative and statistically insignificant, these findings are highly
non-robust, but all are slightly negative estimates. Depending on specification choices, we
estimate that a large cash windfall reduces the inflow into self employment by 0.1% to
slightly larger than 0.3%. Though the estimate is robust in sign, it is relatively small and
statistically insignificant for approximately half of the (reasonable) specification choices.
Panel B of Figure 3.9 presents the specification curve for inflows into business ownership. As
the specification curve indicates, the estimated positive effect of cash windfalls on business
formation is quite robust to the choices of which sets of controls to include. All specifications
in the specification curve give similar estimates, both in terms of magnitude and statistical
significance.
Figure 3.10 presents the specification curves for flows out of entrepreneurship. Panel A
presents the specification curve for the result on the flow out of self-employment. The main
estimate we report −16.16%, though large in economic magnitude, is in the middle of the
distribution of estimates from all reasonable specifications. Across the specification curve,
all of the specifications we consider are statistically significant at the 10% level or better,
and the estimated magnitude ranges from −8% to approximately −20%. That is, despite
the possible concern with this estimate being from a small sample size, the effect of cash
windfalls on extending the duration of self-employment spells is a consistent feature of the
sample, such that our conclusions are insensitive to a broad set of specification choices.
By contrast, Panel B of Figure 3.10 presents the specification curve for our results showing
that wealth shocks do not affect flows out of business ownership. The positive and statistically insignificant estimate that we report in the outflows specification in Panel B of Table
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3.6 is actually one of the largest estimates in the specification curve. Other choices lead to
smaller (and sometimes negative) estimates on the effect of cash windfalls on the flow out
of business ownership. Taken together with the main estimates we report, this specification
curve enhances our confidence that there is not a true effect of cash windfalls on the duration
of business ownership.
3.4.2. Transitions from Self-Employment to Business Ownership
In this section, we examine the impact of cash windfalls on transitions from self-employment
to business ownership.

This analysis is of interest because previous work (e.g., see

Dillon and Stanton (2017)) has argued that self-employment spells are a trial period in
which constrained entrepreneurs learn about their prospective business ideas before forming
incorporated businesses. Thus, the subset of initially self-employed individuals is a useful
subset to evaluate the impact of shocks to wealth and credit access.
Restricting attention to the sample of initially self-employed individuals, we study how
large cash windfalls affect the inflow into business ownership using the following differencein-differences specification, which we estimate via OLS:

bus_owneri,t =F E + β1 P osti,t × Large_paymenti (> $50k) + X′i,t β + ϵi,t ,

(3.3)

where the dependent variable bus_owneri,t is an indicator (=1 multiplied by 100 for a
percentage interpretation) for whether individual i is a business owner in year t. Apart
from this change, the specification choices are identical to the specification of outflows from
self-employment in Table 3.6, Panel A.
Table 3.8 presents our results on the impact of wealth shocks on the transition rate from selfemployment to business ownership. Broadly, we find little evidence that these shocks speed
the transition from self-employment to business credit. Specifically, the only specification
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with statistical significance for the wealth shock (column (2)) indicates a reduction in the
transition rate between self-employment and business ownership. As a complement to our
main specifications, these findings reinforce our interpretation that self-employment and
business ownership are economically distinct activities. Moreover, these results contrast with
the idea that self-employment represents a precursor or trial period to business ownership.
3.4.3. Placebo Exercises
An important limitation of our sample is that we have only 6 years of panel data. Thus, the
pretrends analysis that we present in Section 3.3.3 cannot rule out longer-term trends that
are changing beyond this window of time. Our paper addresses this concern by presenting
a series of placebo exercises for the main specifications.
For the placebo exercises, we estimate the main specifications in which we replace the large
payment indicator (>$50k) by an indicator for a small payment (i.e., individuals who received less than $50,000 but more than $10 which is equivalent to a windfall of $1,922.101
on average). Appealing to the startup capital evidence in Robb and Robinson (2014), these
small windfalls are insufficient to affect business incorporation decisions, and thus, provide a
useful set of events to use for placebo treatments. Across specifications, we find little impact
of small cash windfalls on entrepreneurial decisions. As an illustration of these findings and
how they compare to our main results, the dynamic graphs we described in our analysis of
parallel trends (depicted in Figure 3.8) overlay the estimated impact of small windfalls in
light gray. Similar to our main findings, we see no parallel trends in the impact of small
windfalls, but importantly, we see no significant post effect on either inflows into business
ownership or outflows from self-employment.
Together with our evidence from the specification curve analysis, these placebo exercises
reinforce the interpretations of our main tests.21
21
Because our main tests include several time-varying fixed effects, the main estimates directly control
for the kind of variation that would lead to non-parallel trends in our setting (e.g., mineral owners who
own large plots of land are on different trends or different regions on different economic growth paths
that could influence entrepreneurial activity). Further, the specification curve analysis – which considers
all combinations of these time-varying fixed effects – provides indirect evidence that non-parallel trends
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3.4.4. Impact on Self-Employment Income
As a final set of evidence on mechanisms behind our main results, we present evidence
on how the average income of self-employed individuals changes after receiving large cash
windfalls. The motivation for including this test on entrepreneurial incomes is to relate
to the literature on the role of non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship. Relating to this
idea, Hurst and Pugsley (2017) develop a model of entrepreneurship choice that incorporates
a role of non-pecuniary benefits to drive decisions to enter and stay in self-employment.
They argue that self-employment is more likely to be driven by non-pecuniary benefits than
business ownership. Our results on flows out of self-employment are consistent with this
interpretation, but admit other plausible interpretations.
For this reason, we evaluate what happens to the income of individuals who remain in
self-employment after receiving a large cash windfall. In Figure C.5, we present the dynamic graph of the effect of receiving a large cash windfall on the average income for the
individuals who stay in self-employment in a triple difference-in-differences. We find that,
consistent with the non-pecuniary motives theory of Hurst and Pugsley (2017), individuals
who stay in self-employment have lower income (on the order of ~$150 several years after
receiving the first mineral payment). Although this particular result admits alternative interpretations (e.g., the literature suggests that average income is lower for entrepreneurs
who value right tail entrepreneurial outcomes), this finding in combination with the main
findings on flows into and out of self-employment versus business ownership is consistent
with theoretical predictions about entrepreneurs motivated by factors other than income
(e.g., Hurst and Pugsley (2017)).

3.5. Conclusion
The economics literature has long understood that entrepreneurship is fundamental to longterm growth (Schumpeter (1934); Parker (2009)). Rooted in this understanding, a clasare unlikely to be driving the results we obtain. Indeed, our results are robust to including or excluding
geography (ZIP3) x year fixed effects, age x year fixed effects, income quintile x year fixed effects and acreage
quintile x year fixed effects.
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sic question is to understand what factors hold back entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic
(1989)), yet the empirical literature on barriers to entrepreneurship has come to mixed
conclusions (e.g., Dobbie et al. (2020); Herkenhoff et al. (2021); Hombert et al. (2020);
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996); Lindqvist et al. (2020)). In this paper, we provide new insight
by studying how different types of entrepreneurs – business owners versus self-employed
individuals – respond to wealth shocks. Our core insight is that the effect of household
liquidity constraints depends critically on the type of entrepreneurship.
Specifically, using large cash payments to mineral owners for identification, we find that
personal wealth spurs new business formation, but not new spells of self-employment. In
addition, these cash payments have no impact on the duration of business ownership while
extending existing spells of self-employment. Our work highlights important economic differences between business ownership and self-employment, which provides a new perspective on
the wide range of entrepreneurial decisions identified in prior surveys (Hurst and Pugsley
(2011); Levine and Rubinstein (2017)). These findings suggest that business owners are
more disciplined in evaluating the continuation value of their business than are self-employed
individuals, which is consistent with the stronger non-pecuniary motives of self-employed
individuals that is noted in the literature (Hurst and Pugsley (2017)).
Beyond economic mechanisms, understanding the effects of wealth on entrepreneurial activity is important from a policy perspective. For example, entrepreneurship policies differ
with respect to whether they target entrepreneurial constraints directly or depend on direct cash transfers (e.g., see Howell (2017)). Broader policies that consider large transfers of
wealth, such as a universal basic income, may also have unintended effects on entrepreneurial
activity. In this context, our results suggest that personal wealth is particularly useful for
spurring new business creation, whereas it has minimal effect on new self-employment spells.
This core finding may inform policies that either insure downside risk or alleviate financial
constraints directly via the banking sector. Though a systematic comparison of policy options is beyond the scope of our study, our core insight that unrestricted cash windfalls have
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different effects on business formation versus self-employment is important to keep in mind
when evaluating the benefits to the broader economy.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
This table contains descriptive statistics for the main panel data sets used in our analysis. The
panel data covers six years, from 2010 to 2015. Panel A provides statistics on the full panel data
set, while panel’s B and C provide detailed statistics on the sub samples we focus on in our study,
individuals that are initially self-employed as of 2010 and individuals that are business owners as of
2010. The unit of observation in the panel data sets is at the person-year level. The data on mineral
payments is constructed via open records request from Texas counties in the Barnett Shale, while
all other data is obtained from Experian individual and business credit data files. Self-employed is
an indicator equaling 100 if an individual is self-employed, and 0 otherwise. Business owner is an
indicator equaling 100 if an individual is a business owner, and zero otherwise. Total payment in
dollars is the total mineral windfall received by an individual between 2010 and 2015, all individuals
in the sample receive their first payment strictly after 2010. Payment above $50k ($100k) is an
indicator equal to 100 if an individual receives a mineral windfall greater than $50,000 ($100,000)
and zero otherwise. Retired is an indicator equal to 100 if an individual is retired and zero otherwise.
Having a mortgage is equal to 100 if an individual has a mortgage on their credit profile in a given
year and 0 otherwise. Age is an individuals age. W2 Income is an individual’s W2 income as reported
by Experian. Credit score is an individual’s credit score as reported by Experian.

A. Full sample:
Variable
Self-employed (%)
Business owner (%)
Total payment (in $)
Payment above $50k (%)
Payment above $100k (%)
Retired (%)
Having a mortgage (%)
Age
W2 income
Credit score

Mean

SD

p50

Person-year observations

1.960
1.015
1,134.414
0.277
0.100
4.586
67.973
58.438
54.377
708.454

13.863
10.023
7,609.785
5.253
3.168
20.918
46.658
14.421
25.349
98.771

0
0
0
0
0
0
100
58
48
726

1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224
1,021,224

B. Self-employed in 2010:
Variable
Self-employed (%)
Business owner (%)
Total payment (in $)
Payment above $50k (%)
Payment above $100k (%)
Retired (%)
Having a mortgage (%)
Age
W2 income
Credit score

Mean

SD

p50

Person-year observations

87.996
3.027
1,382.274
0.324
0.118
1.214
64.996
61.371
57.280
706.787

32.501
17.133
7,143.148
5.686
3.432
10.950
47.699
12.407
30.568
99.330

100
0
0
0
0
0
100
61
49
723

20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352
20,352

C. Business Owner in 2010:
Variable
Self-employed (%)
Business owner (%)
Total payment (in $)
Payment above $50k (%)
Payment above $100k (%)
Retired (%)
Having a mortgage (%)
Age
W2 income
Credit score

Mean

SD

p50

Person-year observations

5.530
92.233
2,658.158
0.997
0.272
2.085
78.740
59.951
71.151
727.921

22.859
26.767
16,542.130
9.937
5.209
14.290
40.918
11.256
38.364
89.501

0
100
0
0
0
0
100
60
62
752

6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
6,618
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Table 3.2: Balance tests
This table presents balancing tests that compare the initial (year 2010) characteristics between
treated and control samples for the main samples employed in the paper. Panel A contrasts individual
characteristics between treatment individuals who receive a payment above $50k between 2011 and
2015 versus the full control group (“All controls”) or the subset of control individuals who received
a payment below $50k. The differences between treated and each control group after controlling for
the fixed effects that are included in the regressions are reported under Adj Diff. Panel B (Panel
C) reports the same statistics after restricting the sample to people who are self-employed in 2010
(respectively individuals who are business owners as of 2010). The data on mineral payments is
constructed via open records request from Texas counties in the Barnett Shale, while all other data
is obtained from Experian individual and business credit data files. The variables are defined as
previously. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

A. Full sample:
Variable
Self-employed
Business owner
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people

Treatment

All controls

Adj diff

Low payment controls

2.34
2.34
69.00
3.61
61.12
61.04
740.23
471

1.99
0.64
69.91
3.75
58.43
52.82
703.98
169,733

-0.139
1.079
-4.414
-0.770
0.000
0.831
0.071

1.90
0.68
79.66
3.29
56.33
54.99
713.16
73,678

Adj diff
-0.167
1.136
-7.522∗∗∗
-0.917
0.000
0.395
0.054

B. Self-employed in 2010:
Variable
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people.
Variable
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people

Group treated

Control group

Adj diff

Low payment controls

63.64
0.00
62.36
79.45
775.64
11

68.38
0.00
61.38
56.26
700.96
3,381

-10.900
0.000
0.000
11.114
0.368∗

77.3
0.00
59.1
59.92
713.79
1,401

C. Business Owner in 2010:

Group treated

Control group

Adj diff

Low payment controls

72.73
0.00
60.18
76.00
740.18
11

82.07
1.49
59.79
69.86
720.88
1,092

-10.738
-0.357
0.000
1.681
0.419∗

84.18
0.88
58.84
72.97
723.06
500
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Adj diff
-20.341
0.000
0.000
14.991
0.256

Adj diff
-14.579
2.931
0.000
9.85
0.400∗

Table 3.3: Inflow to self-employment and business ownership from wealth windfalls
This table estimates the effect of wealth windfalls on transitions into self-employment and business
ownership. The dependent variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to 100 if an individual
transitions into self-employment (Panel A) or business ownership (Panel B). The unit of observation
is at the individual year level. The sample used in each regression specification is based on the
individuals in our study that are not engaged in self-employment in 2010 (Panel A) and business
ownership in 2010 (Panel B). Specifically, Panel A is composed of all individuals in regular employment, business ownership, retired, etc, but who are not self-employed. Panel B is composed
of all individuals in regular employment, self-employment, retired, etc, but who are not business
owners. The regression estimations take the form of a difference-in-differences estimation where
the key coefficient of interest is an interaction term P osti,t × Large paymenti . The direct effect
of Large paymenti is subsumed by the individual fixed effects. The fixed effects used are reported
in the table, and the controls used are credit score, debt-to-income, delinquencies, revolving credit
utilization, mortgage dummy indicator, auto loan dummy indicator, and collection dummy indicator.

A. Inflow to self-employment:
Sample:

Full sample
(1)

Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

Within treated

(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Self-employedi,t

0.015
(0.015)
-0.232
(0.186)

1,000,542
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.211

0.015
(0.015)
-0.552∗∗
(0.229)
1,000,542
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.211

0.023
(0.021)
-0.252
(0.177)

435,582
.55
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.221

0.022
(0.021)
-0.430∗∗∗
(0.104)
435,582
.55
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.221

B. Inflow to business ownership:
Sample:

Full sample

Within treated

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Business owneri,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

0.019
(0.021)
0.897∗
(0.543)

1,014,269
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.420
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0.019
(0.021)
2.027∗
(1.120)
1,014,269
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.420

0.044
(0.031)
0.950∗
(0.552)

0.045
(0.030)

440,979
.58
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.452

440,979
.58
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.452

2.113∗
(1.137)

Table 3.4: Inflow to self-employment and business ownership from wealth windfalls – by
initial income (1/2)
This table estimates the effect of income on the link between wealth windfalls and transitions into
self-employment and business ownership. The dependent variable of interest is an indicator variable
equal to 100 if an individual transitions into self-employment (Panel A) or business ownership (Panel
B). The unit of observation is at the individual year level. The sample used in each regression
specification is based on the individuals in our study that are not engaged in self-employment
in 2010 (Panel A) and business ownership in 2010 (Panel B). Each panel is split by individuals
with high W2 income versus low W2 income, where W2 income is based on data from Experian.
Panel A is composed of all individuals in regular employment, business ownership, retired, etc, but
who are not self-employed. Panel B is composed of all individuals in regular employment, selfemployment, retired, etc, but who are not business owners. The regression estimations take the
form of a difference-in-differences estimation where the key coefficient of interest is an interaction
term P osti,t × Large paymenti . The direct effect of Large paymenti is subsumed by the individual
fixed effects. The fixed effects used are reported in the table, and the controls used are credit score,
debt-to-income, delinquencies, revolving credit utilization, mortgage dummy indicator, auto loan
dummy indicator, and collection dummy indicator. Standard errors are clustered by individual and
reported in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

A. Inflow to self-employment:
Low income
(1)
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

High income

(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Self-employedi,t

-0.003
(0.021)
-0.253∗∗∗
(0.058)

533,494
.56
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.185
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-0.003
(0.021)
-0.178∗∗∗
(0.057)
533,494
.56
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.185

0.032
(0.023)
-0.018
(0.302)

467,048
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.240

0.032
(0.023)
-0.331∗∗∗
(0.095)
467,048
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.240

Table 3.5: Inflow to self-employment and business ownership from wealth windfalls – by
initial income (2/2)
B. Inflow to business ownership:
Low income

High income

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Business owneri,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

0.059∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.338
(0.637)

0.058∗∗∗
(0.020)

541,821
.54
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.230

541,821
.55
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.230
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1.925
(1.781)

-0.031
(0.039)
1.404∗
(0.852)

472,448
.58
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.638

-0.029
(0.039)
2.175
(1.469)
472,448
.58
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
0.638

Table 3.6: Mineral windfalls and outflows from self-employment and business ownership
(1/2)
This table estimates the effect of wealth windfalls on transitions from self-employment and business
ownership to regular employment. The dependent variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to
100 if an individual transitions into regular employment from self-employment (Panel A) or business
ownership (Panel B). The unit of observation is at the individual year level. The sample used in each
regression specification is based on the individuals in our study that are engaged in self-employment
in 2010 (Panel A) and business ownership in 2010 (Panel B). The regression estimations take the
form of a difference-in-differences estimation where the key coefficient of interest is an interaction
term P osti,t × Large paymenti . The direct effect of Large paymenti is subsumed by the individual
fixed effects. The fixed effects used are reported in the table, and the controls used are credit score,
debt-to-income, delinquencies, revolving credit utilization, mortgage dummy indicator, auto loan
dummy indicator, and collection dummy indicator. Standard errors are clustered by individual and
reported in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

A. Flow out of self-employment:
Sample:

Full sample

Within treated

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Regular employmenti,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

-0.739
(0.724)
-16.162∗∗∗
(3.950)

19,589
.68
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.004

169

-0.764
(0.723)
-26.001∗∗∗
(7.782)
19,589
.68
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.004

1.952∗
(1.079)
-13.712∗∗∗
(4.605)

7,976
.69
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.512

1.885∗
(1.077)
-20.479∗∗∗
(7.640)
7,976
.69
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.512

Table 3.7: Mineral windfalls and outflows from self-employment and business ownership
(2/2)
B. Flow out of business ownership:
Sample:

Full sample

Within treated

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Regular employmenti,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

-2.039
(1.263)
4.718
(7.215)

6,093
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.767
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-2.066
(1.257)
37.144∗∗∗
(9.532)
6,093
.57
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.767

-1.158
(1.938)
3.308
(9.515)

2,783
.59
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.371

-1.205
(1.939)
47.287∗∗∗
(9.908)
2,783
.59
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.371

Table 3.8: Mineral windfalls and transitions from self-employment to business ownership
This table estimates the effect of wealth windfalls on transitions from self-employment to business
ownership. The dependent variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to 100 if an individual
transitions into business ownership. The unit of observation is at the individual year level. The
sample used in each regression specification is based on the individuals in our study that are engaged
in self-employment in 2010. The regression estimations take the form of a difference-in-differences
estimation. The fixed effects used are reported in the table, and the controls used are credit score,
debt-to-income, delinquencies, revolving credit utilization, mortgage dummy indicator, auto loan
dummy indicator, and collection dummy indicator. Standard errors are clustered by individual and
reported in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Sample:

Full sample
(1)

Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t × yeart FE
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean dep. var.

Within treated

(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Business owneri,t

0.044
(0.316)
0.475
(3.668)

19,589
.80
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
87.996
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0.054
(0.316)
-5.630∗
(3.270)
19,589
.80
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
87.996

1.059∗∗
(0.468)
2.095
(3.725)

1.078∗∗
(0.470)

7,976
.84
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
87.488

7,976
.84
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
87.488

-0.386
(3.642)

Figure 3.1: Geographical distribution of mineral payments
Panels A and B contain a heatmap where each individual is represented by a square. The darker
(lighter) is the square, the more (less) density of people there is. The location of the individual is
defined as follows: it is the centroid of the 5 digit zipcode of their personal location the day they
receive their first payment. Panel A plots the spatial distribution of the people in the sample that
have received a wealth windfall above $0. Panel B plots the spatial distribution of the people in the
sample that have received an oil and gas royalty payment that is above $50,000.

Panel A: Mineral owners

Panel B: High payment
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Figure 3.2: Self-Employment Surveys versus Credit Bureau Self Employment
Panel A plots the fraction of the workforce that is self-employed as reported by the American
Community Survey (y-axis) compared to the Credit Bureau (x–axis). The unit of observation is at
the state-year level. Panel B plots the fraction of the workforce that is self-employed as reported
by the Current Population Survey (y-axis) compared to the Credit Bureau (x–axis). The unit of
observation is at the state-year level.

4

Unincorporated self-employed (ACS)
6
8

10

Panel A: American Community Survey versus Credit Bureau

1

2

3
Self-employed (CB)

State-year average

4

5

Fitted values

0

Unincorporated self-employed (CPS)
2
4
6

8

Panel B: Current Population Survey versus Credit Bureau
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Figure 3.3: Distribution Comparison: High Payment Mineral Owners vs National Representative Sample

0

.01

Age density

.02
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Panel A, B and C report the distribution of the age, credit score, and W2 income between
individuals that receive a mineral payment above $50,000 and the national random sample.
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Figure 3.4: Mineral Payment Distribution
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This figure reports the distribution of payments. The first bin represents the number of
people that receive a payment between 0 and $10,000. Similarly, all other bins group people
by interval of $10,000, except for the last one that is composed of all the people that have
a payment above $150,000.

10K 20K 30K 40K 50K 60K 70K 80K 90K 100K 110K 120K 130K 140K 150K+

Mineral payment amount (in dollars)
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Figure 3.5: Business Formation and New Self-Employment Spells – Treatment versus Control
This figure presents the raw comparison of business formation rates and rates of initiating
new self-employment spells for treatment individuals who receive cash payments exceeding
$50,000 versus control individuals who smaller or no cash payments. At the person level,
we say that someone starts a new business (or self-employment spell) if they transition
from regularly employed to business owner (or self employed) at any point during the 20102015 window. The height of each bar reflects the percentage of business formations or new
self-employment spells in each group. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.6: Heterogeneity in the Effect of Cash Windfalls by Age and Education
This figure presents two heterogeneity tests for the effect of large cash windfalls (> $50,000)
on the likelihood of business formation and the likelihood of starting a new self-employment
spell. In each panel, the overall estimate is drawn from column (3) of Table 3.3 to provide a
benchmark for the heterogeneous effects. The estimated impact of wealth for younger and
older are drawn from a triple difference specification in which P osti,t × Large paymenti is
interacted with an indicator for below-median age (Panel A), or an indicator for obtaining
a college degree (Panel B). The height of each bar is the estimated coefficient on P osti,t ×
Large paymenti for the indicated group, implied by the estimated model. The error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Panel A: Heterogeneity by Age (Above versus Below Median)

Panel B: Heterogeneity by Education (College Educated versus Not)
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Figure 3.7: Heterogeneity in the Effect of Cash Windfalls by Age on Outflows
This figure presents a heterogeneity test for the effect of large cash windfalls (> $50,000)
on the likelihood of an individual remaining in business ownership or self-employment. The
overall estimate is drawn from column (3) of Table 3.6 to provide a benchmark for the
heterogeneous effects. The estimated impact of wealth for younger and older are drawn
from a triple difference specification in which P osti,t × Large paymenti is interacted with
an indicator for below-median age. The height of each bar is the estimated coefficient on
P osti,t × Large paymenti for the indicated group, implied by the estimated model. The
error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.8: Evidence on Parallel Trends
These figures plot the estimated coefficients of the difference-in-differences regression from
table 3.3. The x-axis is the year around the wealth windfall. The reference year is one year
before the year when the well is taxed and the bonus payment received. Low wealth shock
is any payment between 10 dollars and 50,000 dollars, which implies a total payment of
1,922.101 on average. Panel A reports the estimates when the dependent variable takes the
value of 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. The sample of Panel A contains
all the persons that are not business owner in 2010. Panel B reports the estimates when the
dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person is self-employed. The sample of Panel
B contains all the persons that are self-employed in 2010. Standard errors are defined at the
10% level and clustered at the individual level.
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Figure 3.9: Specification curves for inflows into entrepreneurship
These figures plot 64 estimated coefficients of the impact of wealth from the regressions
of table 3.3.1, where different combinations of fixed effects and characteristics are reported.
Panel A reports the regression when the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person
is self-employed, 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated among persons that are initially
not self-employed in 2010. Panel B plots the regression when the dependent variable takes
the value 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated
among persons that are initially not business owners in 2010.
Panel A: Inflows into self-employment
Coefficients:
0

-.1

-.2

-.3
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table

p-value ≥ .10

Panel B: Inflows into business ownership
Coefficients:
1
.75
.5
.25
0
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table
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p-value ≥ .10

Figure 3.10: Specification curve outflows from entrepreneurship
These figures plot 64 estimated coefficients of the impact of wealth from the regressions
of table 3.6, where different combinations of fixed effects and characteristics are reported.
Panel A reports the regression when the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person
is self-employed, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated in the sample of persons that are
initially self-employed in 2010. Panel B plots the regression when the dependent variable
takes the value 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated
in the sample of persons that are initially business owners in 2010.
Panel A: Outflows from self-employment
Coefficients:
0
-4
-8
-12
-16
-20
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table

p-value ≥ .10

Panel B: Outflows from business ownership
Coefficients:
5
2.5
0
-2.5
-5
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table
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p-value ≥ .10

APPENDIX
Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1. Contaminated areas in the United States
To put the results of this paper into perspective, this section describes some salient facts
on contaminated sites in the United States. Specifically, subsection A shows that federal
funding allocated to environmental cleanup in the United States has diminished in the last
20 years, despite the immense cost of environmental liabilities (subsection B) and the social
benefits of environmental cleanups (subsection C). Finally, I summarize studies that show
that climate change will make the brownfield problem in the United States even more acute.
A.1.1. Clean up cost of all currently contaminated sites in the United States
Estimates about the total cost of cleaning up all contaminated areas do not exist and the
problem “is plagued by a lack of quantitative data” (Northeast Midwest Institute).
One way to provide a quantification is to collect information using public balance sheet and
recent policy proposals. The US government’s environmental liability amounted to $577
billion in fiscal year 2018. However, this number does not take into account the cleanup of
sites contaminated by per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). During a House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee meeting in 2021, Richard Kidd, deputy assistant secretary
of defense for environment and energy resilience, estimated that cleaning military sites to
remove this substance would cost $29 billion. In Biden’s proposal of March 2021, $16 billion
were allocated for cleaning abandoned mines and orphaned oil and gas wells (E&E News
PM, March 31). These numbers omit the cleanup of abandoned sites owned by private
entities that are not in the oil and gas or mining industries but provide a conservative lower
bound estimate of $622 billion.
Precise estimates about the magnitudes of the problem for other private sites are not readily
available. There is an agreed estimated number of 450,000 brownfields in the United States.
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Moreover, there were 1,374 sites registered in the National Priorities List (NPL) and awaiting
remedial action. On average, a Superfund site costs between $25 and $50 million and the
average per-site cost for brownfield remediation is estimated at $602,000 according to the
Northeast Midwest Institute, which is based on cleanup data from EPA (Paull (2008)). The
extrapolation ignores the large variability in cleanup costs. For instance, the Kingston Fossil
Plant coal fly ash slurry spill in 2008 cost the Tennessee Valley Authority more than $1 billion
in cleanup costs. With these caveats in mind, simple extrapolation and back-of-the-envelope
calculations give a total cost of $339.6 billion.
A.1.2. Social gain of environmental cleanup
While the cleaning of a contaminated area necessitates considerable upfront costs, the benefits are diffuse, scattered and even more challenging to identify and quantify precisely. The
literature has identified several ways through which contaminated areas reduce welfare.
First, contaminated areas pose a public health problem to a significant fraction of the US
population. One out of three Americans live within three miles of a federal Superfund sites
(US EPA (2016), Persico et al. (2020)), and 11 million Americans, including 3 to 4 million children, are located within one mile of a Superfund site (Steinzor and Clune (2006),
Persico et al. (2020)). People are exposed to the contaminants from Superfund sites by
drinking or swimming in contaminated water or eating food grown on toxic land. As a result,
people exposed to contaminated areas are more likely to suffer from health problems, including cancer (Environment America Research and Policy Center (2021)), which reduces life
expectancy (Kiaghadi et al. (2021)). Young children and pregnant women are particularly
affected by these effects. In particular, children living close to Superfund sites have higher
lead levels in their blood (Klemick et al. (2020)), which causes anemia, weakness, kidney
failure, and brain damage. Children living close to a contaminated site or who experienced
prenatal exposure also have lower cognitive and behavioral outcomes (Persico and Venator
(2021), Persico et al. (2020)).
Second, the release of hazardous substance by contaminated sites endangers the survival
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of ecosystems (Environment America Research and Policy Center (2021)). It is difficult to
evaluate how prevalent this damage is because of data scarcity. Moreover, it is challenging
to quantify how the loss of ecosystems affects human welfare, as it depends on unknown
parameters, such as the cash flows of ecosystems, their discount rates and the irreversibility
their losses.
Third, contaminated areas are often previous industrial sites located in densely developed urban areas with high location efficiency.

Cleaning up the areas allows for ur-

ban redevelopment with better energy efficiency uses at the city level. For instance, the
Office of Brownfields and Land Revitalization (2015) shows that brownfield redevelopment
in five areas1 would lead to 32-57% less carbon dioxide emissions per capita and air pollutants. It would also reduce stormwater runoff more than other conventional developments
by reducing the daily vehicle miles and trips per capita.

1

Seattle (WA), Baltimore (MD), Minneapolis-Saint Paul (MN), Emeryville (CA), and Dallas-Forth Worth
(TX)
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A.2. EPA response to a contamination threat
During the Preliminary Assessment phase, an EPA team performs initial and limited inspections to assess the danger of a site. The assessment is made using the Hazard Ranking
System (HRS). This system provides a grade between 0 and 100 that evaluates the risk level
a site represents to human health and the environment. The risk is multidimensional because it takes into account different pathways through which the toxic releases could affect
environmental systems or human health. The EPA evaluates four main pathways: groundwater migration, soil exposure, surface water migration, and air migration. For instance,
groundwater migration relates to the likelihood of toxic components traveling to aquifers
and drinking water wells. Sites ranked highly are registered in the National Priorities List
(NPL). In April 2021, there were 1,374 sites on this list, with an average score of 43.5. Figure
A.2 shows their locations.
The EPA team then decides the type of response actions it requires. A release may necessitate an emergency response to eliminate immediate risks to human health, such as in
the case of a road accident where toxic chemicals may directly enter into contact with the
population. A site could necessitate an early action to block a near-future threat of contamination or a long-term action if the risk of contamination may take several years or decades
to materialize. For instance, if drums storing chemical components leak from an industrial
site, an early action would consist of removing the leaking drums, and a long-term action
would be a cleanup of the contaminated soil and underground water formation from the
chemical component.
The EPA’s plans for long-term responses are subject to public comments at least 30 days
before the remedial action begins. The plan describes the options possible to perform the
cleanup as well as the remediation preferred by EPA. Public concerns are taken into account,
and then the EPA issues a Record of Decision (ROD) that describes how the cleanup will
be performed. Once the cleanup is completed, the site is removed from the NPL.
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A.3. Case study 1: United States v. Mirabile (E.D. Pa. Sept 4, 1985)
I describe the case in three steps : first, I present the facts, then the procedural history.
Finally, I expose the court’s rationale for its decision.
A.3.1. Case facts
In 1976, Turco Coatings, Inc. (henceforth, Turco) purchased a facility in Phonixville, Pennsylvania (henceforth, Turco site) and opened a manufacture paint factory on the site. The
purchase was made from Arthur C. Mangels Industries Inc. (henceforth, Mangels). The
previous owner of the facility has taken a loan from the American Bank and Trust Company (ABT), which was partially secured by a mortgage on the Turco site. Turco filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in January 1980, but the petition was rejected in 1981 by a
bankruptcy court. Turco ceased operating in December 1980.
In 1976, the predecessor of Mellon Bank provided a credit line to advance working capital
at Turco, secured by the inventory and assets of the company. One board member in charge
of supervising Turco’s operations was the loan officer initially responsible for the loan. The
monitoring effort increased after Turco filed the petition.
Finally, Turco took out a loan from the Small Business Administration (henceforth, SBA)
in July 1979, secured by a second lien on equipment, inventory, account receivables and real
estate. An SBA representative monitored the site three times to inspect how the assets were
sold in 1981. SBA contracts contained several limitations of Turco’s actions. Specifically,
Turco was not allowed to enter into management consulting services withtout SBA approval,
and the bank set a cap on the total remuneration of operating officers. Moreover, the
purchase of any life insurance or dividend required SBA approval.
The bank ABT repossessed the facility and sold it to Thomas A. Mirabile and Anna Mirabile
on December 15, 1981. Between the foreclosure and the sale to the Mirabiles, the bank
performed several tasks on the property, including « boarding up windows and changing
locks, made inquiries as to the approximate cost of disposal of various drums located on
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the property, and, through its loan officer Donald Hans, visited the property on various
occasions ». The predecessor of Mellon Bank took possession of the inventory from the
Turco site with the approval of the bankruptcy court.
In December 1981, the Pennsylvania Resources of Environmental Resources (D.E.R.) informed Mr. Mirabile that toxic leaking drums were on the Turco site, contaminating the
surroundings. Mirabile undertook some actions to clean up the site, regrouping the drums
into a warehouse, but no further action was undertaken. However, there is an absence of
evidence that the Mirabiles increased the overall pollution when they purchased the site at
auction.
In February of 1983, a representative from the EPA visited the site and noticed that many
drums were in poor condition and the access to the site was not sufficiently protected from
trespassers. Evidence that some trespassers could access the site was noted. Immediate
removal was ordered, and the EPA started the cleanup on February 11 of that year using
Superfund money.
A.3.2. Procedural history and Final disposition
The court entered a summary judgment in favor of the SBA and ABT. However, the court
rejected the motion for a summary judgment from Mellon Bank.
A.3.3. Court rationale
The court’s reasoning was based on both statutory arguments and the legislative history
of CERCLA. First, the statutory argument derived from CERCLA implied that a secured
lender must participate in the management of a facility to be held liable. The court enunciated a narrow standard of what it means to “participate in the management”, stating that
“before a secured creditor such as ABT may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site.” The court accepted participation
in management affairs as equating to participation at the site, that is, “the participation
in operational, production or waste disposal activities” to incur environmental liabilities for
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secured lenders.
Second, the court justified this standard as being closer to the principle of CERCLA, which
is to make polluters pay for their pollution, as they bore the fruit of negligent environmental
practices. The court referred to a decision from the District Court of Missouri (United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823,
849 (W.D. Mos. 1984)), where this principle was first stated.
Given this standard, the court rejected the motion for a preliminary judgment from the
Mellon Bank, as one of its loan officers was part of the board attached to the management
of Turco’s site. However, SBA and ABT did not participate in the day-to-day operational
aspects of the business and were therefore exempt according to this test.
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A.4. Case study 2: United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. (11th Cir. 1990)

This case is presented similarly to the discussion above, outlining the details of the matter
and reviewing the court’s final judgment.
A.4.1. Case details
In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet), a factoring company, made a collateralized factoring agreement with Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a cloth printing facility. In the
agreement, Fleet advanced funds against the assignment of SPW’s accounts receivable. Fleet
took a security interest in SPW’s equipment, inventory, and fixtures. In August 1979, SPW
filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy, but the loan contract between SPW and Fleet continued.
At the beginning of 1981, Fleet stopped providing funds to SPW because the company estimated that the ongoing debt of SPW exceeded the value of its accounts receivable. On
February 27, 1981, SPW ceased operations, and in December 1981, the company filed for
chapter 7 bankruptcy.
As soon as SPW stopped operating, Fleet started to participate directly in the management
of the facility in a number of dimensions to maximize the amount collected on the accounts
receivable.
(1) Fleet tried to sell “the twenty to twenty-five million yards of grey goods and finished
cloth remaining” and collected from the accounts receivable from those goods. Specifically,
Fleet took care of the resolving disputes, ensured the reliability of consumers and that they
did not have delinquent accounts.
(2) Fleet wired money to SPW’s account to pay the remaining workers to maintain the
production of the facility. No workers directly employed by Fleet were on-site. Fleet also
directly paid some suppliers that were not accepting SPW checks.
(3) Finally, Fleet participated in the tax management of SPW. Fleet provided advice to the
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company and used the EIN of SPW. It was involved with the “tax deposit reports” of the
company.
One disputed fact concerns whether Fleet blocked the sale of SPW chemicals and, by doing
so, maintained the leaking drums on-site. The Government used the argument as evidence
that Fleet participated in the management of the company. However, the evidence at trial
suggested otherwise. Managers instead testified at trial that they were constrained by the
Fleet lien in relation to SPW’s chemicals. A communication problem ocurred among SPW’s
managers that did not transmit correctly their intentions to sell the drums. Subsequently,
the non-response by Fleet was interpreted by SPW’s managers as a refusal to sell the drums.
However, Fleet never foreclosed on its whole collateral but did so for the equipment and
machines.
After 1981, Fleet hired two contractors. The first contractor, Baldwin Industrial Liquidators
(Baldwin) was responsible for auctioning off the remaining equipment. The task of the
second contractor, Nix Riggers (Nix) was to clean the facility and make it “Broom clean”.
Nix testified that he was allowed to do anything possible so that no equipment or machinery
remained.
The Environmental Protection Agency inspected the facility on January 20, 1984, and found
evidence of environmental contamination. The EPA proceed to clean up and then sued the
two principal owners of the facility as well as Fleet to cover the cleanup costs.
A.4.2. Procedural history and final judgment
Fleet filed for a summary judgment, which was rejected in United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 724 F.Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.Ga. 1988), on the basis that its participation in the
management of the facility made the applicability of the secured creditor exemption questionable. Fleet filed an interlocutory appeal following the denial of its summary judgment.
The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (Fleet II) that, as a matter of law, the secured creditor exemption was
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not applicable. As a result, the court concluded that rejecting Fleet’s motion for summary
judgment was correct and remanded the case.
A.4.3. Court rationale
The court explicitly rejected the interpretation given during Mirabile. The 11th Circuit put
forward two main arguments in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th
Cir. 1990) (Fleet II) to justify the final disposition.
The first argument is that the legislative history of CERCLA supports a broader interpretation of lender liability. Indeed, Senators made a clear distinction between an operator and a
secured lender that participates in managing a facility. The interpretation of environmental
lender liability that Mirabile gives is similar to the one related to operators. However, when
the Senators wrote the initial CERCLA law, they made a clear distinction between a secured
lender that “participates in the management” with the one of an “operator”. The definition
of the secured lender exemption is similar to the definition of an owner or operator under
Mirabile, thus making it redundant. The 11th Circuit Court interpreted the statement made
by Representative Harsha when the amendment was introduced as consistent with the narrow interpretation of CERCLA liability. Indeed, the word “affiliated” was used to describe
which lenders would be exposed to CERCLA liabilities under the new statement. Affiliation
implies less involvement in day-to-day activities made by lenders than an owner.
The second argument is that more robust environmental lender liability helps lenders influence their debtors to adopt better environmental practices, consistent with one of CERCLA’s
goals. “Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly the
waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors.” Lenders that are more exposed
to the cleanup costs of their secured assets have astronger incentive to require better environmental compliance when negotiating their loan terms with debtors.
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A.5. Fuzzy matching
To match the business register to the EPA database and obtain a cross-link between the two
administrative sources, I perform a fuzzy matching algorithm that contains multiple steps.
Step 1: Normalization of fields
Names are normalized so that each word has the exact spelling and is capitalized. For
instance, INC. and Incorporated are transformed to INCORPORATED, as their meanings
are the same. I exploit the four different names available in the Business Register (BR) from
the Census Bureau and the two names available in the TRI data from the EPA.
The street number from the address field in both databases is extracted. Next, the street
name is normalized. For instance, rd is the abbreviation for road, so I replace road with rd.
For the BR, I use the physical address when available. If this field is missing, the mailing
address is used instead.
Step 2: Drop duplicate observations
From the BR and TRI, I use a time span from 1992 to 1999. I drop the duplicates according
to the field that will be used for the matching, namely the establishment names, addresses,
zip, state and county codes, NAICS, and other identifiers.
Step 3: Run matching without pre-processing the data
I run a perfect matching of variables using names and addresses within establishments that
share the same state number, street number and two-digit NAICS code. As we have two
names for the TRI and four for the BR, the score for the name field is the highest score
of all name pairs. The reason I first keep all perfect matching sets before pre-processing is
to avoid dropping relevant information. For instance, if someone drops the common name
“GROUP,” “INTERNATIONAL,” and “AMERICAN,” then the firm AIG would be dropped,
which would result in a loss of relevant information.
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Step 4: Pre-processing of variables
I then pre-process the variables to keep the most relevant information in a firm’s name.
Intuitively, if one term is used by many firms, then its usefulness in terms of matching is
more limited than a unique term. I compute the frequency of each term for each database
separately. I create a list of terms to be dropped from the database if the term is among the
1% most frequent terms for each database. This step results in dropping common terms,
such as “America,” “group,” or “LLC.”
Step 5: Coarse fuzzy matching
I then perform a first fuzzy matching on the address and company names, using a bigram
approach with no weight where the similarity scoring is based on the Jaccard index. The
final score is the unweighted average of the best score for the name matching, between the
combination of the four names from the BR and the two names from TRI, with the score
for the street name. The matching is done at the establishment level with the same zip code
and industry code. If the physical address is used, I review that the street number matches
perfectly. All matches that have a score above 90% accurary are kept. I manually check the
accuracy of matches when the score is between 70% and 90%.
Finally, all establishments for which I am able to find a linkage are dropped from the BR
and TRI files before moving to the next step.
Step 6: Broader fuzzy matching
I then perform a second fuzzy matching on the address and company names. Similar to the
previous approach, I use a bigram approach with no weight where the similarity scoring is
based on the Jaccard index. The final score is the unweighted average of the best score for
the name matching, between the combination of the four names from the BR and the two
names from TRI, with the score for the street name.
If the physical address is used, I review whether the street number matches perfectly. I then
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verify that the two establishments are in the same county. All matches that have a score
above 90% accurary are retained. I manually check the accuracy of matches when the scores
is between 70% and 90%. In particular, I use the industry code when this information can
be located.
Finally, all establishments for which I am able to find a linkage are dropped from the BR
and TRI files before moving to the next step.
Step 7: Visual inspection of perfect matches for addresses
I then perform matching within counties but using only the address name. I keep all matches
that have a score above 90%. I manually check the names for these observations. Sometimes,
a database will report a name through abbreviations or only the initials, resulting in a low
matching rate for the name score. Alternatively, one name will be a lengthy description of
the business, with the name inside the description. In these cases, the matching score for
the name field will be below 70%, although a visual inspection makes it evident that the
company is the same.
Step 8: Visual inspection of perfect matches for addresses
I manually check all the matched links. As I keep all links with a score above 90%, I end up
having multiple links for the same establishment in some rare cases. In this case, I visually
inspect the name and detailed industry code to keep the most relevant linkage.
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A.5.1. Data cleaning steps
I create a balanced panel at the establishment level between 1992 and 1999, which retains
374,158 observations representing 71.53% of the unbalanced sample. Several reasons motivate such an action. The first is to make my results comparable with other papers (such as
Ohlrogge (2020)) using TRI, which also adopts this assumption.
Second, unbalanced panels introduce noise into the regressions. If this noise is exogenous,
then it attenuates the coefficients. However, if the selection is due to the reporting framework
of the TRI, then the unbalanced panel will put more weight on some specific industries or
establishments with more employees.
The third advantage is that focusing on firms that report consistently every year allows us to focus on the highest quality part of the dataset.

Previous works, such as

Brehm and Hamilton (1996), have shown that misreporting in the TRI2 results from ignorance rather than strategic misconduct, as the errors are concentrated among firms that
report small amounts of chemicals. However, firms that consistently report a higher quantity
of chemicals and are more likely to have a specific team dedicated to TRI reporting. Also, it
means that they are not “new firms” that had to learn how to report to the survey, e.g., the
utilities included in 1998. Note that creating a balanced panel does not mean that bankrupt
firms are automatically dropped from the sample. If an establishment is liquidated and sold
to another firm, then the establishment will still report to the TRI and will be observed.
I impute the missing chemicals by a zero. This imputation is motivated by the fact that
when facilities report to the TRI, they can either mention a chemical that they do not report
as using zero pounds of the component, or simply omit to mention it. Replacing zero to the
missing components solved this problem.
Finally, I focus on publicly listed firms. This brings the sample to 210,000 observations3 .
2
3

Bui and Mayer (2003) found that there is little systematic over or under reporting in the TRI.
All sample sizes are rounded to four significant digits following Census Bureau disclosure guidelines
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The first reason for this choice is that the cross-sectional tests and the firm-level controls are
based on Compustat, which is available only for publicly listed firms. Another advantage
of focusing on publicly listed firms is that it allows us to concentrate on the highest quality
segment of the TRI. As Brehm and Hamilton (1996) have shown, there are fewer inconsistencies in reporting among firms that report higher pollution measures. Publicly listed firms
have a higher scale of production, and as a result, report more pollution.
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A.5.2. Additional tables and figures
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Table A.1: Other measures of pollution
Panel A: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine
Dependent variable: IHS(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.160∗∗∗
(0.0135)

0.150∗∗∗
(0.0170)

0.148∗∗∗
(0.0181)

0.144∗∗∗
(0.0173)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Mean Dep. Var.

210,000
70.3
x
x

210,000
72.4
x

210,000
72.4
x

210,000
72.4
x

x
x

x
x
x

0.7476

0.7476

0.7476

x
x
x
x
0.7476

Panel B: Pollution per capital
Dependent variable: on-site CERCLA pollution per facility capitalcit
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Postt × Groupi

0.654∗∗
(0.213)

0.734∗∗
(0.297)

0.747∗∗
(0.275)

0.704∗∗
(0.241)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

183,000
67.6
x
x

183,000
67.6
x

183,000
67.6
x

183,000
67.6
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Note: These tables report the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed, for alternativepmeasures
of pollution. The dependent variable of Panel A is the inverse hyperbolic sine (f (x) = log(x + 1 + x2 ))
of the on-site CERCLA release of chemical c at time t. The inverse hyperbolic sine is approximately equal
to the natural logarithm of x, but is well defined in 0. The dependent variable for Panel B is the on-site
CERCLA release of chemical c at time t divided by the capital of the facility’s structure (as defined the
ASM/CMF). The dataset is at the establishment-chemical-year level. Postt is a variable that takes one after
1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit
and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level.
Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed
effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect
that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes
12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset,
the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE,
tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four
significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table A.2: Include adjacent Circuits as control group
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)
Postt × Groupi

0.147∗∗
(0.02)

(4)

0.131∗∗
(0.028)

0.131∗∗
(0.026)

0.123∗∗
(0.025)

Observations
99,000
99,000
R-squared
69.8
72.4
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
x
x
Year FEt
x
Legal statusi × Year FEt
x
CAS FEc × Year FEt
x
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site pollution (discrete)

99,000
72.4
x

99,000
72.5
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

2.079∗∗
(0.310)

2.146∗∗
(0.399)

2.134∗∗
(0.396)

2.072∗∗
(0.355)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

99,000
67.6
x
x

99,000
69.4
x

99,000
69.4
x

99,000
69.5
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

This table reports the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit and the states from adjacent
Circuits, namely the 5th Circuit (Texas Louisiana Mississippi) the 6th Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio and Tennessee) and the 4th Circuit (Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and
West Virginia). The treatment year is 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The
dependent variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit the log of the total amount in
pound of on-site pollution +1. The dependent variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit ,
a dummy variable that takes one if the total amount in pound of on-site pollution is strictly positive
and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the establishment-chemical-year level. Postt is a variable that
takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located
within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at
the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect
and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the
LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status
as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm
level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx,
capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net
income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio,
Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have been rounded to four significant
digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table A.3: Exclude Adjacent Circuits
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)
Postt × Groupi

0.150∗∗∗
(0.0180)

(4)

0.144∗∗∗
(0.0200)

0.140∗∗∗
(0.0217)

0.140∗∗∗
(0.0212)

Observations
123,000
123,000
R-squared
69.7
72.1
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
x
x
Year FEt
x
Legal statusi × Year FEt
x
CAS FEc × Year FEt
x
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site pollution (discrete)

123,000
72.2
x

123,000
72.2
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

2.061∗∗∗
(0.399)

2.254∗∗∗
(0.408)

2.185∗∗∗
(0.416)

2.196∗∗∗
(0.390)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

123,000
68.5
x
x

123,000
70.2
x

123,000
70.2
x

123,000
70.2
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

This table reports the difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit and the states that are not
from adjacent Circuits. This means that I exclude states from the 5th Circuit (Texas Louisiana Mississippi) the 6th Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee) and the 4th Circuit (Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia). The treatment year is 1996, the year
that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The dependent variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit the log of the total amount in pound of on-site pollution +1. The dependent
variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit , a dummy variable that takes 100 if the total
amount in pound of on-site pollution is strictly positive and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the
establishment-chemical-year level. Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero
otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise.
CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a
year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based
upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that
groups together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes
12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate
finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of
capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA),
the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and
sample size have been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure
guidelines.
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Table A.4: Different time ranges for the sample: 1993 to 1998
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)
Postt × Groupi
(0.00976)

0.140∗∗∗
(0.0136)

(4)

0.128∗∗∗
(0.0146)

0.128∗∗∗
(0.0132)

0.121∗∗∗

Observations
157,000
157,000
R-squared
74.4
76.3
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
x
x
Year FEt
x
Legal statusi × Year FEt
x
CAS FEc × Year FEt
x
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site pollution (discrete)

157,000
76.3
x

157,000
76.3
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

2.022∗∗∗
(0.240)

2.158∗∗∗
(0.298)

2.152∗∗∗
(0.306)

2.090∗∗∗
(0.287)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

157,000
73
x
x

157,000
74.2
x

157,000
74.2
x

157,000
74.2
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The dependent
variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit the log of the total amount in pound
of on-site pollution +1. The dependent variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit , a
dummy variable that takes 100 if the total amount in pound of on-site pollution is strictly positive
and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1993 and 1998 (instead of
1992 to 1999). Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a
chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed
effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups
together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12
time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total
asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have
been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table A.5: Different time ranges for the sample: 1994 to 1997
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.120∗∗∗
(0.00981)

0.109∗∗∗
(0.0124)

0.108∗∗∗
(0.0135)

0.103∗∗∗
(0.0138)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site

105,000
80.6
x
x

105,000
81.9
x

105,000
82
x

105,000
82
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

pollution (discrete)

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

1.986∗∗∗
(0.207)

1.960∗∗∗
(0.251)

1.953∗∗∗
(0.253)

1.884∗∗∗
(0.251)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal status FEi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

105,000
79.7
x
x

105,000
80.5
x

105,000
80.5
x

105,000
80.5
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The dependent
variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit the log of the total amount in pound
of on-site pollution +1. The dependent variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit , a
dummy variable that takes 100 if the total amount in pound of on-site pollution is strictly positive
and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1994 and 1997 (instead of
1992 to 1999). Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a
chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed
effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups
together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12
time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total
asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have
been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table A.6: Different time ranges for the sample: 1995 to 1996
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

0.0713∗∗∗
(0.0150)

0.0587∗∗∗
(0.0173)

0.0587∗∗∗
(0.0169)

0.0608∗∗∗
(0.0155)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site

52,500
92.8
x
x

52,500
92.9
x

52,500
93
x

52,500
93
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

pollution (discrete)

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

1.318∗∗∗
(0.230)

1.102∗∗∗
(0.284)

1.083∗∗∗
(0.267)

1.148∗∗∗
(0.277)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

52,500
90.7
x
x

52,500
90.8
x

52,500
90.8
x

52,500
90.9
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and the
others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. The dependent
variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit the log of the total amount in pound
of on-site pollution +1. The dependent variable of Panel B is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit , a
dummy variable that takes 100 if the total amount in pound of on-site pollution is strictly positive
and zero otherwise. The dataset is at the chemical-year level between 1995 and 1996 (instead of
1992 to 1999). Postt is a variable that takes one after 1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi
takes the value one for plants located within the 11th Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a
chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry number level. Year FEt is a year fixed
effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi is an industry fixed effect based upon the
two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset. Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups
together firms with the same legal status as defined by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12
time-varying controls defined at the firm level that are commonly used in empirical corporate finance.
These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total
asset, the log of firm size, the net income, R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on
equity ROE, tangibility ratio, Tobin’s Q, and total firms’ liability. Estimates and sample size have
been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
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Table A.7: Reporting Robustness Tests
Panel A: CERCLA on-site pollution (continuous)
Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)
Postt × Groupi

0.135∗∗∗
(0.0162)

(4)

0.129∗∗∗
(0.0162)

0.130∗∗∗
(0.0170)

0.125∗∗∗
(0.0158)

Observations
197,000
197,000
R-squared
72.4
73.4
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
x
x
Year FEt
x
Legal statusi × Year FEt
x
CAS FEc × Year FEt
x
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit
Panel B: CERCLA on-site pollution (discrete)

197,000
73.4
x

197,000
73.4
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

Dependent variable: 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Postt × Groupi

1.933∗∗∗
(0.316)

2.019∗∗∗
(0.323)

2.025∗∗∗
(0.322)

1.983∗∗∗
(0.300)

Observations
R-squared
Facility FEi × CAS FEc
Year FEt
Legal statusi × Year FEt
CAS FEc × Year FEt
NAICS FEi × Year FEt
Firm-level controlsit

197,000
69.4
x
x

197,000
70.3
x

197,000
70.3
x

197,000
70.3
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

These tables report triple difference-in-differences between the 11th Circuit (treated group) and
the others (control group) after 1996, the year that the Lender Liability Act was passed. All the
chemicals that were never reported before 1995 are dropped. The dataset is at the chemical-year level,
between 1992 and 1999. The dependent variable of Panel A is log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
the log of the total amount in pound of on-site pollution +1. The dependent variable of Panel B
is 1(on-site CERCLA pollution)cit , a dummy variable that takes 100 if the total amount in pound
of on-site pollution is strictly positive and zero otherwise. Postt is a variable that takes one after
1996 (included) and zero otherwise. Groupi takes the value one for plants located within the 11th
Circuit and zero otherwise. CAS FEc is a chemical fixed effect that is defined at the CAS registry
number level. Year FEt is a year fixed effect, Facility FEi is a facility fixed effect and NAICS FEi
is an industry fixed effect based upon the two-digit NAICS code as defined in the LBD dataset.
Legal status FEi is a fixed effect that groups together firms with the same legal status as defined
by the LBD. Firm-level controlsit includes 12 time-varying controls defined at the firm level that
are commonly used in empirical corporate finance. These controls are the firm sales, capx, capital
intensity, cash flow, cash holding, cost of capital, total asset, the log of firm size, the net income,
R&D intensity, the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity ROE, tangibility ratio, tobin’s Q
and the total firms’ liability.
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Table A.8: Clustering Robustness Tests
(1)
Postt × Groupi

Dependent variable: log(on-site CERCLA pollution+1)cit
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

0.180∗∗∗
(0.0231)

0.196∗∗
(0.0841)

0.196∗∗
(p-value: 0.0203)

0.138∗∗∗
(0.0302)

0.138∗∗∗
(0.0495)

This table reports different robustness tests to compute the standard errors for the baseline regression. Column (1) reports the coefficients estimated on a sample that takes the average of all variables
before and after 1996. Column (2) takes the first difference of the previous before / after comparison, and reports the coefficient of this cross-section. The coefficient estimated of this sample by
ordinary least square is an asymptotically consistent estimator. Column (3) reports the standard errors estimated on the previous sample using the bootstrapped approach. Running the bootstrapped
approach on this sample significantly reduces the simulation time. Column (4) clusters at the firm
level, while column (5) reports the standard errors clustered at the chemical level. Estimates and
sample size have been rounded to four significant digits according to the Census Bureau disclosure
guidelines.
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Figure A.1: Waste Management Hierarchy (EPA)
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Note: This figure represents the Waste Management hierarchy, as defined by EPA.
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Figure A.2: Brownfield in the USA

Note: This figure depicts the distribution of brownfield in the Superfund National Priorities
List (NPL), when the sites have status information, in April 2021.
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APPENDIX
Appendix B: Chapter 2
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Figure B.1: Cash Flows of Flaring
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Note: This graph reports the production curves of the gas flared for wells that are potentially
not connected to a pipeline in North Dakota. The data come from the North Dakota Industrial
Commission that requires operators to report the quantity of gas flared. The left Figure reports for
each year after the well is completed, the total number of gas flared, in MCF (thousand cubic feet).
The right figure represents the cumulative distribution of the amount of gas flared during the first
15 years. As can be seen, more than 50% of all the flared gas is done within the first 2 years after
the well is completed. Whether the well is connected to a pipeline is confidential information. I
make the assumption that wells flaring a large amount of gas are more likely not to be connected to
a pipeline. Therefore, I first compute the total amount of gas flared during the well first 15 years
and then I keep the 25% with the highest amount of flaring. The distributions look similar if I use
different ways of selecting the data, only the level of the curves changes.
Interpretation Reducing flaring is costly and most of the cost of reducing flaring is paid at the
beginning of the project, while the benefits are only available in the medium long-run. Connecting
the well to a pipeline and has two components. On-site facilities and equipment, such as dehydrators
and compressors need to be installed close to the well. Their prices vary greatly according to the
location and the year, so precise project-level estimates are hard to come by. According to the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) the costs were on average $210,000 per
well in the Bakken. Then, the well needs to be connected to a pipeline and the price is a function
of how far the well is to a pipeline and the diameter of the connecting facility. According to the
INGAA, the prices in 2017 ranged from $29,000 to $167,000 per mile for a diameter range between
2 and 22 inches.
The cash flows follow a predictably declining curve. Production of gas flared is available for North
Dakota, but information on whether the well is connected to a pipeline is not available. Focusing
on projects that are most likely not to have been connected to a well, Figure 7 plots the production
of gas for each year after the well starts producing. As can be seen and consistent with an ARPS
model used by practitioners (Fetkovich (1980)), we have a convex declining curve of gas production.
Half of all the gas flared during the first 15 years of the life of a well is done within the first year
and a half.
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Quote And Citations From The Main PE Sponsors In The Oil And Gas
Industry
“Well-managed sustainability strategies not only reduce pressure on our resources, they also
yield operational cost savings, healthier and more productive work environments, and more
valuable assets." "Saving water helps to preserve our environment as it is limited resource
on earth and it will help to ensure a sustainable adequate water supply in future". TPG
Capital.
“Protecting the environment of the communities in which we operate is critically important."
GSO Capital Partners.
“We firmly believe that ESG issues can affect the risk-adjusted performance of our investment
portfolios to varying degrees across asset classes over time". GCP Capital Partners.
“Contributed to national environmental standards formulation process through collaboration
with the US Department of Energy to improve shale gas production best practices, disclosure
and technology". First Reserve Corporation.
“We encourage and embrace the efficient use of natural resources and continuously look for
and expect the best environmental solutions for our portfolio companies’ operations. We believe that economic considerations in isolation do not provide sufficient guidance for environmentally conscious decision-making that balances the interests of individuals, communities
and future generations. We seek to fully comply and/or exceed compliance with applicable
environmental regulatory requirements." EnCap Investments.
“We recognize the importance of climate change, biodiversity, and human rights, and believe
negative impacts on project-affected ecosystems, communities, and the climate should be
avoided". Denham Capital Management.
“Seek to grow and improve the companies in which they invest for long-term sustainability and
to benefit multiple stakeholders, including on environmental, social and governance issues".
Carlyle Group.
“Protecting the environment of the communities in which we operate is critically important".
Blackstone Group.
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Fracking Rule: Additional Background (1/3)
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is responsible for the environmental regulation
of federal land and Native American reservations. It oversees one eighth of the land in
the continental United States.

It is a federal agency within the U.S. Department of the

Interior. Its core mission is “to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the public
lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations.” Within its mission, the
BLM supervises the leasing of oil and gas reserves and provides technical advice for drilling
operations on Native American reservations.

In 2012, the BLM started drafting a regulation aimed at reducing the negative externalities
caused by hydraulic fracturing. The rule was finalized and made available on March 26,
2015 after collecting feedback, remarks, and comments. The regulation was supposed to
be effective on June 24, 2015. It comprised several points: (1) improve the disclosure of
operational activities, (2) increase the quality and integrity of the wellbore, and (3) increase
the standard of water protection. This rule did not forbid the usage of highly toxic chemicals,
but increased their indirect costs. Specifically, operators were required to “isolate all usable
water and other mineral-bearing formations and protect them from contamination.” The
rule expanded the definition of usable water to include “waters containing up to 10,000 parts
per million (ppm) of total dissolved solids,” which doubled the previous threshold.
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Fracking rule: additional background (2/3)
On March 20, 2015, various petitioners filed a motion for preliminary injunction to challenge
the fracking rulea . The preliminary injunction was granted by the Federal Court of the
10th Circuit. The Federal Court found that “BLM did not have the authority to regulate
fracking” (Williams (2015)), ending uncertainty over whether the BLM had legislative power
over fracking activities. Specifically, each of the acts used by the BLM to justify its right to
enact the Fracking rule, such as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”),
the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”) , was rejected by the court, under the reason that “none
of them gave BLM authority to regulate fracking” (Williams (2015))b .
On June 21, 2016, the rule is abrogated by the District of Wyoming and three days after
the BLM appealed. On January 20, 2017, Trump is inaugurated and proceed to a change
in the political orientation of the BLM, which now no longer supports the fracking rule.
An interior Department Assistant Secretary stated that an “initial review has revealed that
the 2015 Rule does not reflect . . . the current Administration’s policies and priorities
concerning the regulation of hydraulic fracturing on Federal and Indian lands”. Shortly
after, the Trump administration issued an executive order asking for the BLM to rescind
the rulec . This causes the Tenth Circuit to dismiss the lawsuit as moot on September 21,
2017. The rescind is made official on December 29, 2017.

a

The petitioners included the Independent Petroleum Association of America (“IPAA”), the Western
Energy Alliance (“Alliance”), the states of Utah, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado and the Ute Indian
Tribe.
b
The remaining reasons to grant the preliminary injunction were the following. First, the regulation was
not supported by “substantial evidence and lacked rational justification”. Second, the consultation meetings
with indigenous American tribes were not made in a way consistent with procedures and policies that this
regulatory authority should respect. The next two reasons stated that the petitioners would have incurred
“irreparable harm” if the regulation was allowed while the litigations were pending and these costs outweighs
any potential harm to BLM.
c
Executive Order No. 13,783, Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
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Fracking rule: additional background (3/3)
Following this rescind, the State of California and a group of environmental activists sue the
BLM on January 24, 2018 for voiding the fracking rule. Three main reasons were put forward
to justify such an action. Firstly, this decision of the BLM was accused to be capricious. The
Administrative Procedure Act (henceforth, APA) requires that any agency that decides to
change its policy should explain why the new policy is better. The rescind was motivated by
the fact that it was supposed to promote energy development on federal and tribal lands by
removing regulatory burden. However, this explanation was not supported by the evidence
put forward by the BLM itself that finds that the price of oil and gas is the main factor
affecting the production of fracking activities. Thus the explanation “runs counter to the
evidence before the agency”. Secondly, the APA requires that agencies should always act
in a way that is allowed by their statute. The rescind of the fracking rule was seen as
contradicting its statute. Indeed, the core missions of the BLM are to prevent “unnecessary
or undue degradation” of public lands and to enable the development of energy while ensuring
environmental protections. Thirdly, the decision to rescind the rule violates the National
Environmental Policy Act as the BLM didn’t carry out an environmental impact analysis
of the repeal.
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Figure B.2: Geographical Distribution Of Flaring Practices
This figure plots the geographical distribution of the practice of flaring as detected by the
satellite measure. It matches the spatial distribution of oil and gas basins.
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Figure B.3: Probability Of Observing Flaring Before And After The Well Completion
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This figure plots the probability of observing the practice of flaring as detected by the
satellite measure before and after the well completion. The pattern is consistent with the
idea that the satellite measure is able to detect correctly the practice of flaring.
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Figure B.4: High-frequency Geographical Fixed Effect: Geographical Example Using The
Marcellus Formation
This map illustrates the coarser geographical fixed effect after zooming on the Marcellus
formation.
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Figure B.5: Geographical Fixed Effect: Illustration Of The Longitude And Latitude Unit
Square
This Table plots the 60 miles by 60 miles geographical fixed effect.
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Figure B.6: Impact Of PE Buyout On The Number Of Toxic Chemicals: robustness test
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Note: This figure reports the dynamic difference-in-differences estimates around the PE buyout as
well as its confidence interval estimated in the full sample. More specifically, the (γτ )τ =−6,...,9,10 of
the following estimated equation are reported:
Yikt = IDi + BYjt + GEO_coarsek +

10
X

γτ .(τ semester(s) after the PE deal) + controlsit + ϵikjt

τ =−6

where Yijt is the total number of toxic chemicals used for a well and as defined in Table 2.1. IDi is
an operator fixed effect, that captures any heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through
time and affects the decision to use toxic chemical. BYtj is a geographical-time fixed effect, that
regroups within the same year, wells that are in the same basin, the same state as well as the same
latitude and longitude unit (equivalent to 60 by 60 miles square). Figure B.5 maps the different
regions that are used to construct the 60 by 60 miles square. Finally, GEO_coarsek is a fixed effect
that regroups wells within the same first two digits of the latitude and longitude -equivalent to a 7
miles to 4 miles square-. To illustrate this grouping, Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color
if they have the same first two digits of latitude and longitude and if they are situated in one half
of the Marcellus formation. controlsit includes the production of oil and gas of the well, its vertical
depth and horizontal length. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and confidence intervals
at the 5% level are reported.
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Figure B.7: Role Of EPS Targets On Toxic Chemicals
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Note: This figure plots the estimates (qτ )τ =1,...,9 of the following regression:

Yijt = Firmi + Locationj × Yeart +

9
X

qτ .(τ decile of the forecast errors)it + controlsijt + ϵijt

τ =1

The variable (τ decile of the forecast errors)it is constructed as follow. We first calculate the differences between the average one year forecast of earning per share (EPS) made by analysts and
the realized one. This provides us a measure of how accurate the analysts forecast were. Then, we
take the decile of the errors for each year-firm observations. (τ decile of the forecast errors)it is a
dummy that is equal to one if the project i made at time t belongs to a firm that has an error of
EPS forecast that belongs to the quantile τ . The horizontal bar separates errors where analysts are
wrong because they anticipate a higher EPS than the realized one (left side) from the cases where
they anticipate a lower EPS than the realized one (right side).
The rest of the variables are the same as before. Namely, Yijt is the total number of toxic chemicals
used for a well and as defined in Table 2.1. Firmi is an operator fixed effect, that captures any
heterogeneity at the firm level that is constant through time and affects the decision to use toxic
chemical. Locationj is a geographical fixed effect, that regroups all wells that have the same first 2digit longitude and latitude. To illustrate this grouping, Figure B.4 plots the wells with a same color
if they have the same first two digits of latitude and longitude and if they are situated in one half
of the Marcellus formation. This location fixed effect is interacted with a year Fixed effect (Yeart ).
controlsit includes the production of oil and gas of the well, its vertical depth and horizontal length
as well as the realized EPS. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and confidence intervals
at the 5% level are reported.
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Figure B.8: Pollution for Firms Close to Bankrupty
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Note: This figure reports the yearly average of the number of toxic chemicals (Panel A) and the
fraction of wells flared (panel B) within firms that file for bankruptcy chapter 11 in an event study
around the year of filing.
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Table B.1: Reporting
2010
Wyoming

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Louisiana
Michigan
Montana
Texas

Colorado
Idaho
Indiana
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Dakota

Alabama
Arkansas
Kansas
Mississippi
Nebraska
Tennessee
Utah

Alaska
California
Illinois
Nevada
West Virginia

Kentucky
North Carolina

Note: This Table shows the year when reporting to FracFocus became mandatory.

220

Table B.2: Results On Marginal Wells
Panel A: Marginal well within the firm
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post deal
Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE

-0.183∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.174∗∗∗
(0.062)

-0.268∗∗∗
(0.066)

-0.162∗∗∗
(0.040)

134551
X
X
X

133301
X
X
X

130848
X
X
X

128572
X
X
X

Panel B: Marginal well within the basin
(1)
Post deal
Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE

Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(2)
(3)

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.219∗∗∗
(0.065)

-0.297∗∗∗
(0.096)

134512
X
X
X

130566
X
X
X

128078
X
X
X

Note: This table replicates the baseline regressions after dropping projects that are in places that
could create an endogeneity problem. Panel A drops project from PE-backed firms that are in their
of projects in basin j for firm i
main region of activity. Specifically, I first calculate the variable C= Number
.
Total number of project of firm i
If the ratio C is low, then it implies that this basin is a marginal location for the PE firm and is
therefore less likely to be the main reason for which a PE bought the company in the first place. I
take different threshold value for what “low” means. Equation (1) drops firms that drill in only one
location (ratio=1). Equation (2) estimates the baseline relationship on locations that account for
less than 0.77 of the total firm project (.77 is the 75th percentile of the ratio C). Equation (3) does
the same but with a threshold equals to .21 (median of the ratio C) and equation 4 for .11 (25th
percentile of ratio C).
Finally,
Panel B replicates the exercise but with a different ratio M=
Number of projects in basin j for firm i
Total number of project in basin j . The intuition of panel B is to drop projects in basins where the
PE backed firm accounts for a large fraction of the local projects. The thresholds for M are 0.085,
0.046 as well as 0.01 and corresponds to the 75th, 50th and 25h percentile. Equation (1) drops
projects located in basin(s) where M is above 0.085, equation (2) when M is above 0.046 and
equation (3) drops all projects located in basin(s) where M is above 0.46.
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Table B.3: Controlling for Confidential Reporting
Panel A: Baseline results and confidential reporting
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
PE deal with control rights
Drillco (no control rights)

Post deal
Controls
Firm FE
Basin × Year FE
Location × Year FE
Confidential
Adjusted R2
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.188∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.178∗∗∗
(0.055)

-0.205∗∗∗
(0.036)

-0.196∗∗∗
(0.038)

-0.028
(0.045)

-0.041
(0.048)

-0.003
(0.042)

-0.034
(0.043)

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
0.57
135544

X
0.35
21433

X
0.37
21423

X
X
0.57
135728

0.45
28581

X
0.49
28575

0.56
135554

0.55
135738

Panel B: Natural experiment
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
Net effect
Full interactions

Beta
Observations
R2
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.354∗∗∗
(0.065)

0.285∗∗∗
(0.067)

0.314∗∗∗
(0.059)

0.252∗∗∗
(0.059)

0.386∗∗∗
(0.089)

0.316∗∗∗
(0.087)

0.329∗∗∗
(0.085)

0.257∗∗∗
(0.082)

135738
0.60
X

135257
0.67
X
X

135728
0.61
X

135246
0.68
X
X

135738
0.60
X

135257
0.67
X
X

135728
0.61
X

135246
0.68
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

Note: Panel A contains the baseline specifications where the number of confidential items reported
is taken into account. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) adds the total number of confidential items
reported for a well as a linear control. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) include a dummy for each
number of confidential items. Column (1), (2) (4) and (5) are estimated on the full sample, whereas
column (3), (4) (7) and (8) use the matching sample. Columns (1) to (4) measure the impact of PE
ownership, whereas columns (5) to (8) evaluate the effect of PE DrillCo. Panel B contains regressions
that perform the same exercise on the natural experiment. Beta stands for the coefficient: Federal
or Native American reservations well × Post deal × Post Injunction. The dependent variable is the
number of toxic chemicals. Column (1) to (4) are estimated when only the interaction is specified.
Column (5) to (8) presents the results where the full interactions is made, as in a triple differencein-differences. Columns (1), (3), (6) and (7) contains a firm FE, that is interacted with a year-FE
in column (2), (4), (6) and (8). Column (1), (2), (5), and (6) include as a control the number of
confidential items reported, and column (3), (4), (7) and (8) include this number as a fixed effect.
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Table B.4: Role Of Confidential Reporting
Panel A: Impact on confidential reporting (net effect)
Dependent variable: Number of inputs reported as confidential
PE deal with control rights
Drillco (no control rights)
Post deal
Controls
Firm FE
Basin × Year FE
Location × Year FE
Adjusted R2
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-4.328∗∗∗
(0.635)

-4.317∗∗∗
(0.630)

-3.420∗∗∗
(0.695)

-4.316∗∗∗
(0.788)

-4.327∗∗∗
(0.778)

-4.798∗∗∗
(0.854)

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
0.61
135554

X
0.61
135554

X
X
X

X
0.61
135554

X
0.61
135554

X
X
X

0.57
21433

0.46
28581

Panel B: Impact on confidential reporting (Natural experiment)
Dependent variable: Number of inputs reported as confidential
(1)
(2)
(3)
Federal or Indian well × Post deal × Post Injunction
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.994
(0.817)

0.992
(0.814)
X

X
X
135738
0.61

X
X
135738
0.61

(4)

0.205
(0.996)

0.213
(1.000)

X

X
X

X
135257
0.66

X
135257
0.66

Note: Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Panel A report the impact of PE ownership on the total
number of confidential items reported and columns (4), (5) and (6) of Panel A study the impact
of PE financing through DrillCo on the same outcome variable. Column (1) and (4) estimate the
relationship without controls, that are added in column (2) and (5). The coefficients remain stable
when the controls are added. Column (3) and (6) contain the results when the relationship is
estimated on the matched sample using a nearest neighbor matching (NNM) approach, both before
and after the deal at the project level. The matched sample is constructed as follow: for each
project that belongs to a firm that is acquired by a PE, we matched within the same geographical
area (basin) and year, the project that has the closest size (horizontal length and vertical depth) and
production (6 first months production of oil and gas). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Panel B investigates the impact of BLM fracking rule preliminary injunction and subsequent rescind
in a triple difference-in-differences on the number of confidential items reported. Specifically, the
dependent variable is regressed on all the interactions between the post acquired dummy, a dummy
for wells in federal lands or Native American reservations and a dummy for the period between.
Only the triple coefficient is reported. Column (1) and (3) do not include time-varying controls,
that are added in column (2) and (4). The controls are the same as the one used in Panel A. Column
(1) and (2) report the results with a location and year FE as well as a firm FE. Column (3) and (3)
add a year FE interacted with a firm FE.
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Table B.5: Controlling For Population And Housing Density In The Baseline Results
Panel A: PE ownership and control
(1)
Post deal
Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Housing FE
Population FE

Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(2)
(3)
(4) NNM (5) NNM (6) NNM

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.054)

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.053)

-0.209∗∗∗
(0.036)

-0.209∗∗∗
(0.035)

-0.212∗∗∗
(0.035)

135554
X
X
X

135554
X
X
X

135554
X
X
X
X
X

21433
X
X
X

21433
X
X
X

21433
X
X
X
X
X

Panel B: PE financing (DrillCo)
(1)

Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(2)
(3)
(4) NNM
(5) NNM
(6) NNM

Post deal

-0.037
(0.046)

-0.037
(0.046)

-0.038
(0.046)

-0.022
(0.048)

-0.020
(0.049)

-0.020
(0.047)

Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Housing FE
Population FE

135554

135554
X
X
X

135554
X
X
X
X
X

28581

28581
X
X
X

28581
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

Note: Panel A replicates the baseline results where housing and population of the census tract
where the well is located are added as controls. Column (1) and (4) adds the control in a linear way.
Column (2) and (5) add the controls by adding all interactions of the two variables and their squared
values. Column (3) and (6) add a decile fixed effect of the controls. Regressions from columns (1)
to (3) are estimated on the full sample and columns (4) to (6) on the matched sample. Panel B has
the same structure, except that the post variable takes the value 1 after a DrillCo deal.
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Table B.6: Controlling For Population And Housing Density In The Natural Experiment
Panel A: Natural experiment (net effect)
(1)

Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

beta

0.346∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.275∗∗∗
(0.064)

0.346∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.275∗∗∗
(0.064)

0.346∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.274∗∗∗
(0.065)

Observations
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Housing FE
Population FE

135738
X

135257
X
X

135738
X

135257
X
X

135738
X

135257
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Panel B: Natural experiment (full interaction)
(1)

Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

beta

0.383∗∗∗
(0.090)

0.309∗∗∗
(0.084)

0.383∗∗∗
(0.090)

0.309∗∗∗
(0.084)

0.382∗∗∗
(0.090)

0.308∗∗∗
(0.084)

Observations
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Housing FE
Population FE

135738
X

135257
X
X

135738
X

135257
X
X

135738
X

135257
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Note: Panel A and B contains the estimations of the natural experiment. Panel A reports the
net effect when only the triple interaction term beta is included, and panel B reports the triple
difference-in-differences estimates where all the intermediary interactions are included. Beta stands
for the coefficient Federal lands or Native American reservations $\times$ Post deal $\times$ Post
Injunction. Column (1) and (2) add the control housing and population density of the census tract
where the well is located in a linear way. Column (3) and (4) add as a control the full interaction
terms with their square value to capture any non-linearity effect. Finally, column (5) and (6) add
the decile of housing and population density as a fixed effect. Column (2), (4), (6), (8) include a
firm interacted with a year fixed effect and column (1), (3), (5) and (7) a firm fixed effect.
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Table B.7: Sorting on population
Panel A: Baseline effect
PE ownership
(1)
Post deal
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

-2.114
(1.681)

PE drillco

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-2.088
(1.684)

-1.164∗

-1.149∗

(0.665)

(0.667)

-1.160
(2.683)

-1.313
(2.701)

0.018
(1.025)

-0.037
(1.031)

X
X
X
135738
0.51

X
X
135738
0.51

X
X
X
135738
0.53

X
X
135738
0.53

X
X
X
135738
0.51

X
X
135738
0.51

X
X
X
135738
0.53

X
X
135738
0.53

Panel B: Natural experiment
Dependent variable: population

Beta
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

Dependent variable: housing

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

6.274
(8.208)

5.405
(6.767)

8.804
(7.889)

8.414
(7.084)

2.635
(3.522)

2.100
(2.821)

3.776
(3.399)

3.612
(2.956)

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
135738
0.51

X
135257
0.52

X
X
135738
0.51

X
135257
0.52

X
X
135738
0.53

X
135257
0.54

X
X
135738
0.53

X
135257
0.54

Note: Note: Panel A investigates whether PE-backed firms locate their wells in less populated area.
The dependent variable is the total population in the census tract for columns (1), (2), (5) and (6)
or the total number of housing units for columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). Column (1), (3), (5) and (7)
don’t contain controls that are added in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Columns (1) to (4) estimate
the relationship for PE contracts where there is a transfer of controls. Columns (5) to (8) estimate
the relationship for DrillCo contracts.
Panel B investigates the effect of the BLM shock for PE-backed firms on the population and housing
density where the well is located. Beta stands for . The dependent variable of columns (1) to (4) of
Panel B is the total population of the census tract where the well is located. The dependent variable
of columns (5) to (8) of Panel B is the number of housing units in the census tract where the well
is located. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7) include a firm fixed effect that is interacted with a year fixed
effect in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) report the net effect. The triple
difference-in-differences effect are contained in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8). Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
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Table B.8: Impact Of PE On Pollution: Other Definition Of Toxicity
Panel A: Net effect
Dependent variable: Number of toxic chemicals (EPA definition)
PE deal with control rights
Drillco (no control rights)
Post deal
Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Basin × Year FE
Location × Year FE

(1)

(2)

(3) NNM

(4)

(5)

(6) NNM

-0.089∗∗∗
(0.021)

-0.089∗∗∗
(0.021)

-0.080∗∗∗
(0.023)

0.028
(0.031)

0.027
(0.031)

0.033
(0.041)

135554

X

135738
X
X

X

X

21433
X
X
X

135738

X

135554
X
X

X

X

28581
X
X
X

Panel C: Natural experiment
Beta
Controls
Firm × Year FE
Firm FE
Location × Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.172∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.172∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.121∗∗∗
(0.030)

0.121∗∗∗
(0.030)

X

X
X

X
135071
0.82

X
135071
0.82

X
X
X
135554
0.80

X
X
135554
0.80

Note: The dependent variable is the number of toxic chemicals used in the production process,
where the toxicity is defined in another way as in the baseline regression. Columns (1), (2) and (3)
report the impact of PE ownership on pollution and columns (4), (5) and (6) study the impact of
PE financing through DrillCo contracts on pollution. Column (1) and (4) estimate the relationship
without controls, that are added in column (2) and (5). The coefficients remain stable when the
controls are added. Column (3) and (6) contain the results when the relationship is estimated on
the matched sample using a nearest neighbor matching (NNM) approach, both before and after the
deal at the project level. The matched sample is constructed as follow: for each project that belongs
to a firm that is acquired by a PE, we matched within the same geographical area (basin) and year,
the project that has the closest size (horizontal length and vertical depth) and production (6 first
months production of oil and gas).
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Table B.9: Pollution For Public Listed Firm
Effect of going public
Post IPO
Before IPO

Earnings forecasts

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.140∗
(0.077)

0.141∗
(0.077)

0.275∗
(0.143)
0.210
(0.211)

Under estimate
Over estimate
(mean) actual
Observations
Controls
Firm FE
Location × Year FE

135724
X
X

135724
X
X
X

135724
X
X
X

(4)

(5)

0.062∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.011
(0.088)
-0.013
(0.012)

0.062∗∗∗
(0.022)
-0.012
(0.088)
-0.013
(0.012)

53411

53411
X
X
X

X
X

Note: Equations (1), (2) and (3) estimate the impact of going public on the usage of toxic chemicals.
Relying on the Field-Ritter dataset, I identify 7 IPO between 2011 and 2019 that can be matched to
the sample: (1) Athlon Energy (2) Bonanza Creek Energy (3) Diamondback Resources (4) Extraction
oil & gas (5) Jagged Peak Energy (6) Kinder Morgan and (7) RSP Permian. Post IPO is a variable
that takes the value one after the firm went public. Similarly, Before IPO is a variable that takes the
value one three years before the IPO. Equations (4) and (5) investigate the magnitude of missing
the one-year EPS forecasts by analysts on the usage of toxic chemicals. The controls are defined as
in the previous specifications and include the realized EPS.
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APPENDIX
Appendix C: Chapter 3
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Table C.1: Balance tests with raw differences
This table is a more detailed version of the balancing tests in Table 3.2. Panel A contrasts individual
characteristics between treatment individuals who receive a payment above $50k between 2011 and
2015 versus the full control group (“All controls”) or the subset of control individuals who received
a payment below $50k. The differences between treated and each control group after controlling for
the fixed effects that are included in the regressions are reported under Adj Diff. Panel B (Panel
C) reports the same statistics after restricting the sample to people who are self-employed in 2010
(respectively individuals who are business owners as of 2010). The data on mineral payments is
constructed via open records request from Texas counties in the Barnett Shale, while all other data
is obtained from Experian individual and business credit data files. The variables are defined as
previously. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

A. Full sample:
Variable
Self-employed
Business owner
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people.

Treatment

All controls

2.34
2.34
69.00
3.61
61.12
61.04
740.23
471

1.99
0.64
69.91
3.75
58.43
52.82
703.98
169,733

Diff
0.344
1.692∗
-0.911
-0.145
2.689∗∗∗
8.217∗∗∗
36.248∗∗∗

Adj diff

All controls

-0.139
1.079
-4.414
-0.770
0.000
0.831
0.071

1.90
0.68
79.66
3.29
56.33
54.99
713.16
73,678

Diff
0.434
1.657∗
-10.657∗∗∗
0.319
4.794∗∗∗
6.045∗∗
27.068∗∗∗

Adj diff
-0.167
1.136
-7.522∗∗∗
-0.917
0.000
0.395
0.054

B. Self-employed in 2010:
Variable
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people

Variable
Having a mortgage
Retired
Age
W2 income
Credit score
Number of people

Group treated

Control group

63.64
0.00
62.36
79.45
775.64
11

68.38
0.00
61.38
56.26
700.96
3,381

Group treated

Control group

72.73
0.00
60.18
76.00
740.18
11

82.07
1.49
59.79
69.86
720.88
1,092

Diff

Adj diff

Low payment controls

-4.741
0.000
0.984
23.192∗
74.681∗∗∗

-10.900
0.000
0.000
11.114
0.368∗

77.3
0.000
59.1
59.92
713.79
1,401

C. Business Owner in 2010:
Diff

Adj diff

Low payment controls

-9.344
-1.494∗∗∗
0.394
6.141
19.300

-10.738
-0.357
0.000
1.681
0.419∗

84.18
0.88
58.84
72.97
723.06
500
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Diff
-17.297
0.000
1.901
21.384
62.107∗∗∗

Diff
-6.398
-0.879∗∗∗
1.340
3.030
17.120

Adj diff
-20.341
0.000
0.000
14.991
0.256

Adj diff
-14.579
2.931
0.000
9.85
0.400∗

Figure C.1: Self-employment (CPS) validation after controlling for unemployment
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The left figure plots the fraction of the workforce that is self-employed as reported by the Current Population
Survey (y-axis) compared to the Credit Bureau (x–axis), after controlling for the unemployment (from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics). The unit of observation is at the state-year level. The correlation between
the two variables is equal to 0.30. The right figure plots the fraction of the workforce that is self-employed
as reported by the American Community Survey (y-axis) compared to the Credit Bureau (x–axis), after
controlling for the unemployment (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The unit of observation is at the
state-year level. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.69.
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Figure C.2: Self-employment (CPS) validation after controlling for unemployment
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The left figure plots the fraction of the workforce that is self-employed as reported by the American Community Survey (y-axis) compared to the Credit Bureau (x–axis), after controlling for the unemployment (from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics). The unit of observation is at the state-year level. The correlation between
the two variables is equal to 0.69. The right figure plots the fraction of the workforce that is unemployed
(from the Bureau of Labor Statistics) (y-axis) compared to our measure of self-employment from Credit Bureau (x–axis). The unit of observation is at the state-year level. The correlation between the two variables
is equal to -0.35.
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Figure C.3: Analysis of the flows
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The left figure plots the fraction (over the active workforce) of the workforce that remained in their occupation
from one year to another one in the Credit Bureau (y-axis) to the yearly average fraction of people that
JobStayS
stayed in their job in the Job-to-Job Flows (J2J) Data ( ((MainB+MainE)/2)
) (x–axis). The unit of observation
is at the state-year level. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.47. The right figure
plots the yearly income of people that stayed in their job in the Job-to-Job Flows (J2J) Data (variable
JobStaySEarn_Orig) (y-axis) to the yearly income of people that stayed in their job in the credit bureau
data. The unit of observation is at the state-year level. The correlation between the two variables is equal
to 0.58.
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Figure C.4: Ethnicity of the treated group
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This histogram plots the estimated race of the people that sign an oil and gas lease. The race is found using
Nameprism, a classification algorithm using name embeddings.
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Figure C.5: Impact on income: self-employment
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of the dynamic double difference-in-differences
regression for the persons that receive a wealth shock and remain self-employed. The dependent variable is the W2 income provided by Experian. The specification includes all the
interaction between self-employed, high payment and post payment. The x-axis is the year
around the wealth windfall. The reference year is one year before the year when the bonus
payment received. Low wealth shock is any payment between 10 dollars and 50,000 dollars,
which implies a total payment of 1,922.101 on average.
Income for people that are self-employed and received the wealth windfall
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Figure C.6: Specification curves for inflows into entrepreneurship
For specifications that use the threshold of $100,000 as the cutoff for large payment, these
figures plot 64 estimated coefficients of the impact of wealth from the regressions of table
3.3.1, where different combinations of fixed effects and characteristics are reported. Panel
A reports the regression when the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person is
self-employed, 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated among persons that are initially not
self-employed in 2010. Panel B plots the regression when the dependent variable takes the
value 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated among
persons that are initially not business owners in 2010.
Panel A: Inflows into self-employment
Coefficients:
0
-.1
-.2
-.3
-.4
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table

p-value ≥ .10

Panel B: Inflows into business ownership
Coefficients:
2
1.5
1
.5
0
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table
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p-value ≥ .10

Figure C.7: Specification curve outflows from entrepreneurship specifications
For specifications that use the threshold of $100,000 as the cutoff for large payment, these
figures plot 64 estimated coefficients of the impact of wealth from the regressions of table
3.6, where different combinations of fixed effects and characteristics are reported. Panel A
reports the regression when the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person is selfemployed, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated in the sample of persons that are initially
self-employed in 2010. Panel B plots the regression when the dependent variable takes the
value 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated in the
sample of persons that are initially business owners in 2010.
Panel A: Outflows from self-employment
Coefficients:
0
-6
-12
-18
-24
-28
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table

p-value ≥ .10

Panel B: Outflows from business ownership
Coefficients:
50
40
30
20
10
0
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < .10
Coefficient in the table

237

p-value ≥ .10

Table C.2: Mineral windfalls and outflows from self-employment and business ownership Zip3 instead of Zip3 x year fixed effects (1/2)
This table estimates the effect of wealth windfalls on transitions from self-employment and business
ownership to regular employment. The dependent variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to
100 if an individual transitions into regular employment from self-employment (Panel A) or business
ownership (Panel B). The unit of observation is at the individual year level. The sample used in each
regression specification is based on the individuals in our study that are engaged in self-employment
in 2010 (Panel A) and business ownership in 2010 (Panel B). The regression estimations take the
form of a difference-in-differences estimation where the key coefficient of interest is an interaction
term P osti,t × Large paymenti . The direct effect of Large paymenti is subsumed by the individual
fixed effects. The fixed effects used are reported in the table, and the controls used are credit score,
debt-to-income, delinquencies, revolving credit utilization, mortgage dummy indicator, auto loan
dummy indicator, and collection dummy indicator. Standard errors are clustered by individual and
reported in parenthesis under the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

A. Flow out of self-employment:
Sample:

Full sample

Within treated

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Regular employmenti,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean Dep. Var.

-0.268
(0.794)
-15.056∗∗∗
(3.295)

20,304
.67
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.004
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-0.297
(0.792)
-20.371∗∗∗
(5.943)
20,304
.66
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.004

2.495∗∗
(1.193)
-13.337∗∗∗
(4.218)

8,411
.68
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.512

2.431∗∗
(1.188)
-16.167∗∗∗
(6.047)
8,411
.68
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
12.512

Table C.3: Mineral windfalls and outflows from self-employment and business ownership Zip3 instead of Zip3 x year fixed effects (2/2)
B. Flow out of business ownership:
Sample:

Full sample

Within treated

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dependent variable: Regular employmenti,t
Posti,t
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$50k)
Posti,t × Large paymenti (>$100k)
Person-year observations
R-squared
Individuali FE
Agei,t × yeart FE
ZIP3i,t
Income quantilei,t × yeart FE
Acre quantilei × yeart FE
Controlsi,t
Credit score centilei,t FE
Mean Dep. Var.

-2.235
(1.371)
0.821
(6.103)

6,568
.54
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.767
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-2.256∗
(1.364)
9.216
(16.867)
6,568
.54
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.767

-2.738
(1.974)
-3.754
(6.786)

3,023
.55
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.371

-2.831
(1.976)
1.735
(17.539)
3,023
.55
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
7.371

Figure C.8: Specification curve outflows from entrepreneurship – specifications, Zip3 fixed
effects
For specifications that use the threshold of $100,000 as the cutoff for large payment, these
figures plot 64 estimated coefficients of the impact of wealth from the regressions of Table
3.6, where different combinations of fixed effects and characteristics are reported. Instead
of using Zip3 x year fixed effects, these specifications use Zip3 fixed effects instead. Panel
A reports the regression when the dependent variable takes the value 100 if the person is
self-employed, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated in the sample of persons that are
initially self-employed in 2010. Panel B plots the regression when the dependent variable
takes the value 100 if the person is a business owner, 0 otherwise. This regression is estimated
in the sample of persons that are initially business owners in 2010.
Panel A: Outflows from self-employment
Coefficients:
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3 x Year FE
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < 0.10
Coefficient in the table

p-value ≥ 0.10

Panel B: Outflows from business ownership
Coefficients:
25
20
15
10
5
0
Controls:
Characteristics
Credit score centile FE
Acreage x Year FE
income quartile x Year FE
Zip3
Age x Year FE
id FE

p-value < 0.10
Coefficient in the table
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p-value ≥ 0.10
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